The paper recalls some skeptical comments Norbert Wiener made regarding the potential use of cybernetics in social sciences. A few social scientists were seduced by cybernetics from the beginning, but cybernetics never really caught on in sociology. The paper argues that one reason for this may lie in the mathematical theory of communication entertained by early cybernetics. This theory which maintains that there are probability distributions of possible communication is at odds with the sociological theory’s idea of a communication driven by improbable understanding. Yet the move from first-order cybernetics to second-order cybernetics, by re-entering the observer into the very systems she observes, provides for a bridge between cybernetics and sociology.

Key words: Communication, culture, cybernetics, double closure, observer, sociology, technology, understanding

The paper deals with Aristotelian logic as the special case of more general epistemology and sociology of both science and common sense. The Aristotelian principles of identity, of noncontradiction, and of excluded middle are to be supplemented by the secondorder cybernetic, or cybernEthic principles of paradox, of ambivalence, and of control. In this paper we collect some ideas on how to evaluate the scope of Aristotelian logic with respect to the laws of thought they tried to determine and to do so within the historical moment of the impact of the invention of writing possibly triggering this determination. We look at some modern doubts concerning these laws and discovering an understanding of complexity that is not to be resumed under any principle of identity. The invention of sociology, epistemology, and the mathematics of communication follow suit in focusing not only on the observer but more importantly on the distinction between observers to further contextualize any talk of identities and operationalize both talk and fact of contradiction, paradox, and ambivalence.

Key words: Aristotle, Spencer-Brown, distinction, form, logic, mathematics, pistemology, sociology

Open peer commentary on the article “Systems Theory and Algorithmic Futures: Interview with Elena Esposito” by Elena Esposito, Katrin Sold & Bénédicte Zimmermann. Abstract: Elena Esposito’s interview is a great opportunity to ponder on the applications of Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory to current social themes. Among these, I consider the meaning of a theory of society in sociology, the value of critical theory, and the use of algorithms in communication. I differ from Esposito regarding my views on these topics, in that she seems hesitant to make a clear statement regarding the constructivist stance of systems theory’s proposals, in contrast with other approaches.

Purpose: The paper discusses possible implications of Heinz von Foerster’s notion of second‐order cybernetics for management thinking. The purpose of this paper is to outline challenges of as well as prospective further developments for management theory that emanate from second‐order cybernetics. Design/methodology/approach – As a conceptual paper, the paper tries to develop its findings through theoretically applying von Foerster’s insights to management thinking’s conventional assumptions. When looking for applications of von Foerster’s approach within the social sciences, at least in german‐speaking countries one sooner or later comes across Niklas Luhmann’s system sociology. Hence, Luhmann’s version of the theory of the observer is introduced and its take on organization and management is briefly outlined. Drawing upon von Foerster’s and Luhmann’s reflections, possible implications for management thinking are presented – ideas that might be disagreeable for “classical” management science but might set out a path for further developments of management thinking. Findings: What difference might second‐order cybernetics (and autopoietic systems sociology) make for management thinking? As a conclusion, deliberately poignant statements are formulated, calling for a higher degree of self‐reflection, for critical readings of conventional texts, for more complex descriptions of organizations and for a more modest, low‐key take on management theory’s endeavours. Originality/value – Whereas first‐order cybernetics has been fairly well‐received in management theory, second‐order cybernetics, which poses troubling questions to conventional epistemologies, remained relatively unpopular. Acts of “observing observers” reclaim these questions, possibly leading to valuable insights for researchers and reflected practitioners alike.

Purpose: The text searches for possible uses of a daring postulate to reject dualism, formulated by Josef Mitterer. Furthermore, it explores the inconsistencies of dualism and its remnants in three projects: Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism, the strong program of the sociology of knowledge, and radical constructivism. The final aim of the argument is to demonstrate that a very interesting incorporation of Mitterer’s postulates is possible, and that it must take the form of a consistent antiessentialism. At this point the article presents Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory. Findings: The article underlines the specific role of the so-called other side of the discourse – which, according to Mitterer is fabricated by the dualizing mode of speaking. Such an instance is a priori essentialized and it plays a crucial role as a tool for settling arguments. The text traces the role of this instance in the concepts mentioned above. Benefits: Through the use of Latour’s constructivism, the text indicates that there exists a fruitful empirical (non-speculative) research program, which was projected in accordance with Mitterer’s postulates.

