Open peer commentary on the article “A Moving Boundary, a Plastic Core: A Contribution to the Third Wave of Extended-Mind Research” by Timotej Prosen. Abstract: I sympathize with Prosen’s conviction in integrating enactivism, the free-energy principle, and the extended-mind hypothesis. However, I show that he uses the concept of “boundary” ambiguously. By disambiguating it, I suggest that we can keep both Markov blankets and operational closure as ways of drawing the boundaries of a cognitive system. Nevertheless, from an enactive perspective, neither of those boundaries is a “cognitive” boundary.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Moving Boundary, a Plastic Core: A Contribution to the Third Wave of Extended-Mind Research” by Timotej Prosen. Abstract: The role of representation in the extended mind is central to understanding the philosophical commitments of the hypothesis and its relation to other accounts of cognition. While the target article provides an important analysis of the development and outlook for the extended mind and its relation to enactivism and active inference, it does not discuss the possibility of the free-energy framework as non-representational. I argue that such a reading allows for more fruitful exchanges between the extended mind, enactivism, and active inference.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Moving Boundary, a Plastic Core: A Contribution to the Third Wave of Extended-Mind Research” by Timotej Prosen. Abstract: We argue that the free-energy principle (FEP) can indeed be used to articulate a conception of the boundaries of cognitive systems that meets the desiderata of third-wave extended-mind research. We point out that Markov blankets under the FEP definitionally constitute the means through which internal and external states are coupled, and so do not isolate systems from their environment. We argue that the nested, multiscale boundaries of the FEP formulation are indeed plastic and open to re-negotiation. Finally, we appeal to the formulation of niche construction under the FEP to argue that the extension of cognitive boundaries in this formulation is both synchronic and diachronic.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Moving Boundary, a Plastic Core: A Contribution to the Third Wave of Extended-Mind Research” by Timotej Prosen. Abstract: We explore both some novel claims made by Prosen’s account of plastic cores and some overlaps between his and other accounts of third-wave extended mind. In the first instance we discuss whether the Markov blanket formalism should be regarded as incompatible with a third-wave extended view. Secondly, we discuss whether Prosen’s proposal of a plastic core quite meets the radical departure of the third wave from organism-centeredness - or whether Prosen’s contribution might be more aptly considered as a compromise between second- and third-wave extended mind.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Moving Boundary, a Plastic Core: A Contribution to the Third Wave of Extended-Mind Research” by Timotej Prosen. Abstract: Prosen’s conception of the extension and temporal transformation of the bounds of viability of a single cognitive agent can be fruitfully complemented with a Sellarsian account of language as rule-governed behavior. Specifically, language allows for the externalization of the organism’s model of its own bounds of viability into a collective model that is instantiated in concrete linguistic practices that follow norms of use. This externalization gives cognitive agents the resources to unframe from their evolved problem space, extend their bounds of viability and transform them through time.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Moving Boundary, a Plastic Core: A Contribution to the Third Wave of Extended-Mind Research” by Timotej Prosen. Abstract: I extend the conclusion of Prosen’s target article by sketching out what it could mean for an aesthetic object to constitute an extended mind. After providing two examples of a musically extended mind, I continue by closely investigating the classical form of the string quartet. I show that it acts as an external bound of viability by setting up a novel and specific kind of aesthetic experience of chamber music. By doing this I provide a clear example of what Prosen calls an “aesthetic catalyst.”

Abstract: The commentaries on my target article can be clustered into three topics. First, I discuss the broader theoretical background underlying the notion of cognitive boundary, and argue that this notion should be taken to refer to the boundary by which cognitive autonomous agents actively distinguish themselves from their environment. Subsequently, I address the difference between the notions of Markov blanket and operational boundary, pointing out that the two notions of boundary are compatible in some, but not all cases. In the last section I deal with some concrete examples of extended mind and argue that the proposed account does justice to instances of distributed assembly.

Context: There is still no detailed defence of Goodman’s starmaking constructivism against the objection Boghossian presented in his 2006 book, Fear of Knowledge. Problem: I defend Goodman’s constructivism against the problem of stuff raised by Boghossian, that is, that constructivism requires unconstructed stuff and thus cannot explain all features in the world. Method: I argue that there is a way out for constructivists when they face the problem of stuff. Constructivists can choose to accept a constructivist-friendly worldview and the problem of stuff does not hold in this worldview. Goodman already provides hints for such a worldview in his works. I articulate the worldview in detail and argue that it does not have obvious faults. Results: I show that starmaking constructivism does not have the problem of stuff at least under a certain tenable worldview. Implications: The constructivist-friendly worldview and related novel ideas could be used to defend starmaking constructivism against other objections in Boghossian’s book and is helpful in answering other philosophical questions such as the mind-matter problem and modality. Constructivist content: This article may contribute to reviving Goodman’s starmaking constructivism.

Key words: Anti-foundationalism, bundle theory, constructivism, phenomenalism.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Defence of Starmaking Constructivism: The Problem of Stuff” by Bin Liu. Abstract: I consider two problems arising in the context of Goodmanian constructivism as discussed by Bin Liu: the question of solipsism and the status of immaterial minds.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Defence of Starmaking Constructivism: The Problem of Stuff” by Bin Liu. Abstract: I present alternative responses to those Liu offers to two challenges to Nelson Goodman’s constructivist thesis: A. it is not possible for everything to be constructed and B. the thesis cannot account for the existence of things prior to their being constructed.