Rudrauf D. & Damasio A. (2006) The biological basis of subjectivity: A hypothesis. In: Kriegel U. & Williford K. (eds.) Self-representational approaches to consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 423–465.
The biological basis of subjectivity: A hypothesis.
In: Kriegel U. & Williford K. (eds.) Self-representational approaches to consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 423–465.
Excerpt: Our main hypothesis is that feeling arises in the conflictive dynamics of resistance that our brain and body proper produce when they confront the highly inertial variance that they continuously and inevitably undergo. This variance is the result of delayed auto-perturbations of the brain–body system, divergent motivational tendencies, and attentional shifts. It is not only related to random fluctuations of the system, but also to controlled functional processes, capable of affecting the system as a whole through its functional connectivity. We see the process of resistance to variance, and in particular its central attention-related profile, as delineating the dynamic locus of an internal state of tension through which subjective experience emerges. Such a dynamical structure is intrinsically related to the system’s need to engage in intentional behaviors, attend, preserve coherence, and respect the hierarchy of the various influences that affect its internal dynamics and organization. We see this general dynamics and its subjective counterpart in the framework of a monitoring and control function that lies at the core of the functionality we call consciousness.
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