Much scholarship in the history of cybernetics has focused on the far-reaching cultural dimensions of the movement. What has garnered less attention are efforts by cyberneticians such as Warren McCulloch and Norbert Wiener to transform scientific practice in an array of disciplines in the biomedical sciences, and the complex ways these efforts were received by members of traditional disciplines. In a quest for scientific unity that had a decidedly imperialistic flavour, cyberneticians sought to apply practices common in the exact sciences – mainly theoretical modeling – to problems in disciplines that were traditionally defined by highly empirical practices, such as neurophysiology and neuroanatomy. Their efforts were met with mixed, often critical responses. This paper attempts to make sense of such dynamics by exploring the notion of a scientific style and its usefulness in accounting for the contrasts in scientific practice in brain research and in cybernetics during the 1940s. Focusing on two key institutional contexts of brain research and the role of the Rockefeller and Macy Foundations in directing brain research and cybernetics, the paper argues that the conflicts between these fields were not simply about experiment vs. theory but turned more closely on the questions that defined each area and the language used to elaborate answers.

Key words: Cybernetics, Macy foundation, Neurophysiology, Rockefeller Foundation, Theoretical modeling, Warren S. McCulloch

Die gegenwärtige Konstruktivismus-Diskussion bietet in bezug auf den Wissenserwerb ein uneinheitliches und verwirrendes Bild. Aus diesem Grund werden drei Diskussionslinien in diesem Beitrag herausgearbeitet. Ausgehend von Fragen nach der Objektivität des Wissens und dessen Verhältnis zur Welt, nach der theoretischen Modellierung des Wissens, seiner kontextuellen und kulturellen Einbettung und schließlich nach den Möglichkeiten der Förderung des Wissenserwerbs werden drei Varianten unterschieden:(1) Konstruktivismus als Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie; (2) “Neuer” Konstruktivismus in der Soziologie, Kognitionswissenschaft und Psychologie; (3) konstruktivistische Ansätze in der Instruktionspsychologie und empirischen Pädagogik. Abschließend werden Schlußfolgerungen für die Psychologie des Wissenserwerbs gezogen. Englisch: As regards knowledge acquisition, the present discussion on constructivism is marked by a confusing diversity. Therefore, the authors attempt to identify three distinct lines of discussion. Based on questions concerning the objectivity of knowledge and its relation to the universe, the theoretical modeling of knowledge, its contextual and cultural embedding and, finally, possibilities of promoting knowledge acquisition, three different approaches are distinguished: (1) constructivism as epistemology and theory of science; (2) “new” constructivism in the fields of sociology, cognitive science, and psychology; and (3) constructivist approaches in educational psychology and empirical pedagogics. Finally, consequences for the psychology of knowledge acquisition are drawn.