This paper argues that episodic thoughts (judgments, decisions, and so forth) are always unconscious. Whether consciousness is understood in terms of global broadcasting/widespread accessibility or in terms of non-interpretive higher-order awareness, the conclusion is the same: there is no such thing as conscious thought. Arguments for this conclusion are reviewed. The challenge of explaining why we should all be under the illusion that our thoughts are often conscious is then taken up.

Key words: attention, confabulation, consciousness, self-knowledge, thought, working memory.

Open peer commentary on the article “Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting” by Aleš Oblak. Abstract: In contrast to the experimental methods of studying visual memory, Oblak has used a less constrained method of investigation. The comparison between the conventional experimental methods and the present phenomenological method should be done, not in terms of a single difference, but in terms of three separable distinctions. Disentangling the three comparisons could benefit future research.

Open peer commentary on the article “Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting” by Aleš Oblak. Abstract: While appreciating Oblak’s call for and investment in more ecological research designs in psychology, I point out several aspects in Oblak’s own experimental setup that might themselves derive from traditional psychological concepts about cognition and which, therefore, might hinder his intended exploration of subjective experience by disregarding the very nature of this new “object of investigation.” Finally, I propose the use and development of micro-phenomenology to solve some of the possible issues raised, while at the same time promoting progress and change in the activity explored.

Open peer commentary on the article “Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting” by Aleš Oblak. Abstract: We review four constraints we judge to be necessary to the high-fidelity apprehension and description of inner experience: cleaving to specific moments, cleaving to pristine inner experience, bracketing presuppositions, and using an iterative method. With the aim of promoting discussion of inner-experience-exploration methods, we use methodological concerns in Oblak’s study of inner experience to provide concrete perspectives on those four constraints.

Open peer commentary on the article “Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting” by Aleš Oblak. Abstract: I critically examine possible advantages of the introduction of a “naturalistic” setting to empirical phenomenological inquiry. As an alternative, I suggest taking the sum of factors influencing the outcome of research (including the impact of observation and research setting) as an inevitable constitutive characteristic of any research approach. I maintain that such a sum can be experienced and therefore researched. Only through understanding the characteristics of the research approach, can we arrive at a full understanding of its results.

This chapter discusses the inclusion of phenomenological analysis in the cognitive psychological research of meditation. Different meditation styles involve the specific changes of the mind, such as a long-lasting, vivid, and stable mental imagery in some types of Tibetan meditation. Comparative phenomenological analysis of the Deity Yoga, mandala, Vipashyana, and Rig-pa types of Tibetan meditation was included in designing a cognitive experiment. Results indicate the increase of visual working memory due to the practice of Deity Yoga, suggesting access to the heightened visual processing resources (Kozhevnikov, Louchakova, Josipovic, & Motes. Psychological Science 20(5):645–653, 2009). The phenomenological part of the design, reported here for the first time, included a new methodology termed phenomenological-cognitive mapping (PCM). PCM linked the comparative phenomenological analysis of meditation to the psychological parameters of cognitive testing. PCM proved to be crucial in designing a successful experiment that led to novel findings. In the absence of PCM, isolating the meditation style that causes the optimization of visual-spatial processing and finding at what stage of meditation this happens would not be possible. This chapter argues in favor of including a detailed phenomenological analysis of experience in the cognitive research of meditation, as opposed to using only general classifications such as meditation styles.

Key words: phenomenology, visual cognition, consciousness, tibetan meditatio, n meditation styles, non-dual consciousness, open awareness, non-conceptual state.

Various kinds of observations show that the ability of human beings to both consciously relive past events – episodic memory – and conceive future events, entails an active process of construction. This construction process also underpins many other important aspects of conscious human life, such as perceptions, language and conscious thinking. This article provides an explanation of what makes the constructive process possible and how it works. The process mainly relies on attentional activity, which has a discrete and periodic nature, and working memory, which allows for the combination of discrete attentional operations. An explanation is also provided of how past and future events are constructed. Relevance: The article (1) shows that various forms of consciousness (such as time travel, linguistic thought, dreams) are the result of an active process of construction, rather than faithful representations of a world independent from the observer; (2) puts forward an hypothesis about the most plausible mechanisms underpinning the process of construction; (3) shows how the combined working of these mechanisms generate some forms of consciousness

Excerpt: Our focus, in this article, on the originary phenomenological sources of mathematical reasoning, moves beyond cognitivist approaches to examining mathematical incomprehension, such as focusing on issues of working memory, semiotic representations, and varied aspects of cognitive function and dysfunction (e.g., Geary, Hoard & Hamson, 1999). We propose to shift the investigative locus of research on mathematical learning to earlier phenomenological events in students’ subjective process of meaning making, just prior to engaging in formal mathematical representation and modeling of psychological content. Our proposition rests on the adoption of a contemplative orientation that promotes a deep focus on somatic and preconceptual realms. In our development of this approach, we introduce contemplative practice as a means to resolve the bottleneck introduced above. Contemplative practices can do this, we suggest, by providing a pre-conceptual or liminal space that bridges the nuanced apprehension of tacit sensorimotor activity and conscious configuring of this ineffable psychological content into expressive forms.

Context: In sciences of the mind, cognitive phenomena are typically investigated with the use of psychological tasks. These usually represent highly constrained environments that isolate and make phenomena under investigation measurable. However, it is poorly understood how psychological tasks constrain one’s cognition and, to a certain extent, construct their own object of inquiry. Problem: I address the question of how visual-spatial working memory is constrained differently in a naturalistic setting, as compared to when measured with psychological tasks. Specifically, can we observe principled and empirical support for the claim that psychological tasks to a certain extent construct the phenomena they purportedly measure? Method: I employ an empirical phenomenological approach that combines the methodological and analytical framework of constructivist grounded theory with contemporary approaches to the scientific study of experience, to gather phenomenal data on visual working memory in a naturalistic setting - a drawing task. Results: The drawing task elicits visual-spatial working memory as a type of visual-motor behavior with rare instances of mnemonic representations taking the form of language. Importantly, my empirical findings show that investigating cognitive phenomena in naturalistic settings yields constructs that are different from phenomena elicited in a laboratory setting. Implications: The findings suggest that investigating the mind solely with psychological tasks provides an incomplete picture of the phenomena under investigation. Constructivist content: I outline empirical data that points to how, under different constraints from the environment, not only do we conceptualize cognitive phenomena according to different theoretical constructs, but our cognitive system deploys different strategies to solve the task at hand. Keywords: Psychological task, visual-spatial working memory, empirical phenomenology, naturalistic task, drawing task.

Open peer commentary on the article “Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting” by Aleš Oblak. Abstract: This commentary requests some further details about the study and raises some concerns about factors that may have affected the findings or the interpretation thereof. These include the possibility that the author’s co-researchers were imagining drawing the motifs and remembering planned movements rather than, or alongside, the motifs themselves. I also discuss the potential effects of differing levels of drawing skills and of experience in the micro-phenomenological method.