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fulltext:"artificial"
fulltext:22artificial
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fulltext:22artificial intelligence22 author:maturana
fulltext:"artificial intelligence" author:maturana
fulltext:"artificial intelligence" author:maturana
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Umpleby S. A. (2016) Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science. Constructivist Foundations 11(3): 455–465. https://cepa.info/2848
Umpleby S. A.
(
2016
)
Second-Order
Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science.
Constructivist Foundations
11(3): 455–465.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2848
Copy Ref
Context:
The term “
second-order
cybernetics” was introduced by von Foerster in 1974 as the “cybernetics of observing systems,” both the act of observing systems and systems that observe. Since then, the term has been used by many authors in articles and books and has been the subject of many conference panels and symposia.
Problem:
The term is still not widely known outside the fields of cybernetics and systems science and the importance and implications of the work associated with
second-order
cybernetics is not yet widely discussed. I claim that the transition from (first-order) cybernetics to
second-order
cybernetics is a fundamental scientific revolution that is not restricted to cybernetics or systems science.
Second-order
cybernetics can be regarded as a scientific revolution for the general methodology of science and for many disciplines as well.
Method:
I first review the history of cybernetics and
second-order
cybernetics. Then I analyze the major contents of von Foerster’s fundamental revolution in science and present it as a general model for an alternative methodology of science. Subsequently, I present an example of practicing
second-order
socio-cybernetics from within. I describe some consequences of doing science from within, and I suggest some new horizons for
second-order
cybernetics.
Results:
Second-order
cybernetics leads to a new foundation for conducting science and offers important contributions for a new way of organizing science. It expands the conception of science so that it can more adequately deal with living systems.
Implications:
Second-order
cybernetics extends the traditional scientific approach by bringing scientists within the domain of what is described and analyzed. It provides models of research processes for when the scientist is within the system being studied. In this way it offers a new foundation for research in the social sciences, in management science, and in other fields such as the environmental sciences or the life sciences.
Keywords:
Epistemology, general scientific methodology, cybernetics, social sciences, action research, Heinz von Foerster.
Key words:
Epistemology
,
general scientific methodology
,
cybernetics
,
social sciences
,
action research
,
Heinz von Foerster
Van Bendegem J. P. (2014) Do We also Need Second-order Mathematics? Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 34–35. https://cepa.info/1156
Van Bendegem J. P.
(
2014
)
Do We also Need
Second-order
Mathematics?
Constructivist Foundations
10(1): 34–35.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1156
Copy Ref
Open peer commentary on the article “
Second-Order
Science: Logic, Strategies, Methods” by Stuart A. Umpleby.
Upshot:
The author makes a strong plea for
second-order
science but somehow mathematics remains out of focus. The major claim of this commentary is that
second-order
science requires
second-order
mathematics.
Van de Vijver G. (1992) The experimental epistemology of Walter S. McCulloch: A minimalistic interpretation. In: Van de Vijver G. (ed.) New Perspectives on cybernetics: Self-organization, autonomy and connectionism. Kluwer, Dordrecht: 105–123. https://cepa.info/2740
Van de Vijver G.
(
1992
)
The experimental epistemology of Walter S. McCulloch: A minimalistic interpretation.
In: Van de Vijver G. (ed.)
New Perspectives on cybernetics: Self-organization, autonomy and connectionism
. Kluwer, Dordrecht: 105–123.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2740
Copy Ref
When cybernetics entered the scene during the forties, high ambitions immediately arose and quite unusual claims were made as compared to those of traditional epistemology: cybernetics would do away with the distinction between ’mind’ and ’body’ (Papert, 1965); it would bring a new interpretation, through the artefact, of the Kantian synthetic a priori; cybernetics would give, following Turing’s approach of computability, a mechanistic sense to Kantian schematism (Dupuy, 1985, pp. 105–106). In this text we shall analyse the statute of that sort of claims. In other words, we shall show what is the relation between epistemological questions which we call classical or theoretical and those occurring within cybernetics, and more in particular in the work of McCulloch. McCulloch was clearly an advocate of experimental epistemology. He emphasized, in contrast with Kant for instance, that the experimental inquiry into the functioning, the emergence and the consequences of knowledge can be important for epistemology in general. Furthermore, we shall inquire how McCulloch’s experimental epistemology may be relevant to classical epistemology. Firstly, we shall discuss the position of McCulloch within cybernetics. Secondly, we shall deal with the meaning of his net of formal neurons and with the meaning of the heterarchic nets. This will allow finally us to illustrate in what sense McCulloch is to be situated outside first cybernetics and how he anticipates
second order
cybernetics. It will also allow us to show that the experimental epistemology which he defends can get an interpretation beyond the frame of a traditional reductionism. What we are proposing here is a minimalistic interpretation: the epistemology, insofar as it tends to be experimental, doesn’t have to serve as a support for reductionism, but rather aims at pointing out concrete limits within which a theoretical epistemology can be developed.
