Excerpt: What must immediately surprise any reader new to the discourses of systems theory or what is sometimes called “second-order cybernetics” is the rather systematic reliance of this new theoretical paradigm on the figure of vision and, more specifically, observation. That surprise might turn into discomfort if not alarm for readers in the humanities who cut their teeth on the critical genealogy of vision and the look which runs, in its modernist incarnation, from Freud’s discourse on vision in Civilization and Its Discontents through Sartre’s Being and Nothingness to Lacan’s seminars and finally to recent influential work in psychoanalysis and feminist film theory. With the possible exception of Michel Foucault, no recent intellectual has done more to call into question the trope of vision than America’s foremost pragmatist philosopher, Richard Rorty. From his ground-breaking early work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature onward, Rorty has argued that the figure of vision in the philosophical and critical tradition is indissolubly linked with representationalism and realism, where representationalism assumes that “making true’ and ‘representing’ are reciprocal relations: the nonlinguistic item which makes S true is the one represented by S, ” and realism maintains the “idea that inquiry is a matter of finding out the nature of something which lies outside the web of beliefs and desires, ” in which “the object of inquiry – what lies outside the organism – has a context of its own, a context which is privileged by virtue of being the object’s rather than the inquirer’s.” Instead, Rorty argues, we should reduce this desire for objectivity to a search for “solidarity” and embrace a philo-sophical holism of the sort found in Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, which holds that “words take their meanings from other words rather than by virtue of their representative character” and “transparency to the real.” Hence, Rorty rejects the representationalist position and its privileged figure, and argues instead that “Our only usable notion of ‘objectivity’ is ‘agreement’ rather than mirroring."

Key words: Luhmann, Rorty, Habermas, Žižek, Maturana, Varela, closure

In order to obtain, as the author himself puts it, “a successful internalisation of the comparative metadiscourse” necessary for “the survival of comparative literature,” the author refers to constructivism by noticing crucial similarities between the two directions in terms of their historical development and character. The author does not agree with the accusation of the secondary status of comparative research in relation to other fields of science. He points to the fact that the existence of a rich comparative metadiscourse, which implies analogy with constructivism and accounts for the status of comparative studies as an important area of research, is omitted. Relevance: By means of referring to Niklas Luhman, the author identifies comparative studies with second-order observation, that is, focusing not on the objects of comparative studies (those seem to be as numerous and various as the reality surrounding the human being), but on the nature of the comparative process, in other words on the manner in which the comparison of the above mentioned objects is carried out.

Key words: Constructivism, crisis of comparative literature, metadiscourse, metatheory, Niklas Luhmann, multiculturalism

This paper examines the interdependence between paradigms and pedagogy. This relationship is explored by looking at the lifecycle of a transdisciplinary academic program, called Social Ecology. A number of intellectual themes emerge from the exploration, and their influence on pedagogic organisation and practice is discussed. The themes include the process of paradigm formation, the relevance of transdisciplinary courses (as against disciplinary or interdisciplinary courses) of study under postmodern conditions, and the appropriateness of second-order cybernetics in validating and organising transdisciplinary courses. The process of transdisciplinary paradigm formation and the differentiation of such a paradigm from a traditional Kuhnian perspective is discussed. The paper concludes with the proposition that a knowledge of second-order cybernetics would create a much more liberal climate in the academy, where the self-organising and changing nature of a complex, transdisciplinary, pedagogic paradigm, like Social Ecology, could be recognisable and thinkable.

Open peer commentary on the article “The Circular Conditions of Second-order Science Sporadically Illustrated with Agent-based Experiments at the Roots of Observation” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: I follow the general tenor of Füllsack’s target article but I have some basic reservations as to the utilization of the thermodynamics involved.