On the 50th anniversary of its publication, we look back on some of the intellectual contributions of Gibson’s (1966) The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. This work is often seen as contributing a new perspective to our understanding of the 5 senses. In this paper, we explore another intellectual contribution: Gibson’s treatment of perception–action as an irreducible, functional system. We review select examples of systems thinking from the physical, animal, and human social domains. Our suggestion is that a systems-level approach to social interactions would have been a natural extension of Gibson’s ideas.
Ataria Y., Lahad M. & Horovitz O. (2019) Applying the Neurophenomenological Approach to the Study of Trauma: Theory and Practice. Constructivist Foundations 14(2): 197–214. https://cepa.info/5775
Context: Although trauma research has advanced immensely, the struggle to find effective treatment for posttraumatic survivors continues. It seems reasonable to say that, at present, our ability to treat those suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is, at the very least, limited. Problem: We argue that in order to confront the current crisis in the study of trauma - evidenced by our limited ability to offer successful treatment for those who develop PTSD - we must return to the subjective experience. Our claim is that only by applying a rigorous method to study the subjective experience will we be able to understand the meaning of neuronal activity associated with PTSD. Method: The neurophenomenological research program (NRP) is a working plan that enables us to create a solid and reliable link between the subjective experience and neuronal activity. Thus, the NRP allows us to (a) delve deeply (and rigorously) into the subjective experience and, by so doing, (b) extract the cognitive mechanism that constitutes the building blocks bridging between the subjective experience and neuronal activity. Following this, we will be able to (c) identify the relevant neuronal activity for the phenomenon under examination. Results: Based on previous studies among posttraumatic survivors, we suggest that two cognitive mechanisms are especially relevant for the study of trauma: the sense of body ownership (i.e., the sense that this is our own body) and the sense of agency (the sense that we control our body. The trade-off between these closely related, yet independent mechanisms is highly significant. We conclude the article with the presentation of a detailed working plan for the study of trauma - one that begins with the subject and returns to the subject. Implications: This article summarizes our struggle to conduct a phenomenological research in the study of trauma and our methodological efforts of the last ten years. It should help the beginner to avoid some mistakes that have been made in this long journey, yet obviously, each one must build their own route. Likewise, we suggest that phenomenologists, brain scientists and clinicians should find a way to cooperate. This shared effort might allow us to improve our understanding of the traumatic experience and its long-term implications; as such, we believe that in this process a better treatment could be developed. That being said, the limitation of our proposal is the difficulty of creating a shared language that bridges these different worlds. Constructivist content: We strongly embraces phenomenological approach together with enactivist/embodied theories.
The classical formulation of the object of ethics refers to a knowledge of the rules of the adaptation of the human species to their natural environments, to normative expectations supposed in the others and to the biographical evolution of the self. Accordingly, a doctrine of the duties was edified on three pillars, embracing a reference to the duties towards nature, towards the others and towards oneself. Notwithstanding the fact that human action obeys to a variety of factors including bio-physiological conditions and the dimensions of the social environment, ancient and modern metaphysical models of ethics favored the commendatory discourse about the predicates “right” and “wrong,” concurring to ultimate goals. The ethical discussions consisted chiefly in the investigation of the adequacy of the subordinate goals to the final ends of the human action or in the treatment of the metaphysical questions related to free will or determinism, the opposition of the intentionality of the voluntary conduct of man to the mechanical or quasi-mechanical responses of the inferior organisms or machines. From a “second order” approach to the ethical action and imperatives, I propose with this book a critical analysis of the metaphysical and the Kantian ethics. Relevance: In “Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics” (1992) Heinz von Foerster referred the importance of the application of his notion of “second-order cybernetics” to ethics and moral reasoning. Initially, second-order cybernetics intended an epistemological discussion of recursive operations in non-trivial machines, which were able to include in their evolving states their own self-awareness in observations. The application of his views to ethics entails new challenges. After H. von Foerster essay, what I mean with “second-order ethics is an attempt to identify the advantages of the adoption of his proposal, some consequences in the therapeutically field and lines for new developments.
