Rohde M. & Stewart J. (2008) Ascriptional and “genuine” autonomy. Biosystems 91: 424–433. https://cepa.info/2121
Ascriptional and “genuine” autonomy.
Biosystems 91: 424–433.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2121
Knowing that human judgment can be fallible, we propose to distinguish the subjective ascription of a property, such as autonomy, from the genuine fact that an entity is characterised by a certain property, i.e., it is autonomous. In this paper, we take a closer look at this distinction and what it is grounded on, taking a constructivist stance that sees the scientist as an observing subject. We arrive at a notion of fortified ascription, in which knowledge and scientific study of generative mechanisms play an important role, and look at some models of autonomy in the light of this distinction.