Open peer commentary on the article “Creativity in Solving Short Tasks for Learning Computational Thinking” by Valentina Dagienė, Gerald Futschek & Gabrielė Stupurienė. Abstract: Computational thinking (CT) skills are nowadays strongly advocated for educational institutions at all levels. CT refers broadly to skills of thinking about the world from a computational perspective, however, not necessarily referring to programming skills in particular. There is still a lack of consensus about what CT means, and how CT should be taught. This open peer commentary briefly discusses some ongoing trends of CT in response to the target article, which reports development, field testing and piloting of an extensive set of new learning materials for teaching CT. Recent calls for interdisciplinary technology education, creativity and open-ended problem solving in CT are highlighted.

In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception.

Key words: enactivism, perception, sociality, practices, intersubjectivity, culture

Context: Although trauma research has advanced immensely, the struggle to find effective treatment for posttraumatic survivors continues. It seems reasonable to say that, at present, our ability to treat those suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is, at the very least, limited. Problem: We argue that in order to confront the current crisis in the study of trauma - evidenced by our limited ability to offer successful treatment for those who develop PTSD - we must return to the subjective experience. Our claim is that only by applying a rigorous method to study the subjective experience will we be able to understand the meaning of neuronal activity associated with PTSD. Method: The neurophenomenological research program (NRP) is a working plan that enables us to create a solid and reliable link between the subjective experience and neuronal activity. Thus, the NRP allows us to (a) delve deeply (and rigorously) into the subjective experience and, by so doing, (b) extract the cognitive mechanism that constitutes the building blocks bridging between the subjective experience and neuronal activity. Following this, we will be able to (c) identify the relevant neuronal activity for the phenomenon under examination. Results: Based on previous studies among posttraumatic survivors, we suggest that two cognitive mechanisms are especially relevant for the study of trauma: the sense of body ownership (i.e., the sense that this is our own body) and the sense of agency (the sense that we control our body. The trade-off between these closely related, yet independent mechanisms is highly significant. We conclude the article with the presentation of a detailed working plan for the study of trauma - one that begins with the subject and returns to the subject. Implications: This article summarizes our struggle to conduct a phenomenological research in the study of trauma and our methodological efforts of the last ten years. It should help the beginner to avoid some mistakes that have been made in this long journey, yet obviously, each one must build their own route. Likewise, we suggest that phenomenologists, brain scientists and clinicians should find a way to cooperate. This shared effort might allow us to improve our understanding of the traumatic experience and its long-term implications; as such, we believe that in this process a better treatment could be developed. That being said, the limitation of our proposal is the difficulty of creating a shared language that bridges these different worlds. Constructivist content: We strongly embraces phenomenological approach together with enactivist/embodied theories.

Key words: Trauma, PTSD, treatment, neurophenomenology, subjective experience, introspection cognitive bridges, brain activity

Abstract: This response confronts some crucial questions raised by the reviewers: (a) Can the phenomenological approach be applied to the study of trauma? (b) What is the exact meaning of the term “traumatic event? (c) Is our phenomenological approach too thin? (d) What is the nature of the proposed cognitive bridge - what else is needed? (e) Is the shared world indeed lacking? (f) Is it possible to control patients with posttraumatic stress disorder in the lab? (g) How is our proposal innovative?

This article presents a unifying theory of the embodied, situated human brain called the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM). The HMM describes the brain as a complex adaptive system that actively minimises the decay of our sensory and physical states by producing self-fulfilling action-perception cycles via dynamical interactions between hierarchically organised neurocognitive mechanisms. This theory synthesises the free-energy principle (FEP) in neuroscience with an evolutionary systems theory of psychology that explains our brains, minds, and behaviour by appealing to Tinbergen’s four questions: adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism. After leveraging the FEP to formally define the HMM across different spatiotemporal scales, we conclude by exploring its implications for theorising and research in the sciences of the mind and behaviour.

Key words: active inference, evolutionary systems theory, hierarchically mechanistic mind, free-energy principle, neuroscience, psychology

The notion of structural coupling plays a central role in Maturana and Varela’s biology of cognition framework and strongly influenced Varela’s subsequent enactive elaboration of this framework. Building upon previous work using a glider in the Game of Life (GoL) cellular automaton as a toy model of a minimal autopoietic system with which to concretely explore these theoretical frameworks, this article presents an analysis of structural coupling between a glider and its environment. Specifically, for sufficiently small GoL universes, we completely characterize the nonautonomous dynamics of both a glider and its environment in terms of interaction graphs, derive the set of possible glider lives determined by the mutual constraints between these interaction graphs, and show how such lives are embedded in the state transition graph of the entire GoL universe.

Key words: autopoiesis, enaction, structural coupling, cellular automata, enactivism

Abstract: The commentaries provide useful questions and responses that help us understand better how unplugged activities serve as scaffolding to engage students in computer science. They help us to consider how activities relate to computational thinking, particularly by connecting the scaffolding in the activities to the limits of computation. This in turn helps us to navigate the somewhat disputed boundary between activities that clearly use computation as it occurs on physical devices, and metaphors that could potentially be misleading.

Context: The meaning and implications of “computational thinking” (CT) are only now starting to be clarified, and the applications of the Computer Science (CS) Unplugged approach are becoming clearer as research is appearing. Now is a good time to consider how these relate, and what the opportunities and issues are for teachers using this approach. Problem: The goal here is to connect computational thinking explicitly to the CS Unplugged pedagogical approach, and to identify the context where Unplugged can be used effectively. Method: We take a theoretical approach, selecting a representative sample of CS Unplugged activities and mapping them to CT concepts. Results: The CS Unplugged activities map well onto commonly accepted CT concepts, although caution must be taken not to regard CS Unplugged as being a complete approach to CT education. Implications: There is evidence that CS Unplugged activities have a useful role to help students and teachers engage with CT, and to support hands-on activities with digital devices. Constructivist content: A constructivist approach to teaching computer science concepts can be particularly valuable at present because the public (and many teachers who are likely to have to become engaged with the subject) do not see CS as something they are likely to understand. Providing a clear way for anyone to construct this knowledge for themselves gives an opportunity to empower them when it might otherwise have been regarded as a domain that is open to only a select few.

Key words: Computational thinking, CS Unplugged, Papert, teacher professional learning and development, integrated learning, computation, algorithms, kinesthetic learning.

Abstract: Maker education is a new instantiation of the decades-old project of project-based, constructionist, inquiry-driven learning. However, unlike other past implementations, it offers many unique characteristics, makes possible novel educational outcomes, and challenges policy makers and teachers with new infrastructural needs. In this response, using examples from school and district-wide implementation, we address three categories of questions raised in the commentaries around maker education: the uniqueness of makerspaces and the artifacts produced within them (and how they differ from projects and artifacts produced in other educational environments), teacher professional development for this novel type of school environment, and new approaches to assessment. Our conclusions point to recommendations that could be useful for policy makers, teachers and educators working on the implementation of maker programs.

Open peer commentary on the article “Creativity in Solving Short Tasks for Learning Computational Thinking” by Valentina Dagienė, Gerald Futschek & Gabrielė Stupurienė. Abstract: Teaching computing concepts and computational thinking via short tasks could be considered as an implementation of a minimalism movement in education. Minimalism in this context does not mean less educational or less creative. This commentary will attempt to provide additional insights of minimalism in the form of cards with short tasks, supported by personal experience at university level.