Publication 5828

Gallagher S. (2014) Pragmatic interventions into enactive and extended conceptions of cognition. Philosophical Issues 24(1): 110–126.
Clear statements of both extended and enactive conceptions of cognition can be found in John Dewey and other pragmatists. In this paper I’ll argue that we can find resources in the pragmatists to address two ongoing debates: (1) in contrast to recent disagreements between proponents of extended vs enactive cognition, pragmatism supports a more integrative view – an enactive conception of extended cognition, and (2) pragmatist views suggest ways to answer the main objections raised against extended and enactive conceptions – specifically objections focused on constitution versus causal factors, and the mark of the mental.
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