Vanderstraeten R. (2001) Observing systems: A cybernetic perspective on system/environment relations. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31: 297–311. https://cepa.info/1133
Vanderstraeten R.
(
2001
)
Observing systems: A cybernetic perspective on system/environment relations.
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
31: 297–311.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1133
Copy Ref
This article first sketches the transition from first-order to
second-order
cybernetics. Next it presents an analysis of George Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form. Against this background, Niklas Luhmann’s constructivism is afterwards analyzed in more detail. It is thereby shown how
second-order
observations “work” within modern society.
Relevance:
This article presents an analysis of the constructivist position developed by Niklas Luhmann in his late writings.
Villalobos M. (2013) Enactive cognitive science: Revisionism or revolution. Adaptive Behavior 21(3): 159–167. https://cepa.info/926
Villalobos M.
(
2013
)
Enactive cognitive science: Revisionism or revolution.
Adaptive Behavior
21(3): 159–167.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/926
Copy Ref
The enactive approach is usually associated with a revolutionary project that aims to transform in a radical way our understanding of mind and cognition. Bold theoretical moves such as the rejection of cognitive representations or the assumption of a deep continuity between life and mind, among other enactive ideas, justify this perception. Nonetheless, when we assume a broader historical perspective, including the long cybernetic tradition that preceded the emergence of cognitive sciences, the image of the enactive approach looks different. Put in the context of the paradigmatic shift that took place between first-order and
second-order
cybernetics, especially in the case of Maturana’s autopoietic theory, the enactive paradigm, so I will try to show in this work, appears rather like a conservative or revisionist project. Better said, it appears as a slightly hybrid paradigm, wherein original and progressive elements coexist with revisionist components. The paper aims to offer an alternative interpretation of the enactive approach and contribute to a better understanding of its identity as a research program, and its present and its possible future challenges.
Relevance:
The paper offers a reconstruction of the historical relationship between autopoietic theory and the enactive approach, and evaluates the internal consistency of the enactive approach.
Villalobos M. (2015) Biological roots of cognition and the social origins of mind: Autopoietic theory, strict naturalism and cybernetics. PhD Thesis, The University of Edinburgh, UK. https://cepa.info/7532
Villalobos M.
(
2015
)
Biological roots of cognition and the social origins of mind: Autopoietic theory, strict naturalism and cybernetics.
PhD Thesis, The University of Edinburgh, UK.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7532
Copy Ref
This thesis is about the ontology of living beings as natural systems, their behavior, and the way in which said behavior, under special conditions of social coupling, may give rise to mental phenomena. The guiding questions of the thesis are: 1) What kinds of systems are living beings such that they behave the way they do? 2) How, through what kinds of mechanisms and processes, do living beings generate their behavior? 3) How do mental phenomena appear in the life of certain living beings? 4) What are the natural conditions under which certain living beings exhibit mental phenomena? To answer these questions the thesis first assumes, then justifies and defends, a Strict Naturalistic (SN) stance with respect to living beings. SN is a metaphysical and epistemological framework that, recognizing the organizational, dynamic and structural complexity and peculiarity of living beings, views and treats them as metaphysically ordinary natural systems; that is, as systems that, from the metaphysical point of view, are not different in kind from rivers or stars. SN holds that if in natural sciences rivers and stars are not conceived as semantic, intentional, teleological, agential or normative systems, then living beings should not be so conceived either. Having assumed SN, and building mainly on the
second-order
cybernetic theories of Ross Ashby and Humberto Maturana, the thesis answers question 1) by saying that living beings are (i) adaptive dynamic systems, (ii) deterministic machines of closed transitions, (iii) multistable dissipative systems, and (iv) organizationally closed systems with respect to their sensorimotor and autopoietic dynamics. Based on this ontological characterization, the thesis answers question 2) by showing that living beings’ behavior corresponds to the combined product of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). Points (i) and (ii) support the idea that living beings are strictly deterministic systems, and that, consequently, notions such as information, control, agency or teleology—usually invoked to explain living beings’ behavior—do not have operational reality but are rather descriptive projections introduced by the observer. Point (iii) helps to understand why, despite their deterministic nature, living beings behave in ways that, to the observer, appear to be teleological, agential or “intelligent”. Point (iv) suggests that living beings’ sensorimotor dynamics are closed circuits without inputs or outputs, where the distinction between external and internal medium is, again, an ascription of the observer rather than a functional property of the system itself. Having addressed the basic principles of living beings’ behavior, the thesis explores the possible origin of (truly) mental phenomena in the particular domain of social behavior. Complementing Maturana’s recursive theory of language with Vygotsky’s dialectic approach the thesis advances, though in a still quite exploratory way, a sociolinguistic hypothesis of mind. This hypothesis answers questions 3) and 4) by claiming that the essential properties of mental phenomena (intentionality, representational content) appear with language, and that mind, as a private experiential domain, emerges as a dialectic transformation of language.
Völker J. & Scholl A. (2014) Do the Media Fail to Represent Reality? A Constructivist and Second-order Critique of the Research on Environmental Media Coverage and Its Normative Implications. Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 140–149. https://cepa.info/1185
Völker J.
