The paper recalls some skeptical comments Norbert Wiener made regarding the potential use of cybernetics in social sciences. A few social scientists were seduced by cybernetics from the beginning, but cybernetics never really caught on in sociology. The paper argues that one reason for this may lie in the mathematical theory of communication entertained by early cybernetics. This theory which maintains that there are probability distributions of possible communication is at odds with the sociological theory’s idea of a communication driven by improbable understanding. Yet the move from first-order cybernetics to second-order cybernetics, by re-entering the observer into the very systems she observes, provides for a bridge between cybernetics and sociology.

Key words: Communication, culture, cybernetics, double closure, observer, sociology, technology, understanding

The paper deals with Aristotelian logic as the special case of more general epistemology and sociology of both science and common sense. The Aristotelian principles of identity, of noncontradiction, and of excluded middle are to be supplemented by the secondorder cybernetic, or cybernEthic principles of paradox, of ambivalence, and of control. In this paper we collect some ideas on how to evaluate the scope of Aristotelian logic with respect to the laws of thought they tried to determine and to do so within the historical moment of the impact of the invention of writing possibly triggering this determination. We look at some modern doubts concerning these laws and discovering an understanding of complexity that is not to be resumed under any principle of identity. The invention of sociology, epistemology, and the mathematics of communication follow suit in focusing not only on the observer but more importantly on the distinction between observers to further contextualize any talk of identities and operationalize both talk and fact of contradiction, paradox, and ambivalence.

Key words: Aristotle, Spencer-Brown, distinction, form, logic, mathematics, pistemology, sociology

Purpose: The text searches for possible uses of a daring postulate to reject dualism, formulated by Josef Mitterer. Furthermore, it explores the inconsistencies of dualism and its remnants in three projects: Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism, the strong program of the sociology of knowledge, and radical constructivism. The final aim of the argument is to demonstrate that a very interesting incorporation of Mitterer’s postulates is possible, and that it must take the form of a consistent antiessentialism. At this point the article presents Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory. Findings: The article underlines the specific role of the so-called other side of the discourse – which, according to Mitterer is fabricated by the dualizing mode of speaking. Such an instance is a priori essentialized and it plays a crucial role as a tool for settling arguments. The text traces the role of this instance in the concepts mentioned above. Benefits: Through the use of Latour’s constructivism, the text indicates that there exists a fruitful empirical (non-speculative) research program, which was projected in accordance with Mitterer’s postulates.

Key words: criticism of dualism, anti-essentialism, neopragmatism, strong programme, radical constructivism, actor-network theory

Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: Psychology and sociology are distinct academic disciplines but nevertheless closely interrelated. What are the benefits of conceptual integration using a cybernetic approach and what are the strengths of progressing within the disciplinary paths?

Critical criminology and radical constructivism are frequently regarded as an impossible pair – or, at least, as a rather schizophrenic one. This is so, notably, because radical constructivism rests on the (paradoxical) abandonment of what Jean-Francois Lyotard named meta-recits. It rests on the refusal to distinguish between the phenomenal and the symbolic, and thus implies the complete vanishing of the classical difference between ontology and epistemology. This would consequently deprive criminology (or, more generally, the social sciences) of any anchoring point enabling a critical utterance. The present contribution’s thesis is that, on the contrary, radical constructivism can catalyze critical criminology. Among the possible contributions of a radically constructivist sociology of criminalization, this paper focuses on: its call for a reworking of the concept of social control, which avoids problems related to its contemporary usage; its focus on power and force, in a way which avoids Foucaultian perspectives’ aporetic elements, and problematizes every instance of legitimized authoritarian practices.

Contemporary debates in social disciplines are making increasing reference to theoretical concepts such as sociocybernetics and autopoiesis (Bailey, 1983, 1997, 2001; Bopry, 2007, Brier, 2005; Geyer, 1994, 1995, 2003; Glanville, 2004; Goldspink, 2001; Hernes & Bakken, 2003; Krippendorff, 1996; Letiche, 2007; Luhmann, 1996; Mingers, 2002b; Morgan, 1998; Scott, 1996, 2001b, 2003; Smith & Higgins, 2003; Umpleby, 2005; Van der Zouwen, 1997; Von Foerster, 2003; Von Glasersfeld, 1996). It becomes apparent from these debates that certain paradigm shifts are imminent not so much as a result of new knowledge, but rather as a result of new metaphors that present alternative perspectives for interdisciplinary corroboration. Thus far, debates on revisiting cybernetic concepts have largely been conducted in other social sciences disciplines such as sociology, politics and semiology, this despite the challenges a cocreational perspective poses for communication in general and for organisational communication specifically. This paper aims to raise the debate amongst communication scholars, especially since communication scholars are conspicuously absent in the social-scientific debates within other disciplines, and we are in danger of failing to challenge our own intellectual assumptions. As such, this paper discusses and explores the appropriateness and applicability of cybernetics and autopoiesis as contemporary theoretical approaches to the study of organisations as communicatively enacted entities. It attempts to identify some of the intellectual challenges posed by extending the boundaries of our conversations beyond our recognised metaphors and concepts. The purpose of this paper is to initiate dialogue among communication scholars that may resonate with the constructivist epistemology, and which constitutes both cybernetics and postmodernism. We argue that cybernetics in its entirety poses a challenge for the study of organisations from a communication perspective. We argue, as Geyer (1995) has done, that it may be an intellectually challenging exercise to reposition the current modern and postmodern organisational metaphors within a single new emerging metaphor: the schismatic metaphor.

