The concept of self-organization is reviewed and its implications are explored in relation to management processes and social systems. A world view is taken, emphasizing a descriptive distinction of levels associated with the physical, biological, social, and mental. Self-organization principles, it is argued, are operative in all levels of such a stratified scheme, but they are manifest in different mechanisms and different embodiments. \\Management, planning, design, and other “intervention” type of activities are among the processes through which self-organization is manifest in the social domain. Ultimately they have to do with maintaining, enriching, and amplifying the potential variety of the systems concerned. The operationally critical question involved, it is suggested, is not whether management activities are “man-made” or “natural,” spontaneous” or “planned,” but rather, whether they enhance or supress the potential variety of a system under consideration.

The goal of this paper is to outline what has been called a “radical” constructivist model of knowledge, to describe how this model relates to Piaget’s theory of intellectual development, and to outline how this model can help us understand some of the things that happen in chemistry classrooms.

Recent discussions of “reality” will be argued as having failed to differentiate clearly between two levels: the level of things, people and events that can, for most purposes, reasonably be taken as existing “out there”; and the level of the meanings that can be applied to them by an observer. An anarchistic approach will be recommended.

The aim of the paper is: a) to gain some knowledge of the so-called ‘natural systems’ as interpreted or defined by modern systems scientists; b) to discuss these descriptions and definitions from the viewpoint of modern philosophy of science. In the course of both a) and b) the interwovenness of the classes of natural systems and the controversial issues connected therewith (a.o. their interwovenness with the artificial systems) will be touched upon.

This article presents a constructivist model of human cognitive development during infancy. According to constructivism, the elements of mental representation-even such basic elements as the concept of physical object-are constructed afresh by each individual, rather than being innately supplied. A (partially-specified, yet-unimplemented) mechanism, the Schema Mechanism, is proposed here; this mechanism is intended to achieve a series of cognitive constructions characteristic of infants' sensorimotor-stage development, primarily as described by Piaget. In reference to Piaget's “genetic epistemology”, I call this approach genetic AI-“genetic” not in the sense of genes, but in the sense of genesis: development from the point of origin. The Schema Mechanism focuses on Piaget's concept of the activity and evolution of cognitive schemas. The schema is construed here as a context-sensitive prediction of what will follow a certain action. Schemas are used both as assertions about the world, and as elements of plans to achieve goals. A mechanism of attribution causes a schema's assertion to be extended or revised according to the observed effects of the schema's action; due to the possible relevance of conjunctions of context conditions, the attribution facility needs to be able to sort through a combinatorial explosion of hypotheses. Crucially, the mechanism constructs representations of new actions and state elements, in terms of which schemas are expressed. Included here is a sketch of the proposed Schema Mechanism, and highlights of a hypothetical scenario of the mechanism's operation. The Schema Mechanism starts with a set of sensory and motor primitives as its sole units of representation. As with the Piagetian neonate, this leads to a “solipsist” conception: the world consists of sensory impressions transformed by motor actions. My scenario suggests how the mechanism might progress from there to conceiving of objects in space-representing an object independently of how it is currently perceived, or even whether it is currently perceived. The details of this progression paralledl the Piagetian development of object conception from the first through fifth sensorimotor stage.

Discusses the constructivist view of learning which emphasizes, among others, learning outcomes which depend not only on the learning environment but also on the knowledge of the learner. Implications for science instruction are also addressed.

What is our view of science? What is our view of the learning process? How can understanding of these issues help address problems of science education in schools? These are the questions that Driver and Bell address in this classic article. Science, they say, is about the ideas, concepts, and theories used to interpret the world. They then elaborate on six key aspects of the constructivist view of learning, using examples from science classrooms to illustrate the principles. The principles state that learning outcomes depend on what the learner already knows; learning involves constructing meanings; learning is a continuous and active process; meanings are evaluated and accepted or rejected; learners have responsibility for their learning; and some meanings are shared. Adopting a constructivist view of learning has implications for science education, including the importance of understanding students’ prior assumptions; of providing opportunities for students to reflect, have new experiences, and construct meaning; of revising the curriculum to be more developmentally appropriate; and of examining the conceptions which are most useful for students.

Excerpt: Over the last decade the teaching of science in secondary schools in the UK has been under scrutiny. Surveys undertaken on behalf of the Assessment of Performance Unit report the levels of performance attained by a national sample of pupils in a range of measures and point out, among other things, some of the difficulties that secondary school pupils have in understanding certain scientific ideas. In addition studies of secondary science classrooms including the survey undertaken by HMI suggest that didactic teaching methods still tend to predominate especially in upper secondary classes. When the Secondary Science Curriculum Review was instigated to address a number of issues in the teaching of science in secondary schools the Children’s Learning in Science Project was set up to work in collaboration with the Review. The intention was to develop revised teaching approaches which would be informed by research on children’s thinking in science and current theoretical developments in cognition. In particular we identify three potentially fruitful theoretical developments which suggest the need for rethinking our approach to teaching and learning science.

Patterns of vibrotactile stimulation were delivered to the index fingertips of naive blindfolded subjects. The attributions made by these subjects when they were allowed to experience transformations of vibrotactile stimulation correlated with self-movement were assessed. Although the subjects became aware of the relationship between self-movement and stimulation transformation, they never developed the hypothesis of distal attribution, ie the hypothesis that the ultimate cause of their vibrotactile experience was an encounter with an object in the environment. It is proposed that further investigations of the course of acquisition of distal attribution in the situation described may be instructive in the study of externalization in other modalities.