Key word "social contingency"
De Jaegher H. & Di Paolo E. A. (2008) Making sense in participation: An enactive approach to social cognition. In: Morganti F., Carassa A. & Riva G. (eds.) Enacting intersubjectivity: A cognitive and social perspective to the study of interactions. IOS Press, Amsterdam: 33–47. https://cepa.info/323
De Jaegher H. & Di Paolo E. A.
(
2008)
Making sense in participation: An enactive approach to social cognition.
In: Morganti F., Carassa A. & Riva G. (eds.) Enacting intersubjectivity: A cognitive and social perspective to the study of interactions. IOS Press, Amsterdam: 33–47.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/323
Research on social cognition needs to overcome a disciplinary disintegration. On the one hand, in cognitive science and philosophy of mind – even in recent embodied approaches – the explanatory weight is still overly on individual capacities. In social science on the other hand, the investigation of the interaction process and interactional behaviour is not often brought to bear on individual aspects of social cognition. Not bringing these approaches together has unfairly limited the range of possible explanations of social understanding to the postulation of complicated internal mechanisms (contingency detection modules for instance). Starting from the question What is a social interaction? we propose a fresh look at the problem aimed at integrating individual cognition and the interaction process in order to arrive at more parsimonious explanations of social understanding. We show how an enactive framework can provide a way to do this, starting from the notions of autonomy, sense-making and coordination. We propose that not only each individual in a social encounter but also the interaction process itself has autonomy. Examples illustrate that these autonomies evolve throughout an encounter, and that collective as well as individual mechanisms are at play in all social interactions. We also introduce the notion of participatory sense-making in order to connect meaning-generation with coordination. This notion describes a spectrum of degrees of participation from the modulation of individual sense-making by coordination patterns, over orientation, to joint sense-making. Finally, we discuss implications for empirical research on social interaction, especially for studies of social contingency.
Di Paolo E. A., Rohde M. & lizuka H. (2008) Sensitivity to social contingency or stability of interaction? New Ideas in Psychology, 26(2), 278294. https://cepa.info/4483
Di Paolo E. A., Rohde M. & lizuka H.
(
2008)
Sensitivity to social contingency or stability of interaction?
New Ideas in Psychology, 26(2), 278294.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4483
We introduce a series of evolutionary robotics simulations that address the behaviour of individuals in socially contingent interactions. The models are based on a recent study by Auvray, Lenay and Stewart [(2006) The attribution of intentionality in a simulated environment: The case of minimalist devices. In Tenth meeting of the association for the scientific study of consciousness, Oxford, UK, 23–26 June, 2006] on tactile perceptual crossing in a minimal virtual environment. In accordance, both the empirical experiments and our simulations point out the essential character of global embodied interaction dynamics for the sensitivity to contingency to arise. Rather than being individually perceived by any of the interactors, sensitivity to contingency arises from processes of circular causality that characterise the collective dynamics. Such global dynamical aspects are frequently neglected when studying social cognition. Furthermore, our synthetic studies point out interesting aspects of the task that are not immediately obvious in the empirical data. They, in addition, generate new hypotheses for further experiments. We conclude by promoting a minimal but tractable, dynamic and embodied account to social interaction, combining synthetic and empirical findings as well as concrete predictions regarding sensorimotor strategies, the role of time-delays and robustness to perturbations in interactive dynamics.
McGann M. & De Jaegher H. (2009) Self-other contingencies: Enacting social perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6: 463–483. https://cepa.info/783
McGann M. & De Jaegher H.
(
2009)
Self-other contingencies: Enacting social perception.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6: 463–483.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/783
Can we see the expressiveness of other people’s gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question: What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action (perception is action and action is perception), an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies, that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure – both constrain and empower – social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed. Relevance: This paper provides an outline of an approach to social perception grounded in sensorimotor and enactive approaches, particularly the participatory sense-making approach of De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007). It also provides links between enactive approaches to social activity and the constructivist views of cultural psychologists such as Jerome Bruner.
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