Autopoietic enactivism (AE) has over the last two decades undoubtedly been at the forefront of the “embodiment revolution” in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It has developed a “radical” and influential account of embodiment which maintains that cognition is constitutively dependent on the living body. AE presents a naturalist but non-reductive framework in which the body can be understood both as an autonomous system and subjective sense-making agent. According to AE this account should serve as the core basis from which to develop a truly embodied cognition paradigm worthy of challenging traditional cognitivism. The paper will present AE’s account of the body in order to examine and critically evaluate it. This evaluation will explore certain conceptual ambiguities and theoretical incongruences which are at the root of two difficulties for AE’s account: (i) it highlights a potential anthropocentric and anthropomorphic bias; and (ii) it is too abstract, synchronic, and does not pay sufficient attention to the historical, sociocultural dimension of embodiment. The paper concludes by drawing from recent work in the sociology of the body to both support this reading of AE and also as a possible means to improve on it.

Key words: anthropomorphism, enactivism, embodied cognitive science, embodiment, sense-making, the body multiple.

Context: Non-dualist philosophy is no longer novel. Arguing against the distinctions between thought and action, theory and practice, language and objects has been a staple of the debate for decades, and Josef Mitterer offers another approach to the problem. Problem: Non-dualist philosophy is beset by a problem: it is trying to argue against a separation of “ideas” from the life-world while staying exclusively on the side of ideas. It offers a philosophy seminar argument against the bread and butter of philosophy seminars. Results: The paper argues that non-dualism in practice should be represented not by philosophers but by everyday life sociologists; not by those who argue against theory and idealisms but by those who simply ignore them. Non-dualism, however, is a useful tool when theorists have to be confronted practically; this, I argue, is its value, and in this debate, non-dualism is welcome. It is, however, a value that should not be overstated.

Key words: Non-dualism, pragmatism, everyday life sociology, symbolic interaction, Erving Goffman, Herbert Blumer

The introduction of this article presents a sketch of the three main current versions of social constructivism (social epistemology, strong social constructivism, and social ontology) and of the historical background of social constructivism (Section Social Constructivism – Variants and Background). The following three sections outline these three approaches in some more detail and assess them briefly. Concerning social epistemology, veritistic and nonveritistic approaches to social epistemology are discussed (Sections Social Epistemology (Weak Social Constructivism), The Veritistic Approach to Social Epistemology, and Nonveritistic Approaches to Social Epistemology). Concerning strong social epistemology, views about ontology and the social are addressed (Sections Radical (Strong) Social Constructivism, Strong Social Constructivism and Ontology, and Strong Social Constructivism and the Social). And concerning social ontology, first a currently much debated specific example (social ontology in theories on international relations) and then the general approach to social ontology are characterized (Section Constructivism about the Social (Social Ontology), Constructivism and International Relations, and Nonveritistic Approaches to Social Epistemology).

Key words: actor network theory, constructivism, culture of knowledge, international relations, sociological analysis of science, social epistemology, social ontology, strong program of the sociology of science.

Modern organic metaphors for society have run parallel to the very idea of sociology as a science, starting with Comte and Spencer’s use of the term “social organism” (Comte, 1830–42; Spencer, 1897). These metaphors provide a self-renewing source of debate, analogies, and disanalogies. Processes of social regulation, conservation, growth, and reproduction provoke an irresistible epistemic resonance and make us lose little time in offering explanations resembling those of biological regulation, conservation, growth, and reproduction. The phenomenon has not been restricted to metaphor-hungry social scientists: the final chapter of W. B. Cannon’s The wisdom of the body (1932) is called “Relations of biological and social homeostasis.” Attempts to apply a modern theory of living organisms – the theory of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980) – to social systems are but the latest installment in this saga. Despite the appeal of the organic metaphor, there are good reasons to remain skeptical of these parallels. “Because every man is a biped, fifty men are not a centipede,” says G. K. Chesterton (1910) ironically in his essay against the medical fallacy. Doctors may disagree on the diagnosis of an illness, he says, but they know what is the state they are trying to restore: that of a healthy organism (implying, admittedly, a rather unproblematic concept of health). In social systems, a “social illness” confronts us with precisely the opposite situation: the disagreement is about what the healthy state should be.