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By default, Find returns all publications that contain the words in the surnames of their author, in their titles, or in their years. For example,
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Abramova E. & Slors M. (2019) Mechanistic explanation for enactive sociality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18(2): 401–424. https://cepa.info/5837
Abramova E.
&
Slors M.
(
2019
)
Mechanistic explanation for enactive sociality
.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
18(2): 401–424.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5837
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In this article we analyze the methodological commitments of a radical embodied cognition (REC) approach to social interaction and social cognition, specifically with respect to the explanatory framework it adopts. According to many representatives of REC, such as enactivists and the proponents of dynamical and ecological psychology, sociality is to be explained by (1) focusing on the social unit rather than the individuals that comprise it and (2) establishing the regularities that hold on this level rather than modeling the sub-personal mechanisms that could be said to underlie social phenomena. We point out that, despite explicit commitment, such a view implies an implicit rejection of the mechanistic explanation framework widely adopted in traditional cognitive science (TCS), which, in our view, hinders comparability between REC and these approaches. We further argue that such a position is unnecessary and that enactive mechanistic explanation of sociality is both possible and desirable. We examine three distinct objections from REC against mechanistic explanation, which we dub the decomposability, causality and extended cognition worries. In each case we show that these complaints can be alleviated by either appreciation of the full scope of the mechanistic account or adjustments on both mechanistic and REC sides of the debate.
Key words:
enactivism
,
mechanistic explanation
,
social cognition
Aguayo C. (2019) Autopoiesis in digital learning design: Theoretical implications in education. In: Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE 2019). MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 495–496. https://cepa.info/8142
Aguayo C.
(
2019
)
Autopoiesis in digital learning design: Theoretical implications in education
.
In:
Proceedings of the
2019
Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE
2019
)
. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 495–496.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/8142
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Today’s mobile and smart technologies have a key role to play in the transformative potential of educational practice. However, technology-enhanced learning processes are embedded within an inherent and unpredictable complexity, not only in the design and development of educational experiences, but also within the socio-cultural and technological contexts where users and learners reside. This represents a limitation with current mainstream digital educational practice, as digital experiences tend to be designed and developed as ‘one solution fits all’ products, and/or as ‘one-off’ events, failing to address ongoing socio-technological complexity, therefore tending to decay in meaningfulness and effectiveness over time. One ambitious solution is to confer the processes associated with the design and development of digital learning experiences with similar autopoietic properties found within living systems, in particular adaptability and self-organisation. The underpinning rationale is that, by conferring such properties to digital learning experiences, intelligent digital interventions responding to unpredictable and ever-changing socio-cultural conditions can be created, promoting meaningful learning over-time. Such an epistemological view of digital learning aims to ultimately promote a more efficient type of design and development of digital learning experiences in education. Read less
Albertazzi L. (2019) Experimental phenomenology: What it is and what it is not. Synthese 198: 2191–2212. https://cepa.info/6585
Albertazzi L.
(
2019
)
Experimental phenomenology: What it is and what it is not
.
Synthese
198: 2191–2212.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6585
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Experimental phenomenology is the study of appearances in subjective awareness. Its methods and results challenge quite a few aspects of the current debate on consciousness. A robust theoretical framework for understanding consciousness is pending: current empirical research waves on what a phenomenon of consciousness properly is, not least because the question is still open on the observables to be measured and how to measure them. I shall present the basics of experimental phenomenology and discuss the current development of experimental phenomenology, its main features, and the many misunderstandings that have obstructed a fair understanding and evaluation of its otherwise enlightening outcomes.
Apiola M.-V. (2019) Towards a Creator Mindset for Computational Thinking: Reflections on Task-Cards. Constructivist Foundations 14(3): 404–406. https://cepa.info/6064
Apiola M.-V.
(
2019
)
Towards a Creator Mindset for Computational Thinking: Reflections on Task-Cards
.
Constructivist Foundations
14(3): 404–406.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6064
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Open peer commentary on the article “Creativity in Solving Short Tasks for Learning Computational Thinking” by Valentina Dagienė, Gerald Futschek & Gabrielė Stupurienė.
