Radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological approach and the enactive approach. We propose that these two approaches can be brought together into a productive synthesis. The key is to recognize that the two approaches are pursuing different but complementary types of explanation. Both approaches seek to explain behavior in terms of the animal–environment relation, but they start at opposite ends. Ecological psychologists pursue an ontological strategy. They begin by describing the habitat of the species, and use this to explain how action possibilities are constrained for individual actors. Enactivists, meanwhile, pursue an epistemic strategy: start by characterizing the exploratory, self-regulating behavior of the individual organism, and use this to understand how that organism brings forth its animal-specific umwelt. Both types of explanation are necessary: the ontological strategy explains how structure in the environment constrains how the world can appear to an individual, while the epistemic strategy explains how the world can appear differently to different members of the same species, relative to their skills, abilities, and histories. Making the distinction between species habitat and animal-specific umwelt allows us to understand the environment in realist terms while acknowledging that individual living organisms are phenomenal beings.

Open peer commentary on the article “Systems Theory and Algorithmic Futures: Interview with Elena Esposito” by Elena Esposito, Katrin Sold & Bénédicte Zimmermann. Abstract: Elena Esposito’s interview is a great opportunity to ponder on the applications of Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory to current social themes. Among these, I consider the meaning of a theory of society in sociology, the value of critical theory, and the use of algorithms in communication. I differ from Esposito regarding my views on these topics, in that she seems hesitant to make a clear statement regarding the constructivist stance of systems theory’s proposals, in contrast with other approaches.

Open peer commentary on the article “Materialism and Selection Bias: Political Psychology from a Radical Constructivist Perspective” by Björn Goldstein. Abstract: I argue that bias can be reduced but never completely removed, owing to humanity’s incomplete knowledge. A proposal is thus made for research to have more than one paradigmatic approach in order to provide multiple pathways and multiple results for a single research project.

Open peer commentary on the article “Euphemisms vs. Dysphemisms, or How we Construct Good and Bad Language” by Andrey S. Druzhinin. Abstract: The concepts of euphemism and dysphemism are based on the very common distinction between “good” and “evil,” of which Druzhinin does not attempt any analysis. A rough analysis is easy for some parts, but it also faces the immense problem of phenomenal consciousness or qualia, in front of which even constructivism (like any other approach) is powerless. However, constructivism allows us to frame the problem of qualia better than other approaches.

Abstract: I make explicit the status of the “quasi-metaphysics” associated with neurophenomenology in the target paper. Here, metaphysics serves as a therapy and as a guide, not as a picture of anything. It aims at liberating us from the urge for secure foundations, rather than providing one more foundational representation.

Context: Varela’s neurophenomenology was conceived from the outset as a criticism and dissolution of the “hard problem” of the physical origin of consciousness. Indeed, the standard (physicalist) formulation of this problem is what generates it, and turns it into a fake mystery. Problem: Such a dissolution of the “hard problem” is very demanding for researchers. It invites them to leave their position of neutral observers/thinkers, and to seek self-transformation instead. It leaves no room for the “hard problem” in the field of discourse, and rather deflects it onto the plane of attitudes. As a consequence, it runs the risk of being either ignored or considered as a dodge. How can we overcome this obstacle and restore the argumentative impact of neurophenomenology? Method: I propose a metaphysical compensation for the anti-metaphysical premise of the neurophenomenological dissolution of the “hard problem.” Yet, this alternative metaphysics is designed to keep the benefit of a shift from discourse to ways of being - this is the latent message of neurophenomenology. Results: A dynamical and participatory conception of the relation between body and consciousness is formulated, with no concession to standard positions such as physicalist monism and property dualism. This conception is based on Varela’s formalism of “cybernetic dialectic” and on a geometrical model of self-production. It is in close agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s “intra-ontology: an engaged ontological approach of what it is like to be, rather than a discipline of the contemplation of beings. Implications: Taking neurophenomenology seriously implies a radical shift in our way of tackling the “hard problem” of consciousness. There is no question here of theorizing about the neuro-experiential correlation but of including it in a chain of resonance and continuous research that amplifies our lived life. Even metaphysics partakes in this shift. Constructivist content: The article advocates a critical stance towards standard realist approaches to the science and philosophy of mind. A complete reversal of the hierarchy of ontological priorities between physical objects and consciousness is proposed, in the spirit of Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences. Then, the obvious but usually overlooked relation between being conscious and knowing consciousness is emphasized. Keywords: Neurophenomenology, phenomenology, consciousness, experience, mind-body problem, quantum mechanics, neutral monism, panpsychism, Merleau-Ponty.

Open peer commentary on the article “From Liveness to “Lifeness”: Autopoiesis and an Enactive View of Performance” by Maiya Murphy. Abstract: I consider and expand upon some aspects of the target article that are of particular pertinence to actors and directors. The autopoietic framing is useful in that it can be viewed as carrying on from prior work in systemic views of performance, such as those of cognitive ecologies and Stanislavskian-based approaches.

Alva Noë (2004, 2008, 2012) understands what he calls “perceptual presence” (2004, 59) as the experience of whole, voluminous objects being ‘right there’, present for us in their entirety, even though not each and every part of them impinges directly on our senses at any given time. How is it possible that we perceptually experience voluminous objects as voluminous directly and apparently effortlessly, with no need of inferring their three-dimensionality from experience of the part of them that is directly stimulating our sense organs? For Noë, this is the ‘problem of perceptual presence’. In this paper, I integrate Noë’s view by articulating a different view of what perceptual presence at a more basic level amounts to. This new account of perceptual presence which, I believe, can clarify and make an enactive account of presence richer. The view I suggest revolves around the idea, developed especially by Merleau-Ponty (1945, 1947) and Kelly (2005, 2007, 2010), that perceptual experience is in an important sense indeterminate. Indeterminacy, I argue, is key if we want to understand perceptual presence and the ‘problem’ Noë solves.

Key words: perception, enactivism, perceptual presence, phenomenology, indeterminacy

In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray’s account of love to present a phenomenology of loving interactions and then our enactive account. Finally, we draw some implications for ethics. These concern language, difference, vulnerability, desire, and self-transformation.

Key words: luce irigaray, love, desire, becoming, enactive approach, participatory sense-making, loving and knowing.