“Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply,” makes the case for grounding the autopoietic definition of living beings to the discrete bodies of organisms rather than to autopoietic systems that extend beyond the organisms into their environments. They attempt this grounding by amending a clause to the original formulation of autopoiesis that identifies living beings with their bodies, and then they explicitly define “bodies”. This commentary makes the case that bodily grounding can be derived from molecular autopoiesis by taking the molecular domain seriously, and no new amendment is required.

Key words: autopoiesis, embodiment, organisms.

Villalobos and Razeto-Barry propose a theory of living individuals that includes both considerations about autopoietic systems and about material individuals. However, I think that their characterisation of individuality is problematic and would not be useful to account for living individuals.

Key words: individual bodies, autopoiesis.

Open peer commentary on the article “I Can’t Yet and Growth Mindset” by Fiona Murphy & Hugh Gash. Abstract: Childhood is a sensitive developmental stage with lasting impacts into adulthood. Successful interventions that tackle poor learning strategies provide the child with a stronger foundation for dealing with adversity. Roleplays and immediacy are proposed as two methods of improving learning strategies.

I agree with Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s main argument that living beings are autopoietic bodies. I suggest, however, that if we apply this definition of life to a consideration of living beings as dissipative systems, we find opportunities for further refinement. I propose that living bodies are autopoietic bodies that maintain themselves by using their boundaries to control their constituent processes of dissipative adaptation.

Key words: dissipative systems, autopoiesis, living bodies.

Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s target article highlights a debate about the role of spatial boundaries in autopoiesis that has been simmering for some time. I argue that, ultimately, controversies such as this are best resolved not by verbal argument, but rather in the context of actual mathematically formulated theories of biological individuality. Finally, I briefly review some initial efforts in this direction as they relate to the question of boundaries.

Key words: autopoiesis, boundary, toy model, theory, game of life.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Critique of Barbieri’s Code Biology” by Alexander V. Kravchenko. Abstract: This commentary is largely congruent with the premises advanced by Kravchenko’s target article. It further develops the idea that humans operate in multiple domains of relational behaviour grounded in an ongoing mixture of systemic cognition, oral language, and written symbolic language. Cognition, and hence behaviour, is constrained differently in each of these overlapping modalities so that each affords a different set of understanding and action.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Critique of Barbieri’s Code Biology” by Alexander V. Kravchenko. Abstract: My commentary criticizes Kravchenko’s objections to Barbieri’s biosemiotic theory. Because Kravchenko holds that concepts of signs, codes, and languages should be applied only to humans, his position, which is neither clearly explained nor defended, completely rules out any semiotics that would apply to biological construction in organisms (genetic codes and their expression), intra-organismic communication processes (molecular signals and their interpretations), informational processes in nervous systems (neural codes and how they are read out), and animal communication. I argue that most of the critique is about unproductive disagreements over word usages rather than an attempt to develop an alternative biosemiotics. Kravchenko’s critique also misconstrues how biosemioticians think about signs, codes, interpretation, meaning, and epistemology.

“In Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply”, Villalobos and Razeto-Barry offer an articulation of the embodied aspect of the autopoietic theory. Their aim is to block the extended interpretation of this theory. For them, living beings are, simply put, autopoietic bodies. In this commentary, I advance two concerns regarding the alleged cases of extended living beings. On the one hand, I argue that their proposal fails to account for the intuitive difference between these cases and living beings that are embedded in the environment. On the other hand, I argue that, from the perspective offered by the authors, there also seems to be a problem in the way the boundaries of a system are delineated.

Key words: autopoiesis, extended cognition, extended autopoietic systems, enactivism

Open peer commentary on the article “I Can’t Yet and Growth Mindset” by Fiona Murphy & Hugh Gash. Abstract: A strong emotional theme in relation to children’s learning emerges in the target article. I draw parallels with mathematics education research, where repeated studies have advocated mixed-ability grouping, higher teacher expectations and rich mathematical tasks. However, teachers’ beliefs and attitudes can be resistant to change. My commentary invites the authors to consider how their research might be strengthened by further analysis using identity theory.

Villalobos and Razeto-Barry suggest that extended enactivist interpretations of the autopoietic theory do not adequately address the bodily dimensions of living beings. In reply, we suggest that the extended enactivist view provides a richer account of living beings than a theory confined to autopoiesis, and therefore should not be supplanted by a modified autopoietic theory.

Key words: enactivism, autopoiesis, living systems