Excerpt: The first challenge we face in this endeavor is to define two philosophies which provide the basis for most teaching practices: positivism and || constructivism. Next, we intend to familiarize teachers with the influences these philosophies have had on teacher education programs and the classroom. Our final task is to help teachers identify these philosophies within their own practice so they may determine whether or not their teaching style actually reflects their personal beliefs.

In the Developmental Teacher Education (DTE) program at the University of California at Berkeley, Piagetian developmental theory and research is used as core knowledge for preparing elementary school teachers. Developmental-constructivist principles of knowledge acquisition are particularly well-suited for this purpose because they have implications for what and how children are taught, how progress toward expertise in teaching is conceptualized, and how teachers are educated. The authors describe the 2-year, postgraduate program, whose features include small cohorts of students, course work organized to address key topics repeatedly and hierarchically, multiple student teaching placements in diverse settings, and a master’s project on a teaching-learning issue. They also comment on teaching practices of program graduates and the development of their understanding of children, learning, and teaching during and after graduation from the program.

This Introduction is our attempt to clarify further the cluster of key notions: autonomy, viability, abduction and adaptation. These notions form the conceptual scaffolding within which the individual contribution contained in this volume can be placed. Hopefully, these global concepts represent fundamental signposts for future research that can spare us a mere flurry of modelling and simulations into which this new field could fall.

Key words: cognitivism, connectionism, enaction, autonomy, viability, abduction, adaptation

Excerpt: In the present essay I will be concerned with the dispute between constructivism and realism. I have three aims: to articulate the best arguments for realism against sophisticated versions of constructivism, to explore the implications of those arguments for our understanding of the issue of conventionality generally, and to explore some broader issues of philosophical method which are raised by the dispute between realists and constructivists.

The paper presents a discussion of the epistemological and ontological problems of attempts to found information concepts on the often implicit mechanistic idea that the physical sciences hold the key to the nature of reality and information. It is furthermore shown through an analysis of the ethological and the Batesonian understanding of cognition and behavior that it is impossible to remove the fundamental epistemological position of the observer through a definition of information as neg-entropy. Instead Maturana and Varela’s concepts of autopoiesis and multiverse are invoked. But where the idea to derive information from the concept of negentropy is too physicalistic Maturana’s idea of a multiverse seems to be too close to a constructivistic idealism. To develop a more fruitful non-reductionistic world view it is shown that the more pragmatic understanding of physics, where thermodynamics is understood as the basic discipline and mechanics as an idealization, opens for a non-reductionistic con-ceptualization of chaos. Attention is drawn to C. S. Peirce’s conception of pure chance as living spontaneity which is to some degree regular as a realistic but non-reductionistic theory, which comprises a solution to the different world view problems of Bateson and Maturana. A fruitful connection between second order cybernetics and semiotics will then be possible and a bridge between the technical-scientific and the humanistic-social parts of cybernetics can be developed.

The notion of mechanistic explanation is given a very specific meaning by Maturana. Does it influence research in human sciences? In this article an attempt is made to answer this question.

Excerpt: Not only the historical development of informatics as a scientific and technical discipline but also its core problems are, prima facie, far removed from philosophical developments arising from soft sciences such as hermeneutics, and closer to logic or the philosophy of science. Is the relationship between informatics and hermeneutics of any mutual relevance? What happens when we reflect hermeneutically on the foundations of informatics? Winograd and Flores have made the attempt, and one result was their insight into “the non-obviousness of the rationalistic orientation” of informatics. Consequently, they found themselves “deeply concerned with the question of language.” My purpose is to show why Winograd and Flores have grasped, on the one hand, some key issues of Heidegger’s hermeneutics, while at the same time distorting some of his insights, particularly with regard to science and information technology.

Excerpt: There has been a long-standing debate – from Leibnitz to Lady Lovelace to the present – over whether purely computational devices are capable of fundamentally-creative, truly emergent behavior. This paper will discuss various kinds of devices capable of emergent behaviors and take up the question of whether we can by purely computational means amplify our capacities as observers and actors in the physical world.

The representational view of mind in mathematics education is evidenced by theories that characterize learning as a process in which students modify their internal mental representations to construct mathematical relationships or structures that mirror those embodied in external instructional representations. It is argued that, psychologically, this view falls prey to the learning paradox, that, anthropologically, it fails to consider the social and cultural nature of mathematical activity and that, pedagogically, it leads to recommendations that are at odds with the espoused goal of encouraging learning with understanding. These difficulties are seen to arise from the dualism created between mathematics in students’ heads and mathematics in their environment. An alternative view is then outlined and illustrated that attempts to transcend this dualism by treating mathematics as both an individual, constructive activity and as a communal, social practice. It is suggested that such an approach might make it possible to explain how students construct mathematical meanings and practices that, historically, took several thousand years to evolve without attributing to students the ability to peek around their internal representations and glimpse a mathematically prestructured environment. In addition, it is argued that this approach might offer a way to go beyond the traditional tripartite scheme of the teacher, the student, and mathematics that has traditionally guided reform efforts in mathematics education.