Open peer commentary on the article “Assessing Subjective Processes and Vulnerability in Mindfulness-based Interventions: A Mixed methods Exploratory Study” by Sebastián Medeiros, Carla Crempien, Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati, Javiera Duarte, Catherine Andreu, Álvaro I. Langer, Miguel Ibaceta, Jaime R. Silva & Diego Cosmelli Sánchez. Abstract: I focus on the impact of mindfulness practice in the face of aversive experience and argue that it is more than merely changing one’s cognitive strategy. Shifting perspective instead may be rooted in an emergent qualitatively different subjective awareness of self and phenomena - leading to a different way of relating to any kind of experience.

The aim of this paper is to question the way one conceives the use of a specific theoretical approach (i.e., theories associated with the concept of complexity) in order to promote changes in educational practices and theories. The position I am adopting translates the conviction that any reform of thought has to be conceived in conjunction with a reflection about the idea of reform itself (Morin, 1999). It is therefore assumed that the use of the notion of complexity, to be critical and to bring significant changes, supposes not only to use a specific theoretical vocabulary, but also and above all to change the way scientific activity itself is conceived in order to bring about such a transformation. Following Edgar Morin’s constructivist and non-dualistic contribution, this paper discusses concepts such as program, strategy, prescription, interpretation, monoreferentiality and multireferentiality, in order to discuss researchers’ implication and the way they manage the relationships between the conditions of production of scientific discourses and the ″realities″ to which they are referring.

Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference to qualia and/or mental events. Today, when behaviorism is discussed at all, it is usually in a negative manner, either as an attempt to discredit an opponent’s view via a reductio, or by enabling a position to distinguish its identity and positive claims by reference to what it is (allegedly) not. In this paper, however, we argue that the ghost of behaviorism is present in influential, contemporary work in the field of embodied and enactive cognition, and even in aspects of the phenomenological tradition that these theorists draw on. Rather than take this to be a problem for these views as some have (e.g. Block, J Philos 102:259–272, 2005; Jacob, Rev Philos Psychol 2(3):519–540, 2011; O’Brien and Opie, Philos 43:723–729, 2015), we argue that once the behaviorist dimensions are clarified and distinguished from the straw-man version of the view, it is in fact an asset, one which will help with task of setting forth a scientifically reputable version of enactivism and/or philosophical behaviorism that is nonetheless not brain-centric but behavior-centric. While this is a bit like “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy, as Shaun Gallagher notes (in Philos Stud 176(3):839–8512019), with the shared enemy of behaviorism and enactivism being classical Cartesian views and/or orthodox cognitivism in its various guises, the task of this paper is to render this alliance philosophically plausible.

An important tenet of constructivism is that learning is an idiosyncratic, active and evolving process. Active learning, operationalized by cognitive, metacognitive, affective and resource management learning strategies, is necessary for students to effectively cope with the high level of demands placed on the learner in a constructivist learning environment. Case studies of two students detail contrasting passive and active learning behaviours. Examples of their strategic learning behaviours illustrate that having students involved in activities such as discussions, question answering, and seatwork problems does not automatically guarantee successful knowledge construction. The nature of students’ metacognitive knowledge and the quality of their learning strategies are seen to be critical factors in successful learning outcomes.

Key words: resource management, learning environment, active learning, learning outcome, learning strategy.

A series of articles has recently appeared in which implications of second-order cybernetics for the practice of family therapy have been discussed. In this article, we attempt to advance the discussion by addressing ideas that we think have not been adequately emphasized thus far. Specifically proposed are ideas about conditions that might facilitate the emergence of consciously pragmatic strategy informed by the kind of systemic wisdom that delicately balances natural systems without the benefit of human planning. It is argued that a shift in the personal habits of knowing and acting that typically organize individual human experience is required. After attempting to specify what this shift might involve, implications of these ideas for the practice of family therapy and for human action in general are discussed.

Radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological approach and the enactive approach. We propose that these two approaches can be brought together into a productive synthesis. The key is to recognize that the two approaches are pursuing different but complementary types of explanation. Both approaches seek to explain behavior in terms of the animal–environment relation, but they start at opposite ends. Ecological psychologists pursue an ontological strategy. They begin by describing the habitat of the species, and use this to explain how action possibilities are constrained for individual actors. Enactivists, meanwhile, pursue an epistemic strategy: start by characterizing the exploratory, self-regulating behavior of the individual organism, and use this to understand how that organism brings forth its animal-specific umwelt. Both types of explanation are necessary: the ontological strategy explains how structure in the environment constrains how the world can appear to an individual, while the epistemic strategy explains how the world can appear differently to different members of the same species, relative to their skills, abilities, and histories. Making the distinction between species habitat and animal-specific umwelt allows us to understand the environment in realist terms while acknowledging that individual living organisms are phenomenal beings.