Abstract:
Computational thinking (CT) skills are nowadays strongly advocated for educational institutions at all levels. CT refers broadly to skills of thinking about the world from a computational perspective, however, not necessarily referring to programming skills in particular. There is still a lack of consensus about what CT means, and how CT should be taught. This open peer commentary briefly discusses some ongoing trends of CT in response to the target article, which reports development, field testing and piloting of an extensive set of new learning materials for teaching CT. Recent calls for interdisciplinary technology education, creativity and open-ended problem solving in CT are highlighted.
Arango A. (2019) From sensorimotor dependencies to perceptual practices: Making enactivism social. Adaptive Behavior 27(1): 31–45. https://cepa.info/6199
Arango A.
(
2019
)
From sensorimotor dependencies to perceptual practices: Making enactivism social
.
Adaptive Behavior
27(1): 31–45.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6199
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Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action–perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because it has no traction on socially dependent perceptions (SDPs), which are essential to the role and significance of perception in our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, and music. More specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and intermodal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central features of SDP: attentional focus, aspects’ salience, and modal-specific harmony-like relations.
Key words:
enactivism
,
perception
,
practices
,
culture
,
intersubjectivity
,
pragmatism.
Arango A. (2019) Social enactivism about perception – reply to McGann. Adaptive Behavior 27(2): 161–162. https://cepa.info/6103
Arango A.
(
2019
)
Social enactivism about perception – reply to McGann
.
Adaptive Behavior
27(2): 161–162.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6103
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In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception.
Key words:
enactivism
,
perception
,
sociality
,
practices
,
intersubjectivity
,
culture
Ataria Y., Lahad M. & Horovitz O. (2019) Applying the Neurophenomenological Approach to the Study of Trauma: Theory and Practice. Constructivist Foundations 14(2): 197–214. https://cepa.info/5775
Ataria Y.
,
Lahad M.
&
Horovitz O.
(
2019
)
Applying the Neurophenomenological Approach to the Study of Trauma: Theory and Practice
.
Constructivist Foundations
14(2): 197–214.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5775
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Context:
Although trauma research has advanced immensely, the struggle to find effective treatment for posttraumatic survivors continues. It seems reasonable to say that, at present, our ability to treat those suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is, at the very least, limited.
Problem:
We argue that in order to confront the current crisis in the study of trauma - evidenced by our limited ability to offer successful treatment for those who develop PTSD - we must return to the subjective experience. Our claim is that only by applying a rigorous method to study the subjective experience will we be able to understand the meaning of neuronal activity associated with PTSD.
Method:
The neurophenomenological research program (NRP) is a working plan that enables us to create a solid and reliable link between the subjective experience and neuronal activity. Thus, the NRP allows us to (a) delve deeply (and rigorously) into the subjective experience and, by so doing, (b) extract the cognitive mechanism that constitutes the building blocks bridging between the subjective experience and neuronal activity. Following this, we will be able to (c) identify the relevant neuronal activity for the phenomenon under examination.
Results:
Based on previous studies among posttraumatic survivors, we suggest that two cognitive mechanisms are especially relevant for the study of trauma: the sense of body ownership (i.e., the sense that this is our own body) and the sense of agency (the sense that we control our body. The trade-off between these closely related, yet independent mechanisms is highly significant. We conclude the article with the presentation of a detailed working plan for the study of trauma - one that begins with the subject and returns to the subject.
Implications:
This article summarizes our struggle to conduct a phenomenological research in the study of trauma and our methodological efforts of the last ten years. It should help the beginner to avoid some mistakes that have been made in this long journey, yet obviously, each one must build their own route. Likewise, we suggest that phenomenologists, brain scientists and clinicians should find a way to cooperate. This shared effort might allow us to improve our understanding of the traumatic experience and its long-term implications; as such, we believe that in this process a better treatment could be developed. That being said, the limitation of our proposal is the difficulty of creating a shared language that bridges these different worlds.
Constructivist content:
We strongly embraces phenomenological approach together with enactivist/embodied theories.
