The article presents a history of general systems theory and discusses several of its various aspects. According to the author, the notion of general systems theory first stemmed from the pre-Socratic philosophers, and evolved throughout the ages through different philosophic entities until it was eventually formally structured in the early 1900s. The theory has three main aspects. The first is called “systems science,” or the scientific exploration and theory of systems in various sciences. The second is called “systems technology,” or the problems arising in modern technology and society. The third aspect is called “systems philosophy” and refers to the reorientation of thought and world view.

Excerpt: In contradistinction to the classical problem of scientific inquiry that postulates first a descr.iption-invariant “objective world” (as if there were such a thing) and then attempts to write its description, here we are challenged to develop a description-invariant “subjective world,” that is a world which includes the observer. This is the problem. However, in accord with the classic tradition of scientific inquiry which perpetually asks “How?” rather than”What?,” this task calls for an epistemology nf “How do we know?” rather than “What do we know?” The following notes on an epistemology cf living things address themselves to the “How?” They may serve as a magnifying glass through which this problem becomes better visible.

First paragraph: Truisms have the disadvantage that by dulling the senses they obscure the truth. Almost nobody will become alarmed when told that in times of continuity the future equals the past. Only a few will become aware that from this follows that in times of socio-cultural change the future will not be like the past. Moreover, with a future not clearly perceived, we do not know how to act with only one certainty left: if we don’t act ourselves, we shall be acted upon. Thus, if we wish to be subjects, rather than objects, what we see now, that is, our perception, must be foresight rather than hindsight.

In the course of a long-term research project aimed at enabling a computer to analyse and code (-understand”) the meaning of ordinary English sentences, it became clear that much of the information necessary to understand many, if not most, sentencesis not to be found la the sentences themselves but must he supplied from another source. For the human reader this source is the fund of “knowledge” he has previously accumulated, both through living experience and through linguistic experience. This fund or knowledge is here visualised as a conceptual network onto which the incomplete information supplied by a sentence can be mapped, thus making it possible for the reader to fill in the missing pieces of the conceptual situation designated by the sentence. Such a conceptual network would seem to he the source, also of the various kinds of expectation (concerning the contents of those parts of the sentence which the reader has not yet read) which help the reader to resolve lexical and relational ambiguities. – It is suggested that a greater awareness of this function of the reader’s conceptual universe might lead to an improvement of instructional and remedial strategies for the teaching of the interpretive language skills.

Key words: language, cognition

First paragraph: Although investigations of meaning have in the last ten or fifteen years managed to acquire a sort of respectability and are now no longer considered an unforgivable breach of etiquette by professional linguists. There is still a great deal of reluctance to push semantic analysis beyond the boundaries that, for one reason or another, have been accepted by lexicologists in the past. This reluctance is no less noticeable among psycholinguists, psychologists, and philosophers of language, and it would seem that in most instances it is due to a strong and very understandable desire not to become involved in the tricky and treacherous problems of epistemology.

Key words: language, semiotics

The phenomenon of size constancy is defined as the apparent perceptual invariance of the linear dimensions of a seen object as this approaches the eye or recedes from it. It has been interpreted as resulting from the application by the brain of a size correction, made possible by the subject’s apprehension of distance cues present in the image. We present several observations which, by dissociating accommodation from distance of the seen object and by suppressing the optic effects of accommodation on the visual image itself, show that this interpretation is incorrect, and that in fact the size correction of the visual image is a function of the central effort of accommodation, not of the distance of the seen object.