Upshot: We respond to three main challenges that the commentaries have raised. Firstly, we clarify our misunderstood intention of introducing a newcomer to the neurophenomenological family. Rather, we situate our approach under the broader umbrella of phenomenology. Secondly, we argue that from our empirical position it is questionable that the strategy we pursued in the target article left the black box of consciousness completely closed. Thirdly, we argue that the subjective fluctuations that may appear as outcomes in an experimental paradigm are not to be considered with a resigned attitude but as valuable information to work with. We conclude our response by agreeing with the concerns of two of the commentators about extending the perspectives and plurality of the methods to investigate the explanatory gap problem.

Recent accounts of the relation between law and other social spheres have emphasized law’s “relative autonomy. ” The intui- tion behind the “relative autonomy” formula is that law is neither wholly independent of, nor entirely reducible to, political, eco- nomic and other social processes. Sensible as this intuition is, however, the idea of “relativeautonomy” by itself remainspurely negative. It excludes two unpalatableextremes-pure formalism and pure instrumentalism-butit does not by itself characterize, in positive theoreticalterms, the relation between law and other social discourses or practices. This Article examines an attempt in recent German social thought to specify theoretically the relation between law and other social spheres. The theory examined-Niklas Luhmann’s theory of “autopoiesis”-is,though familiar to Continentalread- ers, not yet well-known to American legal academics. This Arti- cle presents autopoietic theory to the American legal audience, with particularattention to the way in which Luhmann reformu- lates the “relative autonomy” problematic. Throughout, the Ar- ticle focuses on the connections between autopoietic theory and issues in American law and contemporaryAmerican legal theory. The Article’s strategy is to criticize those aspects of autopoietic theory that deserve criticism, but at the same time, to show how he theory might operate as a productive stimulus for American legal theorists.

In der jüngeren Sozialisationstheorie wird vermehrt die Intention formuliert, die Eigenaktivität des Subjektes im Sozialisationsprozess stärker zu berücksichtigen. Zum einen wird dies mit der Formel des ‘produktiv realitätsverarbeitenden Subjektes’ auf den Begriff gebracht, zum anderen bemüht sich insbesondere die kompetenzorientierte ‘konstruktivistische Sozialisationsforschung’ dieses Programm zu verfolgen. Dabei wird jedoch ein handlungstheoretisches Subjektverständnis bemüht, das eine begriffliche Unschärfe produziert, die eine konsistente Subjekttheorie und damit eine trennscharfe Bestimmung der Eigenaktivität des Subjektes erschwert. Um dieses Problem zu lösen, wird in dem Beitrag der Vorschlag gemacht, das Subjekt erkennt-nistheoretisch bzw. -kritisch zu konzipieren. Dadurch wird ein Subjektverständnis instruiert, das die Subjekt-Objekt-Dichotomie überwindet und die Wirklichkeit als je subjektives Konstrukt begreift Der Vorteil dieses zunächst heuristischen Vorschlages liegt einerseits in der Möglichkeit einer konsistenten Subjektbestimmung und andererseits in einer forschungsanleitenden Programmatik, die einen breiteren Zugang zu individuellen Entwicklungsverläufen ermöglicht. – English: From the “individual as a productive processor of reality” to the “individual as a productive producer of reality”. A philosophical foundation of theory of socialization. In recent theory of socialisation there is an increasing awareness giving more attention to the agency of subjects itself in the process of socialization. Direct indications about that change into the focus of theory of socialization are the often used formula of the “ individual as a productive processor of reality” or the programme of the constructivist research of socialization. In both cases still many problems are produced first of all through the idea of an action-theory based subject. One of the main theses in this article is that this understanding aggravates a consistent theory of subject in theories of socialization and so an unequivocal definition of agency of subjects. To solve that problems 1 suggest to conceptualise the subject epistemologically. The consequence of this strategy will offer a comprehension of the subject that is able to overcome the subject-object-dichotomy and to recognize “reality” as a construct made by subjects in a strict sense. On the one hand the advantage of this firstly heuristic proposal is the possibility to ascertain consistently the subject. On the other hand further research may be fruitful instructed because of the broader understanding of individual development. ||

In recent theory of socialisation there is an increasing awareness giving more attention to the agency of subjects itself in the process of socialization. Direct indications about that change into the focus of theory of socialization are the often used formula of the “individual as a productive processor of reality” or the programme of the constructivist research of socialization. In both cases still many problems are produced first of all through the idea of an action-theory based subject. One of the main theses in this article is that this understanding aggravates a consistent theory of subject in theories of socialization and so an unequivocal definition of agency of subjects. To solve that problems I suggest to conceptualise the subject epistemologically. The consequence of this strategy will offer a comprehension of the subject that is able to overcome the subject-object-dichotomy and to recognize “reality” as a construct made by subjects in a strict sense. On the one hand the advantage of this firstly heuristic proposal is the possibility to ascertain consistently the subject. On the other hand further research may be fruitful instructed because of the broader understanding of individual development.