Key words: criticism of dualism, anti-essentialism, neopragmatism, strong programme, radical constructivism, actor-network theory

Excerpt: The capacity to engage in collective intentionality is a key aspect of human sociality. Social coordination might not be distinctive of humans – various nonhuman animals engage in forms of cooperative behavior (e.g., hunting together) – but humans seem to possess a specific capacity for intentionality that enables them to constitute forms of social reality far exceeding anything that can be achieved even by nonhuman primates. During the past few decades, collective intentionality has been discussed under various labels in a number of empirical disciplines including social, cognitive, and developmental psychology, economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, ethology, and the social neurosciences. Despite all this work, however, many foundational issues remain controversial and unresolved. In particular, it is by no means clear exactly how to characterize the nature, structure, and diversity of the we to which intentions, beliefs, emotions, and actions are often attributed. Is the we or we-perspective independent of, and perhaps even prior to, individual subjectivity, or is it a developmental achievement that has a firstand second-person-singular perspective as its necessary precondition? Is it something that should be ascribed to a single owner, or does it perhaps have plural ownership? Is the we a single thing, or is there a plurality of types of we?

Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: Psychology and sociology are distinct academic disciplines but nevertheless closely interrelated. What are the benefits of conceptual integration using a cybernetic approach and what are the strengths of progressing within the disciplinary paths?

Critical criminology and radical constructivism are frequently regarded as an impossible pair – or, at least, as a rather schizophrenic one. This is so, notably, because radical constructivism rests on the (paradoxical) abandonment of what Jean-Francois Lyotard named meta-recits. It rests on the refusal to distinguish between the phenomenal and the symbolic, and thus implies the complete vanishing of the classical difference between ontology and epistemology. This would consequently deprive criminology (or, more generally, the social sciences) of any anchoring point enabling a critical utterance. The present contribution’s thesis is that, on the contrary, radical constructivism can catalyze critical criminology. Among the possible contributions of a radically constructivist sociology of criminalization, this paper focuses on: its call for a reworking of the concept of social control, which avoids problems related to its contemporary usage; its focus on power and force, in a way which avoids Foucaultian perspectives’ aporetic elements, and problematizes every instance of legitimized authoritarian practices.

In the last years, we observed a proliferation of the term constructivism in disciplines such as Psychology, Education, Sociology and Philosophy of Mind. Nervertheless, if we took this concept in its strict sense, as the position that defends an active role of the subject in his relation with knowledge object and in the construction of their reality representations, we see that several positions self-named constructivists adopts theories that contradicts the spirit of this philosophical tradition. This article makes a brief investigation on the most influential contemporary uses of this term, like Piagetian Constructivism, Social Construcionism, Social Constructivism and Radical Constructivism. It concludes that these last three currents are not strict sense constructivists, because they dissolve the epistemic subject. After that, it demonstrates that Constructivism does not implicate idealism, and that the Critical Rationalism and Piagetian Constructivism are the legitimate representatives of the constructivist tradition that, adhering to realism, behold in Modern Science field.

Key words: epistemology, constructivism, social constructivism, radical constructivism, critical rationalism.

Excerpt: From its inception in 1971 as a cybernetic theory of biological form, to its current presence on research fronts extending from immunology to Earth system science to sociology, from geobiology, artificial life, and cognitive science to a range of literary and cultural theories, the concept of autopoiesis has developed on the margins, not in the strongholds, of mainstream Anglo-American science. It may be that its persistent Continental and countercultural vogue has made it suspect there, and also, that its outsider status within this scientific academy has increased its extrascientific traffic. Additionally, as a recent Italian commentator has pointed out, “autopoiesis originated in a time-window (the early 1970s) when the world of biology was completely dominated by a vision of DNA and RNA as the holy grail of life. Alternative views about the mechanism of life didn’t have much chance of appearing in mainstream journals” (Luisi, “Autopoiesis” 179). The concept of autopoiesis is interesting, then, for its multifarious cultural history, itinerant discursive career, and contrarian stance. Moreover, it has been particularly important for enabling microbiologist Lynn Margulis to outline a second-order form of Gaia theory (see Clarke, “Neocybernetics”). Here I will connect the conceptual linkage of autopoiesis and Gaia theory to the wider discourse of self-referential systems.