Foerster H. von, Inselberg A. & Weston P. (1968) Memory and Inductive Inference. In: Oestreicher H. & Moore D. (eds.) Cybernetic Problems in Bionics, Proceedings of Bionics 1966. Gordon & Breach, New York: 31–68.
Foerster H. von, Inselberg A. & Weston P.
(
1968)
Memory and Inductive Inference.
In: Oestreicher H. & Moore D. (eds.) Cybernetic Problems in Bionics, Proceedings of Bionics 1966. Gordon & Breach, New York: 31–68.
Foerster H. von, White J., Peterson L. & Russell J. (1968) Purposive Systems. Spartan Books, New York.
Foerster H. von, White J., Peterson L. & Russell J.
(
1968)
Purposive Systems.
Spartan Books, New York.
Glasersfeld E. von (1968) Alla ricerca di dati precisi. Nuovo 2: 36–40.
Glasersfeld E. von
(
1968)
Alla ricerca di dati precisi.
Nuovo 2: 36–40.
Glasersfeld E. von & Notarmarco B. (1968) Some adjective classes derived from correlational grammar. The Georgia Institute for Research, Athens GA. https://cepa.info/1307
Glasersfeld E. von & Notarmarco B.
(
1968)
Some adjective classes derived from correlational grammar.
The Georgia Institute for Research, Athens GA.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1307
Glasersfeld E. von & Pisani P. (1968) The Multistore system MP-2. The Georgia Institute for Research, Athens GA.
Glasersfeld E. von & Pisani P.
(
1968)
The Multistore system MP-2.
The Georgia Institute for Research, Athens GA.
Jonas H. (1968) Biological foundations of individuality. International Philosophical Quarterly 8: 231–251.
Jonas H.
(
1968)
Biological foundations of individuality.
International Philosophical Quarterly 8: 231–251.
Löfgren L. (1968) An axiomatic explanation of complete self-reproduction. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 30: 415–425. https://cepa.info/1844
Löfgren L.
(
1968)
An axiomatic explanation of complete self-reproduction.
Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 30: 415–425.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1844
A similarity between the concepts of reproduction and explanation is observed which implies a similarity between the less well understood concepts of complete self-reproduction and complete self-explanation. These latter concepts are shown to be independent from ordinary loglcal-mathematical-biological reasoning, and a special form of complete selfreproduction is shown to be axiomatizable. Involved is the question whether there exists a function that belongs to its own domain or range. Previously, Wittgenstein has argued, on intuitive grounds, that no function can be its own argument. Similarly, Rosen has argued that a paradox is implied by the notion of a function which is a member of its own range. Our result shows that such functions indeed are independent from ordinary logical-mathematical reasoning, but that they need not imply any inconsistencies, Instead such functions can be axiomatized, and in this sense they really do exist. Finally, the introduced notion of complete self-reproduction is compared with “self-reproduction” of ordinary biological language. It is pointed out that complete self-reproduction is primarily of interest in connection with formal theories of evolution.
Maturana H. R., Uribe R. & Frenk S. (1968) A biological theory of relativistic colour coding in the primate retina: A discussion of nervous system closure with reference to certain visual effects. Archiva de Biologia y Medicina Experimentales Suplemento 1: 1–30.
Maturana H. R., Uribe R. & Frenk S.
(
1968)
A biological theory of relativistic colour coding in the primate retina: A discussion of nervous system closure with reference to certain visual effects.
Archiva de Biologia y Medicina Experimentales Suplemento 1: 1–30.
Mead M. (1968) Cybernetics of cybernetics. In: Foerster H. von, White J. D., Peterson L. J. & Russell J. K. (eds.) Purposive Systems. Spartan Books, New York: 1–11. https://cepa.info/2634
Mead M.
(
1968)
Cybernetics of cybernetics.
In: Foerster H. von, White J. D., Peterson L. J. & Russell J. K. (eds.) Purposive Systems. Spartan Books, New York: 1–11.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2634
Shoemaker S. S. (1968) Self-reference and self-awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65: 555–567.
Shoemaker S. S.
(
1968)
Self-reference and self-awareness.
Journal of Philosophy 65: 555–567.