Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that modellers may still adopt a mechanistic strategy to produce explanations that are compatible with REC. This argument is scaffolded by a multi-agent model of the true slime mould Physarum polycephalum.

Key words: minimal cognition, radical enactivism, mechanistic explanation

This paper demonstrates that Kohut’s definitional system of the “bipolar self” within psychoanalytic self psychology can be modeled as a biological autopoietic system, both in terms of its structure and dynamics, in a way that accounts for the phenomenological aspects of experiential living. Based on this finding, the author argues that a nonreductionist definitional system of this type is an integral component of any pragmatic methodology, such as Kohut’s “empathic-introspective” method of treatment, which aims to enable the analyst, as observer, to gain access to the phenomenological world of the analysand within the analytic setting. The dialectic approach undertaken in this preliminary exploration of the “bipolar self” as an autopoietic system has proven fruitful in excavating some of the theoretical features of psychoanalytic self psychology, the weighted importance of which can now be reevaluated in contemporary practice.

‘Constructivism’ is a term adopted by many contemporary philosophical approaches. It appeared with the work of Piaget, and since then it has been appropriated by many approaches with different ontological and epistemological orientations. This article examines some of these major contemporary appropriations on three issues: the problem of realism and the problems of possibility and source of knowledge. Piagetian constructivism, socioconstructivism, logical constructivism, radical constructivism and social constructivism are analyzed. The purpose of this study || is to provide a better definition of the term, maintaining its link to its historical origin, and at the same time to be helpful in clarifying its indiscriminate use. A part of the conceptual confusion surrounding the term is solved with the dissolution of the false polarities between realism and constructivism, and between objectivism and skepticism. The conclusion is that the positions vary between realism and antirealism, and between criticism and relativism. It finds in the problem of the source of knowledge the common denominators of all allegations of constructivism: the rejection of empiricist objectivism and the adoption of the Kantian sense of the construction metaphor. We can positively define constructivism as the epistemological thesis that supports the active role of the subject in creating and modifying his representations of the object of knowledge.

Key words: constructivism, social constructivism, radical constructivism, jean piaget, objectivism.

Building on the original formulation of the autopoietic theory (AT), extended enactivism argues that living beings are autopoietic systems that extend beyond the spatial boundaries of the organism. In this article, we argue that extended enactivism, despite having some basis in AT’s original formulation, mistakes AT’s definition of living beings as autopoietic entities. We offer, as a reply to this interpretation, a more embodied reformulation of autopoiesis, which we think is necessary to counterbalance the (excessively) disembodied spirit of AT’s original formulation. The article aims to clarify and correct what we take to be a misinterpretation of AT as a research program. AT, contrary to what some enactivists seem to believe, did not (and does not) intend to motivate an extended conception of living beings. AT’s primary purpose, we argue, was (and is) to provide a universal individuation criterion for living beings, these understood as discrete bodies that are embedded in, but not constituted by, the environment that surrounds them. However, by giving a more explicitly embodied definition of living beings, AT can rectify and accommodate, so we argue, the enactive extended interpretation of autopoiesis, showing that although living beings do not extend beyond their boundaries as autopoietic unities, they do form part, in normal conditions, of broader autopoietic systems that include the environment.

Key words: autopoiesis, extended autopoietic systems, enactivism, body, multiple realizability.

This is a very interesting article, and I would like to make a few epistemological and operational reflective commentaries that it evokes in me.

Key words: autopoiesis, system, unity, living, organism

The theory of autopoiesis holds that an organism can be defined as a network of processes. However, an organism also has a physical body. The relationship between these two things – network and body – has been raised in this issue of Adaptive Behaviour, with reference to an extended interpretation of autopoiesis. This perspective holds that the network and the body are distinct things, and that the network should be thought of as extending beyond the boundaries of the body. The relationship between body and network is subtle, and I revisit it here from the extended perspective. I conclude that from an organism = network perspective, the body is a biological solution to the problem of maintaining both the distinctness of an organism, separate from but engaged with its environment and other organisms, and its distinctiveness as a particular individual.

Key words: autopoiesis, embodiment, extended autopoiesis, origins of life, organism = network

Excerpt: My purpose in this commentary is not only to show the nature of the difference between scientific and philosophical theories but also to reflect on the consequences of their use in the realm of human actions. In order to meet this goal, in the following, I will first say a few words about explanations and theories in general, and then I will describe what I think scientists and philosophers do, showing the different goals with which philosophers and scientists perform their respective theorizations. Finally, I will reflect on the various consequences, to justify our actions in the field of human relations, the different types of theories that we, scientists and philosophers, generate as a result of our different objectives.

Key words: brain process, texture gradient, multistable pattern, gestalt theory, reversion process.