Key words:
Trauma
,
PTSD
,
treatment
,
neurophenomenology
,
subjective experience
,
introspection cognitive bridges
,
brain activity
Ataria Y., Lahad M. & Horovitz O. (2019) Authors’ Response: Whatever Works instead of All or Nothing. Constructivist Foundations 14(2): 226–229. https://cepa.info/5781
Ataria Y.
,
Lahad M.
&
Horovitz O.
(
2019
)
Authors’ Response: Whatever Works instead of All or Nothing
.
Constructivist Foundations
14(2): 226–229.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5781
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Abstract:
This response confronts some crucial questions raised by the reviewers: (a) Can the phenomenological approach be applied to the study of trauma? (b) What is the exact meaning of the term “traumatic event? (c) Is our phenomenological approach too thin? (d) What is the nature of the proposed cognitive bridge - what else is needed? (e) Is the shared world indeed lacking? (f) Is it possible to control patients with posttraumatic stress disorder in the lab? (g) How is our proposal innovative?
Baber C., Chemero A. & Hall J. (2019) What the jeweller’s hand tells the jeweller’s brain: Tool use, creativity and embodied cognition. Philosophy & Technology 32(2): 283–302. https://cepa.info/8121
Baber C.
,
Chemero A.
&
Hall J.
(
2019
)
What the jeweller’s hand tells the jeweller’s brain: Tool use, creativity and embodied cognition
.
Philosophy & Technology
32(2): 283–302.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/8121
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The notion that human activity can be characterised in terms of dynamic systems is a well-established alternative to motor schema approaches. Key to a dynamic systems approach is the idea that a system seeks to achieve stable states in the face of perturbation. While such an approach can apply to physical activity, it can be challenging to accept that dynamic systems also describe cognitive activity. In this paper, we argue that creativity, which could be construed as a ‘cognitive’ activity par excellence, arises from the dynamic systems involved in jewellery making. Knowing whether an action has been completed to a ‘good’ standard is a significant issue in considering acts in creative disciplines. When making a piece of jewellery, there a several criteria which can define ‘good’. These are not only the aesthetics of the finished piece but also the impact of earlier actions on subsequent ones. This suggests that the manner in which an action is coordinated is influenced by the criteria by which the product is judged. We see these criteria as indicating states for the system, e.g. in terms of a space of ‘good’ outcomes and a complementary space of ‘bad’ outcomes. The skill of the craftworker is to navigate this space of available states in such a way as to minimise risk, effort and other costs and maximise benefit and quality of the outcome. In terms of postphenomonology, this paper explores Ihde’s human-technology relations and relates these to the concepts developed here.
Key words:
creativity
,
radical embodied cognitive science
,
postphenomonology
,
jewellery making
,
dynamic systems
,
uncontrolled manifold hypothesis.
Badcock P. B., Friston K. J. & Ramstead M. J. D. (2019) The hierarchically mechanistic mind: A free-energy formulation of the human psyche. Physics of Life Reviews 1: 1–1. https://cepa.info/5879
Badcock P. B.
,
Friston K. J.
&
Ramstead M. J. D.
(
2019
)
The hierarchically mechanistic mind: A free-energy formulation of the human psyche
.
Physics of Life Reviews
1: 1–1.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5879
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This article presents a unifying theory of the embodied, situated human brain called the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM). The HMM describes the brain as a complex adaptive system that actively minimises the decay of our sensory and physical states by producing self-fulfilling action-perception cycles via dynamical interactions between hierarchically organised neurocognitive mechanisms. This theory synthesises the free-energy principle (FEP) in neuroscience with an evolutionary systems theory of psychology that explains our brains, minds, and behaviour by appealing to Tinbergen’s four questions: adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism. After leveraging the FEP to formally define the HMM across different spatiotemporal scales, we conclude by exploring its implications for theorising and research in the sciences of the mind and behaviour.
Key words:
active inference
,
evolutionary systems theory
,
hierarchically mechanistic mind
,
free-energy principle
,
neuroscience
,
psychology
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