Strle T. (2018) Self-Referential and Enactive Nature of First- and Third-Person Sciences of the Mind. Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 230–231. https://cepa.info/4608
Self-Referential and Enactive Nature of First- and Third-Person Sciences of the Mind.
Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 230–231.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4608
Open peer commentary on the article “Excavating Belief About Past Experience: Experiential Dynamics of the Reflective Act” by Urban Kordeš & Ema Demšar. Upshot: I argue that the target article does not clearly explicate in what ways empirical first-person inquiry into experience and theoretical insight contributes to the model of the experiential dynamics of the reflective act. Furthermore, I propose that the self-referential and enactive nature of inquiring into the mind are sine qua non of any understanding of the mind - be it first- or third-person. I conclude by asking whether the authors’ view of the nature of inquiring into experience entails that we have to renounce the wish for any kind of universal or fundamental “truths” about the mind.