The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) offline cognition is body based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.

Key words: Time pressure, implicit memory, cognitive architecture, early human, situate cognition

Excerpt: The rationalistic orientation of our prior training in science and technology made the foundations of hermeneutics and phenomenology nearly inaccessible to us. Before we could become open to their relevance and importance we needed to take a preliminary step towards unconcealing the tradition in which we lived, recognizing that it was in fact open to serious question. For us, this first step came through the work of Humberto Maturana, a biologist who has been concerned with understanding how biological processes can give rise to the phenomena of cognition and language.

Excerpt: In Understanding Computers and Cognition, we presented a theory of language, on which we base our understanding of cognition and of computers. It includes some basic assertions about how language works […] The reviews collected here offer a striking validation of this theory. The same piece of language (in this case, our book) produced four widely different understandings, each generated within the background of a particular listener. The important issue is not that different reviewers “liked” the book more or less, but that they heard it as addresing different concerns in different ongoing conversations. We will begin our response by examining their interpretations and the backgrounds in which they arose.

Excerpt: Review of: Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking, By Diane Pecher and Rolf A. Zwaan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN-13: 978–0–5218–3464–3

I make two points in this commentary on Carey (2009). First, it may be too soon to conclude that core cognition is innate. Recent advances in computational cognitive science and developmental psychology suggest possible mechanisms for developing inductive biases. Second, there is another possible answer to Fodor’s challenge – if concepts are merely mental tokens, then cognitive scientists should spend their time on developing a theory of belief fixation instead.

Context: Shaun Gallagher’s work is very influential in contemporary philosophy, especially when it comes to the mind, to philosophical issues raised by developmental psychology, and to intersubjectivity. Problem: Classical cognitivism” has been, and often still is dominating the sciences of the mind. The reasons for this dominance include being implementable on computers, being consistent with Darwinism, and being allegedly experimentally testable. However, this dominance could just as well be a historical phase as cognitivism is disconnected from biological, anthropological, and neuroscientific research. Method: We historically and epistemologically contextualize how Gallagher contributed to bringing the body and subjectivity back to the center of the sciences of the mind by focusing on two examples: theory of mind and evolutionary psychology. Results: Both contemporary epistemologists and Gallagher’s work indicate why classical cognitivism provides a flawed model of cognition, especially when it comes to its explanatory scope: embodiment, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, among other things, are fundamentally mistreated by cognitivism. Implications: Gallagher helped to structure what Andler calls “heterodoxical” approaches to cognition by conceptualizing a unifying framework, the so-called “E-approaches.” This unification has the major implication of leading Gallagher to a model in which cognition is “decentered,” which helps tackle the philosophical issues one might encounter when narrowing down philosophy of cognition. Constructivist content: We apply E-approaches to the philosophy of cognition, psychology and social sciences.

Key words: Philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, history of science, embodiment, E-approaches

This paper discusses the identity of embodied AI, i.e. it asks the question exactly what it is that makes AI research embodied. From an engineering perspective, it is fairly clear that embodied AI is about robotic, i.e. physically embodied systems. From the scientific perspective of AI as building models of natural cognition or intelligence, however, things are less clear. On the one hand embodied AI seems to be about physically embodied, i.e. robotic models of cognition. On the other hand the term ‘embodied’ seems to signify the type of intelligence modeled and/or the conception of (embodied) cognition that is underlying the modeling. In either case, it appears that embodied AI, as it currently stands, might be too narrowly conceived since each of these perspectives is addressed only partially.

Purpose: To point out the relevance of Heinz von Foerster’s work to modern embodied cognitive science and artificial intelligence research. Approach: The paper discusses (a) von Foerster’s contributions to understanding the limitations of the computer metaphor which has long dominated cognitive science, and (b) his theories concerning how reality is constructed in organizationally closed organisms, and what the underlying neural mechanisms are. The latter is exemplified with a simple neuro-robotic model that illustrates the constructive and anticipatory nature of memory. Findings: von Foerster’s work on the integration of a radical constructivist philosophy of knowledge construction with models of the underlying neurophysiological and sensorimotor mechanisms is still highly relevant to the understanding of embodied cognition and robotic models thereof. Value: This paper identifies conceptual contributions that von Foerster’s constructivist cybernetics can make to cognitive science’s still limited understanding of the embodiment of cognition and “representation.” Relevance: The paper addresses the relevance of radical constructivism in general, and von Foerster’s work in particular, to modern embodied cognitive science and artificial intelligence research.

Key words: Cognition, cybernetics, artificial intelligence, reality.