Beeson I. (2009) Information in organizations: Rethinking the autopoietic account. In: Magalhães R. & Sanchez R. (eds.) Autopoiesis in organizations and information systems. Emerald, Bingley: 185–199.
Excerpt: The rejection of the notion of information, as ordinarily understood, in the theory of autopoiesis, presents problems to theories of organization rooted in ideas of information, control, system, and communication. But the rejection seems well founded if the idea of a self-producing organism is taken seriously. There are various ways of trying to resolve the issue. We can say that autopoiesis cannot be extended to “third-order unities” (societies and organizations), so that its strictures are irrelevant, even if the autopoietic account can be useful metaphorically. Luhmann’s solution is to work out a full-blown autopoietic account of social systems in which the selfproducing entities are not individual human beings but communications. This is elegant, but discards autopoiesis’s biological foundation and so breaks the connection with living in the world. A reworking of ideas of information and communication using theories from pragmatics takes us closer to the autopoietic view by switching focus from stored information and instructive interaction toward a cooperative search for meaning and relevance. Such an approach, however, remains epistemologically focused (on how knowledge is exchanged), while (as Dell suggests) autopoiesis is oriented ontologically (toward existing and what exists). A more radical reworking of the idea of information taken from Gibson’s perceptual theory has therefore been suggested as more compatible with autopoiesis. In terms of the design and interpretation of organizations and organizational systems, an autopoietic account, coupled with a pragmatic approach to communication and a Gibsonian treatment of information pickup, would shift focus (and effort) away from information storage, control, and abstraction toward richer forms of interaction and awareness. While the message of organizational closure from autopoiesis has been taken to mean that individuals and organizations have limited capacity for change (so perhaps need to be forced), the positive conclusion from the theory is that individuals and organizations are autonomous, not finally determinable nor controllable, and so are open, even within their structural constraints, to inexhaustible possibilities.
Birch J. (1991) Re-inventing the already punctured wheel: reflections on a seminar with Humberto Maturana. Journal of Family Therapy 13: 349–373. https://cepa.info/2798
Three central themes of Maturana’s work – autopoiesis, the biology of cognition, and cybernetic ontology – are examined. Evidence is offered that Maturana’s treatment of these themes is either unoriginal or flawed. The uncritical acceptance of Maturana’s work by family therapists raises questions about the maturity of their discipline, especially in so far as many practitioners claim an understanding of cybernetics.
Calenbuhr V., Bersini H., Stewart J. & Varela F. J. (1995) Natural tolerance in a simple immune network. Journal of Theoretical Biology 177: 199–213. https://cepa.info/1998
The following basic question is studied here: In the relatively stable molecular environment of a vertebrate body, can a dynamic idiotypic immune network develop a natural tolerance to endogenous components? The approach is based on stability analyses and computer simulation using a model that takes into account the dynamics of two agents of the immune system, namely B-lymphocytes and antibodies. The study investigates the behavior of simple immune networks in interaction with an antigen whose concentration is held constant as a function of the symmetry properties of the connectivity matrix of the network. Current idiotypic network models typically become unstable in the presence of this type of antigen. It is shown that idiotypic networks of a particular connectivity show tolerance towards auto-antigen without the need for ad hoc mechanisms that prevent an immune response. These tolerant network structures are characterized by aperiodic behavior in the absence of auto-antigen. When coupled to an auto-antigen, the chaotic attractor degenerates into one of several periodic ones, and at least one of them is stable. The connectivity structure needed for this behavior allows the system to adopt particular dynamic concentration patterns which do not lead to an unbounded immune response. Possible implications for the understanding of autoimmune disease and its treatment are discussed.
