Froese T. & Di Paolo E. A. (2009) Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(4): 439–463. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4460
Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(4): 439–463.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4460
The life – mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a twofold strategy is used to show how a consideration of sociality can address both sides of the cognitive gap: (1) it is argued from a systemic perspective that inter-agent interactions can extend the behavioral domain of even the simplest agents and (2) it is argued from a phenomenological perspective that the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns. These two complementary considerations of the constitutive role of inter-agent interactions for mind and cognition indicate that sociality is an indispensable element of the life – mind continuity thesis and of cognitive science more generally.