Froese T. (2014) Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia. Cognitive Neuroscience 5: 126–127. https://cepa.info/2526
Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia.
Cognitive Neuroscience 5: 126–127.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2526
Seth extends predictive processing with counterfactuals: Encoded probabilities of what would occur given a repertoire of possible (but unexecuted) actions. He thereby provides a neat mathematical formulation of the sensorimotor account of perceptual presence, i.e., of the fact that we perceive a whole object while being limited to seeing it from a perspective. Synesthetic concurrents are explained in terms of impoverished counterfactuals. I argue that this explanation misses its target, because it only accounts for a lack of objecthood. Enactive theory is better suited to explain concurrents’ lack of subjectivity veridicality. The world itself shapes experience only during veridical perception.