Attention is paid to the similarities between pragmatic philosophy and symbolic interactionism on the one hand, and radical constructive epistemologies on the other. Referring to the work of George Herbert Mead, symbolic interactionism has frequently been designated as a naive and idealistic sociological theory promoting the liberty of the individual by the use of the metaphysically echoing concepts as “the self”, “the I and the Me” and “taking the role of the other”. In reading the work of Mead closely, however, one is struck by the theoretic nature of these concepts which is not always clearly mentioned in symbolic interactionism. Furthermore, the work of Mead treats very similar topics and in a very similar way to the work of present theorists on autopoiesis and auto‐organisation and its origins in the relation between individuals and society. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest the work of Mead as a possible frame of reference for the elaboration of present discussions on the matter.

The attempt to define living systems in terms of goal, purpose, function, etc. runs into serious conceptual difficulties. The theoretical biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela realized that any such attempt cannot capture what is distinctive about them: their autonomy and unity. Goal, purpose, etc. always define the system in terms of something extrinsic, whereas living systems are unique because they maintain their unitary continuity of pattern despite the ceaseless turnover of their components. So, system-closure is a prerequisite of their adequate conceptual comprehension. Maturana and Varela themselves found that system-closure pertains exclusively to their organization, i.e. the set of relations among system-components which unify them. For living systems this comprises the relation between the system-components and the processes which they undergo. This relation is self-referential because it is closed, i.e. it essentially (re)produces itself. \\While this model worked very well in the biological domain, attempts to extend it to the social domain met with serious conceptual obstacles. The reason for this is that Maturana did not make a consistent enough application of it. He understood the components of social systems biologically (individuals, persons, etc.) and the relations between them socially (language). This inconsistency ruptured the system’s organizational closure. Consequently organizational closure (autopoiesis) can be maintained only when both the components of social systems and their processes are of the same type: social. This interpretation can be found in the work of Niklas Luhmann who recognizes that the components of social systems are not persons, individuals, actors or subjects but communicative actions themselves. This preserves the organizational closure of the system and permits the concept of autopoiesis to be used as a powerful instrument of social analysis.

Key words: Autopoiesis, communication, meaning, organization, social systems, structure.

Self-reference and recursion characterize a vast range of dynamic phenomena, particularly biological automata. In this paper we investigate the dynamics of self-referent phenomena using the Extended Calculus of Indications (ECI) of Kauffman and Varela, who have applied the ECI to mathematics, physics, linguistics, perception, and cognition. Previous studies have focused on the algebraic structure of the ECI, and on form dynamics using only the arithmetic of Spencer-Brown. We here examine the temporal behavior of self-referent or reentrant forms using the full power of the ECI to represent tangled hierarchies and multiple enfolded dimensions of space-time. Further, we explore the temporal convolution of static and recursive states in coherent fluctuation, providing a foundation for going beyond the Turing model of computation in finite automata. Novel results are presented on the structure of reentrant forms and the canonical elements of form eigenbehavior, the characteristic self-determined dynamic inherent in reentrant forms.

The consideration of the relation of mutual specification between a distinguished whole and the parts distinguished in it, and of their specification of two nonintersecting phenomenal domains, constitute the starting point for a radical constructivist redefinition of the ‘mind-body problem’ (MBP), where the opposition between mind and body turns into a relation of complementarity between components of a larger (social, ecological) whole. The implications as to the traditional views on the MBP are outlined, stressing in particular the overcoming of the holism/reductionism and parallelism/interactionism dualities.

Excerpt: My approach to the subject matter of this paper is one that could be subsumed under a genre that we might call the ecology of ideas. What is at issue is less the validity of ideas than the way in which they are born, circulate, take root in areas different from their place of origin and finally take on new, and sometimes unexpected, forms.