The authors point out the difference between the theory of constructivism and its practical application, and they argue that the consequences of implementing constructivism in the classroom will be considerably more challenging than might be anticipated from the simple slogans that advocates repeat.

Constructivist ideas have had a major influence on science educators over the last decade. In this report a model describing possible student responses during science lessons is outlined, and a rationale for it is provided on the basis of both constructivist theory and tests of the model in middle school science classes. The study therefore explores a way to analyze and describe learning derived from both constructivist theoretical considerations and classroom practice. The model was tested in a series of science lessons, resulting in several revisions. The final version explained in this report is therefore consistent with the science lesson contexts explored and the theoretical constructs which underlie it. The lessons were conducted in three classes of 11- to 13-year-olds in provincial cities in Queensland, Australia. Students were mostly of Caucasian extraction, in mixed-ability and mixed-gender classes. Three students from each class were interviewed individually immediately following each of the three lessons, for a total of 27 interviews. The interviews, videotapes of lessons, and field notes were used as data sources. The final version of the model proved to be fairly robust in describing students’ cognitive progress through the lessons. This study has resulted in a model for science lessons which allows the identification and description of students’ cognitive progress through the lessons. By using this focus on the learner, it provides preknowledge for teachers about how students might arrive at solutions to science problems during lessons, and therefore potentially provides indications about appropriate teaching strategies.

While cognitive and social constructivism have at times been portrayed as competing paradigms, some authors such as Cobb (1994) have suggested that they are different ways of looking at the same thing. In an earlier paper, aspects of both cognitive and social constructivism were incorporated into a model used to analyse and describe student learning in science classrooms (Appleton, 1997). The model has subsequently been revised and has been used to draw implications for the teaching of science. In this paper, key elements of the model are explained, and how each may be used to inform and shape science teaching is explored.

The paper recalls some skeptical comments Norbert Wiener made regarding the potential use of cybernetics in social sciences. A few social scientists were seduced by cybernetics from the beginning, but cybernetics never really caught on in sociology. The paper argues that one reason for this may lie in the mathematical theory of communication entertained by early cybernetics. This theory which maintains that there are probability distributions of possible communication is at odds with the sociological theory’s idea of a communication driven by improbable understanding. Yet the move from first-order cybernetics to second-order cybernetics, by re-entering the observer into the very systems she observes, provides for a bridge between cybernetics and sociology.

Key words: Communication, culture, cybernetics, double closure, observer, sociology, technology, understanding

This paper explicates Luhmann’s self-referential theory of autopoiesis. Luhmann shows how social systems work in self-reproducing fashion to define and perpetuate themselves. This process of autopoiesis depends heavily upon binary coding. Systems which define themselves in a unitary fashion face the problem of tautology (`legal is legal’). Systems thus turn to dichotomies or binary coding to define themselves (`legal is not illegal’). This in turn can lead to the problem of paradox (when something is defined in terms of what it is not), so that the systems are seen in Luhmann’s theory as utilizing procedures both for `de-tautologizing’ and `de-paradoxing’ themselves. This paper shows that Luhmann’s paradigm holds great promise for solving current problems of social theory and for moving theory forward. This is illustrated by applying Luhmann’s theory to two empirical examples: law and ecology.

Key words: self-reference, autopoiesis, communication, binary coding, paradox, law, ecology

Diverse forms of constructivism can be found in the literature today. They exhibit a commonality regarding certain classical positions that they oppose – a unity in their negative identities – but a sometimes wild multiplicity and incompatibility regarding the positive proposals that they put forward. In particular, some constructivisms propose an epistemological idealism, with a concomitant relativism, while others are explicitly opposed to such positions, and move in multifarious different directions. This is a potentially confusing situation, and has resulted in some critics branding all constructivisms with the charge of relativism, and throwing out the baby with the bath water. In addition, since the epistemological foundations of even non-relativist constructivisms are not as familiar as the classical positions, there is a risk of mis-interpretation of constructivisms and their consequences, even by some who endorse them, not to mention those who criticize. Because I urge that some version of constructivism is an epistemological necessity, this situation strikes me as seriously unfortunate for philosophy, and potentially dangerous for the practice of education.

Key words: realism, idealism, empiricism, innatism, constructivism, relativism, representation, epistemology, scaffolding.

A problem of action selection emerges in complex and even not so complex interactive agents: what to do next? The problem of action selection occurs equally for natural and for artificial agents for any embodied agent. The obvious solution to this problem constitutes a form of representation, interactive representation, that is arguably the fundamental form of representation. More carefully, interactive representation satisfies a criterion for representation that no other model of representation in the literature can satisfy or even attempts to address: the possibility of systemdetectable representational error. It also resolves and avoids myriad other problematics of representation and integrates or opens the door to many additional mental processes and phenomena, such as motivation.