Publication 5796

Hardcastle V. (2017) Radical embodied cognition, affordances, and the (hard) problem of consciousness. In: In: Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society, Austin TX: 476–481. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5796
Tony Chemero advances the radical thesis that cognition and consciousness is actually the same thing. He draws this conclusion from his understanding of cognition as an extended process. I question this conclusion because this view expands cognition beyond being the sort of natural kind to which one can tie phenomenal experience. Moreover, because cognition has been radically inflated, despite Chemero’s claim to the contrary, embodied cognition does not solve any of the hard problems associated with consciousness.

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