Calenbuhr V., Varela F. J. & Bersini H. (1996) Natural tolerance as a function of network connectivity. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 6(9): 1691–1702. https://cepa.info/2078
This article investigates the following basic question: in the relatively stable molecular environment of a vertebrate body, can a dynamic idiotypic immune network develop a natural tolerance to endogenous components? Our approach is based on stability analysis and computer simulation using a model that takes into account the dynamics of two agents of the immune system, namely, B-lymphocytes and antibodies. We investigate the behavior of simple immune networks in interaction with an Ag whose concentration is being held constant as a function of the connectivity matrix of the network. The latter is characterized by the total number of clones, N, and the number of clones, C, with which each clone interacts. The idiotypic network models typically become unstable in the presence of this type of Ag. We show that idiotypic networks that can be found in particular connected regions of NC-space show tolerance towards auto-Ag without the need for ad hoc mechanisms that prevent an immune response. These tolerant network structures provide dynamical regimes in which the clone which interacts with the auto-Ag is suppressed instead of being excited such that an unbounded immune response does not occur. Possible implications for the future treatment of auto-immune disease such as IvIg-treatment are discussed in the light of these results. Moreover, we propose an experimental approach to verify the results of the present theoretical study.
Carvalho C. A. S. (2015) A theoretical inquiry into the role of enaction in cybertherapy. In: Alves G. R. & Felgueiras M. C. (eds.) Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Technological Ecosystems for Enhancing Multiculturality (TEEM ’15), 7–9 October 2015, Porto, Portugal. ACM, New York: 45–51. https://cepa.info/7604
Some of the problems faced by Cybertherapy along the last two decades are far from being restricted to technical issues. They entail new challenges of medical education, mainly related with the adequate insertion of new technologies in therapeutic processes without distorting the relation between medical professionals and clients. We contend that the acknowledgment of the effects of the systemic effects of therapeutic applications of virtual reality is not fully predictable and can only be achieved attending to the way the patient enacts certain tasks oriented by goals. Enaction means the patient is placed at the centre of the treatment processes, not only as an informed agent, but also as the agent of change through practice. Focusing on the requirements of Cybertherapy applied to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, we propose a theoretic reflection on the conditions of training and treatment in virtual settings. We underline the decisive role of Health Care professionals in applying and improving the potentialities of biometric sensors, graphic and aural engines in virtual (and hybrid) settings. This role can only be adequately understood within a framework of different levels of recursion of the therapeutic system. Two main levels are referred, the first encompassing the patients adaptation and learning to “move within” the interfaces, the second requiring a reflection on the architecture and design of the physical setting and the computerized rendering of sensory data. Further levels concern the larger framework of therapy, relating to its allocation of resources and the social ends that therapeutic technologies, particularly those concerning mental health, must accomplish.
Chiari G. (2013) Emotion in personal construct theory: A controversial question. Journal of Constructivist Psychology 26(4): 249–261. https://cepa.info/918
George Kelly’s personal construct theory (PCT) has been accused of disregarding the role of emotion in human life. This charge originates from a misunderstanding of PCT’s basic assumptions. Kelly deals with experiences commonly called “emotional” in terms of dimensions of transition according to a genuinely constructivist epistemology. A review of the literature shows few elaborations of Kelly’s original formulation of constructs relating to transitions, and even some contributions critical of Kelly’s approach to emotions. This article rebuts the criticisms while making clear the epistemological and theoretical bases of Kelly’s treatment of transitional experiences, its peculiarities, and its role in the diagnostic/therapeutic process. Relevance: It deals with the notion of emotion from a genuinely constructivist epistemology such as that envisioned by Kelly’s personal construct theory.
Clark A. (2010) Memento’s revenge: The extended mind, extended. In: Menary R. (ed.) The extended mind. Cambridge MA, MIT Press: 43–66.
Excerpt: Is the mind contained (always? sometimes? never?) in the head? Or does the notion of thought allow mental processes (including believings) to inhere in extended systems of body, brain, and aspects of the local environment? The answer, we claimed, was that mental states, including states of believing, could be grounded in physical traces that remained firmly outside the head. As long as a few simple conditions were met (more on which below), Leonard’s notes and tattoos could indeed count as new additions to his store of long-term knowledge and dispositional belief. In the present treatment I revisit this argument, defending our strong conclusion against a variety of subsequent observations and objections. In particular, I look at objections that rely on a contrast between the (putatively) intrinsic content of neural symbols and the merely derived content of external inscriptions, at objections concerning the demarcation of scientifific domains via natural kinds, and at objections concerning the ultimate locus of agentive control and the nature of perception versus introspection.