Purpose: An attempt was made to establish a link between brief therapy a’ la MRI and Heinz von Foerster’s view of how we might conceive of and live in the world of our creation, at least in a social sense. Design/methodology/approach – The author relates how her encounter with Heinz von Foerster coincided with and further developed a way of thinking about and doing therapy which she found at the Mental Research Institute (MRI) in Palo Alto, California. She tries to show how Heinz the person has had a lasting effect on the way she conceives of and tries to conduct Brief Therapy a’ la MRI. Findings: She finds that using Heinz’s metaphor of dancing with the world quite useful in the elucidation of what therapy might be all about: how it might, metaphorically speaking, simply be about engaging a client or clients by dancing with them, allowing for the mutual creation of a new possibility. Originality/value – This paper was written to commemorate Heinz and for therapists in search of a therapeutic stance.

Key words: Cybernetics, therapists, philosophical concepts.

Context: For Graham Barnes, the starting point of his research was the observation that most psychotherapists are trained in a theory-centered style of practice, neglecting epistemological and hermeneutical aspects. The consequence is an absence of critical self-reflection about some basic assumptions of psychotherapy theories and clinical practices in the psychotherapy community. When using a particular theory, therapists forget that the theory is “using” them, as well, i.e., they are unaware of the effects the theory has on them and on their relationships with clients. As an alternative to this ignorance, Barnes developed the concept, research project and clinical application of what he called “second-order psychotherapy.” Problem: How can we encourage therapists to engage in systematic self-reflection on the influence of theory on the content and structure of their therapeutic conversations? Following Bateson’s epistemological guidelines, we give an example of how our conversation about understanding his ideas includes conversation about our understanding of the conversation about an understanding of his ideas. Method: Bateson created a new didactic form of dialogical presentation to facilitate the understanding of knowing, called a metalogue, in which the content and the structure of the conversation are intertwined in such a way that it becomes more transparent how the metalevel of relationships between the speakers influences the content and vice versa. Results: By presenting our dialogues as an exemplary metalogue, we propose that metalogues could be a valuable didactic way for promoting epistemological and constructivist teaching and learning, not only for psychotherapists, but for all professionals who need better understanding of their understanding. This second-order understanding opens the space for the inclusion of self-reflection on our relationship (and its evolution) and how our relationship has shaped our understanding. Implications: Our proposal is also meant as an encouragement for contemporary constructivist thinkers to continue to reflect on Bateson’s contribution to the foundation and evolution of constructivism.

Key words: Cybernetic epistemology, second-order psychotherapy, dialogotherapy, self-referential awareness, understanding, difference, schizophrenia, double bind, innocence

Three central themes of Maturana’s work – autopoiesis, the biology of cognition, and cybernetic ontology – are examined. Evidence is offered that Maturana’s treatment of these themes is either unoriginal or flawed. The uncritical acceptance of Maturana’s work by family therapists raises questions about the maturity of their discipline, especially in so far as many practitioners claim an understanding of cybernetics.

Purpose: What is therapy? Which would be today Heinz von Foerster’s answer? The authors try to unveil the mystery of an answer coming from a conversation among them. They think that Heinz von Foerster, like Gregory Bateson, was one of the most influential philosopher of therapy. In the paper they analyse some very basic key words – like trivial machine, human becoming – and key concepts – like “broaden the field of possible” – in order to understand if there is an order or a purpose in doing therapy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is a confrontation between epistemology and therapy. The trick is that, unlike von Foerster, the authors are therapists. So probably their conversation will not be reliable. But usually therapists, in doing therapy, do not look for reliability. They try to be accountable, which is a different issue. Findings: Probably therapy is a language game. If yes, the language game of therapy is a trick without a trickster. A map in a stranger land. That can be considered the main finding which follows from von Foerster’s thought. Practical implications: Nevertheless, such a wrong map sometimes could help who is lost, provided that map and territory will never be the same thing. Originality/value – The original value of the paper is, first of all that it can be considered the last essay written by Gianfranco Cecchin before his death. In the very last period of his life Cecchin was considering and sounding a new perspective for therapy. Pietro Barbetta and Dario Toffanetti were working with him in therapy and theoretically to find new frames for therapies in the post-modern era.

