Hutto D. D. (2009) Mental representation and consciousness. In: Banks W. P. (ed.) Encyclopedia of consciousness. Volume 2. Academic Press, New York: 19–32.
Mental representation and consciousness.
In: Banks W. P. (ed.) Encyclopedia of consciousness. Volume 2. Academic Press, New York: 19–32.
Intentionality and consciousness are the fundamental kinds of mental phenomena. Although they are widely regarded as being entirely distinct some philosophers conjecture that they are intimately related. Prominently it has been claimed that consciousness can be best understood in terms of representational facts or properties. Representationalist theories vary in strength. At their core they seek to establish that subjective, phenomenal consciousness (of the kind that involves the having of first-personal points of view or perspectives on the world – perspectives that incorporate experiences with specific phenomenal characters) is either exhausted by, or supervenes on, capacities for mental representation. These proposals face several serious objections.
Key words: enactivism
, methodological solipsism
, mode of presentation
, narrow content
, phenomenal character
, representational content
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