Meditation as a scientific first-person investigative tool has been discussed for decades, but remains largely a mere idea. One reason may be lack of relevant theory. Maps of mind developed by meditation traditions could prove helpful. The map used by orthodox Indian traditions, for example, identifies six phenomenologically distinct levels (senses, discursive thinking, discriminative intellect, pure individuality and pure consciousness/emptiness). This map, if valid, would have implications for many fields. It would indicate, for example, that the introspective awareness of major philosophers such as Descartes, Hume and Kant was open to particular levels and not others, and suggest why each favored particular theories and found particular problems unresolvable. Identification of physiological correlates of the levels could provide evidence for the map’s validity. Significant correlates of the deepest level already appear to be identified. Research relevant to other levels has been conducted. Identifying correlates of all the levels would provide an objective way to evaluate many mind-related questions. It would also provide an objective, tradition-invariant way to identify individuals capable of sustaining attention at specific levels and using meditation to investigate diverse levels-related topics. Meditation research faces strong questions of appearances of bias. A consortium, including researchers associated with competing traditions and non-associated researchers, overseeing replications and meta-analyses could respond to these questions directly.

Neuroscientific scanning of meditators is taken as providing data on mystical experiences. However, problems concerning how the brain and consciousness are related cast doubts on whether any understanding of the content of meditative experiences is gained through the study of the brain. Whether neuroscience can study the subjective aspects of meditative experiences in general is also discussed. So too, whether current neuroscience can establish that there are “pure consciousness events” in mysticism is open to question. The discussion points to limitations on neuroscience’s capability to add to our understanding of the phenomenological content of mystical experiences.

Key words: constructivism, meditation, mindfulness, multiple realization, mystical experiences, neuroscience, pure consciousness event, science of consciousness

There is a small but growing community of researchers spanning a spectrum of disciplines which are united in rejecting the still dominant computationalist paradigm in favor of the enactive approach. The framework of this approach is centered on a core set of ideas, such as autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience. These concepts are finding novel applications in a diverse range of areas. One hot topic has been the establishment of an enactive approach to social interaction. The main purpose of this paper is to serve as an advanced entry point into these recent developments. It accomplishes this task in a twofold manner: (i) it provides a succinct synthesis of the most important core ideas and arguments in the theoretical framework of the enactive approach, and (ii) it uses this synthesis to refine the current enactive approach to social interaction. A new operational definition of social interaction is proposed which not only emphasizes the cognitive agency of the individuals and the irreducibility of the interaction process itself, but also the need for jointly co-regulated action. It is suggested that this revised conception of ‘socio-cognitive interaction’ may provide the necessary middle ground from which to understand the confluence of biological and cultural values in personal action.

Key words: adaptivity, autonomy, cognition, enaction, sense-making, social interaction

Exerpt: In this essay, we provide an overview of the various claims defended by the enactive approach to intersubjectivity, from how social interactions can be defined operationally to how social understanding is rooted in participatory sense-making, even when we are not interacting with others. In contrast to prevailing views, the enactive approach does not put all the emphasis on individual capabilities to explain forms of social understanding and social action. This has often been interpreted as adopting an interactionist stance on intersubjectivity. It is indeed the case that social interaction patterns have not played a prevalent role in cognitive science and social neuroscience until recently, and in the light of this, a participatory as opposed to spectatorial stance still needs to be presented and defended.

Key words: Enactive approach, Intersubjectivity, Participatory sense-making, Social cognition, Social interaction

In recent years, an increasing number of theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have been opposing reductionist research agendas by appealing to the concept of biological autonomy which draws on the older concept of autopoiesis. In my paper, I investigate some of the ontological implications of this approach. The emphasis on autonomy and autopoiesis, together with the associated idea of organisational closure, might evoke the impression that organisms are to be categorised ontologically as substances: ontologically independent, well-individuated, discrete particulars. However, I argue that this is mistaken. Autopoiesis and biological autonomy, properly understood, require a rigorous commitment to a process ontological view of life.

Key words: autopoiesis, biological autonomy, metabolism, organisational closure, organism, process ontology, substance ontology.

The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computationalrepresentational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with other people. Changes to any of the bodily, environmental, or intersubjective conditions elicit responses from the system as a whole. On this view, rather than representing or computing information, the brain is better conceived as participating in the action.

Excerpt: Das Setzen einer Unterscheidung ist eine Operation, die auch dann möglich ist und möglich bleibt, wenn die Unterscheidung in ihrer Form als Paradoxie beobachtet wird. Man kann es tun, wenn und solange die “Autopoiesis” des Beobachtens funktioniert. So auch die Autopoiesis des Lebens. Ein Lebewesen besteht aus dem, was es vorher geges-sen hat; aber diese Einsicht braucht nicht zu verhindern, daß man weiterhin für Nahrung sorgt. Ein Bewußtsein operiert mit dem, was es vorher gedacht hat; aber diese Einsicht führt nicht zur Einstellung des Denkens. Deshalb muß man Operieren und Beobachten unterscheiden, auch, wenn auch dieses Unterscheiden wiederum eine beobachtende Operation ist. Die Theorie ist an dieser Stelle zum autologischen Schluß, zum Rückschluß auf sich selber gezwungen. Damit ist zugleich alles, was überhaupt beobachtet oder nicht beobachtet wird, auf eine Paradoxie gegründet und zugleich angegeben, welche Unterscheidung aus dieser Paradoxie herausführt, nämlich die Unterscheidung von Operation und Beobachtung.

The author argues against a widespread misconception in the present debate about “radical constructivism.” According to H. v. Förster and Spencer Brown he outlines briefly, that at least in case of the operative constructivism concerned with the theory of systems this attempt contains by no means a declaration of ‘anything is possible’ in cognition or even a ‘flirt with postmodern tendencies. Cognition develops by means of the fundamental differentiation of self reference, not-self reference and observations of the environment, i.e., by perturbations, irritations and by contradictions of one communication with another communication. Against this background new types of problems arise for a theory of mass media concerned with the theory of systems, which the author concludingly outlines in a set of 5 items for further research.