Key words: cybernetics, ethics.

Criticizes H. R. Maturana and F. J. Varela’s (1980) proposition that the passion to change others is not just ethically wrong but essentially impossible. Maturana argued that since reality is observer-dependent, no knowledge about an objective reality is possible. Maturana also stated that the behavior of people is not a purposeful accommodation to the environment but a manifestation of internal structure. It is suggested that Maturana’s distinction between organization and structure is not incompatible with the idea that the therapist may purposefully structure the therapeutic environment to encourage a family to change in a given direction. It is concluded that the passion to change others is intrinsically constitutive of the therapist and that even Maturana is a closeted agent of change in his effort to shift the thinking of family therapists.

I outline five criteria for an enactive account of intersubjectivity. First, it should do justice to social interaction processes and to subjectivity in its experiential, bodily, existential, and historico-sociocultural complexity. Second, an integrative intersubjectivity framework should connect physiological, neural, interactional, linguistic, and societal aspects and levels of explanation. This requires concepts and methodologies that span several different disciplines. Third, it should encourage applications and dialogue with experts in other sectors, such as teachers and therapists. Fourth, it should recognize the values that underlie it, so it can serve critical awareness of how it influences and is influenced by societal institutions and norms. Finally, because its subject matter is the ways in which people understand and deal with each other, it should be prepared to deal with ethical questions and dimensions. Then, I investigate how the state of the art in enactive intersubjectivity research fares in the face of these criteria.

Key words: social interaction, subjectivity, experience, connection, interacting, autonomy, sense-making, participatory sense-making, social understanding, constitutive factor

Barbara Held has taken postmodern therapists to task for making “reality claims” when they have presumably committed themselves to an antirealist epistemology. She is concerned that by focusing so exclusively on individual client narratives, they ignore important aspects of the client’s “extralinguistic” world. Held suggests that constructivist therapists adopt a “modest realism” within which they could (a) tailor therapy methods to individual clients, (b) further systemize therapeutic principles, (c) give extralinguistic reality its due, and (d) make truth claims. The authors argue that the problems she identifies derive largely from the distinctions with which she insists on framing the debate. They agree that constructivists are not always crystal clear about the implications of their epistemology, but it would accomplish little if they were to retreat to the realist posture she proposes.

Discusses H. R. Maturana’s (1980) theory of structure determinism and the implications of this theory for family therapy. Propositions of Maturana’s theory are outlined, and implications for the understanding of causality, descriptions of life’s purposes, and clinical practice are described. Maturana’s theory suggests that all problems are in language and that symptoms cannot be seen as having objective meanings or absolute purposes. Another implication is that family therapists cannot speak to families, but only to an individual or to several individuals. The operation of Alcoholics Anonymous is offered as an illustration of Maturana’s theory. It is concluded that a future challenge for family therapists is to shed the myth that they directly instruct, change, control, treat, or cure people.

If family therapists remain aware of the indivisible and recursive nature of their interactions with families, and if they use this awareness to form a collaborative rather than a hierarchical therapeutic system, and at the same time minimize their attempts to change persons or family structures in strategic or predetermined ways, then they may be said to be practicing a “second-order” family therapy. This article analyzes the development of the second-order position on therapist power and influence, concluding that it is inconsistent and possibly disingenuous.

The doctrine of constructivism, which pays much attention to meaning, has itself a meaning within psychotherapy that has not received sufficient attention by the therapists who have adopted it. To remedy this problem, I first show how an antirealist epistemology (i.e., the knower makes rather than discovers reality) defines constructivism as well as the variant of it known as social constructionism. I then argue that the antirealism of constructivism and social constructionism is subverted when therapists use those doctrines to make clainis about the real workings of therapy; I explain how the word construct is behind much of the confusion. Finally, I give reasons for the rise of antirealism in therapy and maintain that the problem generating that trend can be solved not by an appeal to antirealism, but by a clearer understanding of the nature and use of theoretical systems in therapy.