&
Scholl A.
(
2014
)
Do the Media Fail to Represent Reality? A Constructivist and
Second-order
Critique of the Research on Environmental Media Coverage and Its Normative Implications.
Constructivist Foundations
10(1): 140–149.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1185
Copy Ref
Problem:
First-order scientific research is often not aware of the hidden assumptions provided by an epistemological perspective based upon realism. Beyond philosophical considerations about the epistemological foundations, some practical normative implications deriving from them are crucial: in the field of communication and media studies, some scholars criticize media coverage, e.g., on climate change, as biased and distorted from reality.
Method:
From a constructivist perspective, the article presents a detailed meta-analysis of the course of argumentation provided by two empirical communication studies that follow an objectivist approach. Result: With the help of a
second-order
research strategy, it is possible to uncover their ontological assumptions and criticize their normative implications.
Implications:
Social scientists should be careful with normative suggestions for the system under study (e.g., journalists) unless they are applied within these systems themselves.
Key words:
Meta-analysis
,
second-order research
,
epistemology
,
communication studies
,
climate change
,
bias.
von Storch H. (2014) On Detection and Attribution. Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 131–132. https://cepa.info/1181
von Storch H.
(
2014
)
On Detection and Attribution.
Constructivist Foundations
10(1): 131–132.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1181
Copy Ref
Open peer commentary on the article “On Climate Change Research, the Crisis of Science and
Second-order
Science” by Philipp Aufenvenne, Heike Egner & Kirsten von Elverfeldt.
Upshot:
I discuss the concepts of detection and attribution as they are used in scientific discussions about the cause of global warming.
Vörös S. (2014) Author’s Response: Of Roses, Serpents, and Circles: Fleshing out the Bones of Contention. Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 112–119. https://cepa.info/1178
Vörös S.
(
2014
)
Author’s Response: Of Roses, Serpents, and Circles: Fleshing out the Bones of Contention.
Constructivist Foundations
10(1): 112–119.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1178
Copy Ref
Upshot:
Following a brief reflection on some terminological issues, I discuss the question of the (ir)rationality of non-dualism, the two aspects of the conceptual dimension of phenomenologisation, and the potential of meditative/contemplative practices in cultivating its experiential/existential dimension. Also, I (re)emphasise that the two-pronged project of phenomenologisation is closely associated with the establishment of
second-order
science, and purport to show why it might be an important addition to, and elaboration of, the overarching attempt to think and live the fundamental circularity between subject and object.
Vörös S. (2014) The Uroboros of Consciousness: Between the Naturalisation of Phenomenology and the Phenomenologisation of Nature. Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 96–104. https://cepa.info/1173
Vörös S.
(
2014
)
The Uroboros of Consciousness: Between the Naturalisation of Phenomenology and the Phenomenologisation of Nature.
Constructivist Foundations
10(1): 96–104.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1173
Copy Ref
Context:
The burgeoning field of consciousness studies has recently witnessed a revival of first-person approaches based on phenomenology in general and Husserlian phenomenology in particular. However, the attempts to introduce phenomenological methods into cognitive science have raised serious doubts as to the feasibility of such projects. Much of the current debate has revolved around the issue of the naturalisation of phenomenology, i.e., of the possibility of integrating phenomenology into the naturalistic paradigm. Significantly less attention has been devoted to the complementary process of the phenomenologisation of nature, i.e., of a (potentially radical) transformation of the theoretical and existential underpinnings of the naturalist framework.
Problem:
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it provides a general overview of the resurgence of first-person methodologies in cognitive sciences, with a special emphasis on a circular process of naturalising phenomenology and phenomenologising nature. Secondly, it tries to elucidate what theoretical (conceptual) and practical (existential) implications phenomenological approaches might have for the current understanding of nature and consciousness.
Results:
It is argued that, in order for the integration of phenomenological and scientific approaches to prove successful, it is not enough merely to provide a firm naturalistic grounding for phenomenology. An equally, if not even more important, process of phenomenological contextualisation of science must also be considered, which might have far-reaching implications for its theoretical underpinnings (move from disembodied to embodied models) and our existential stance towards nature and consciousness (cultivation of a non-dual way of being.
Implications:
The broader theoretical framework brought about by the circular exchange between natural sciences and phenomenology can contribute to a more holistic conception of science, one that is in accord with the cybernetic idea of
second-order
science and based on a close interconnection between (abstract) reflection and (lived) experience.
Constructivist content:
The (re)introduction of first-person approaches into cognitive science and consciousness studies evokes the fundamental circularity that is characteristic of
second-order
cybernetics. It provides a rich framework for a dialogue between science and lived experience, where scientific endeavour merges with the underlying existential structures, while the latter remains reflectively open to scientific findings and proposals.
Key words:
Cognitive science
,
phenomenology
,
first-person approaches
,
naturalisation
,
phenomenologisation
,
lived experience
,
non-dualism
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