Verheggen T. & Baerveldt C. (2012) Mixed up perspectives: Reply to Chryssides et al. and Daanen and their critique of enactive cultural psychology. Culture & Psychology 18(2): 272–284.
Mixed up perspectives: Reply to Chryssides et al. and Daanen and their critique of enactive cultural psychology.
Culture & Psychology 18(2): 272–284.
In earlier contributions to Culture & Psychology we have put forward enactivism as an epistemological alternative for representationalist accounts of meaning in relation to action and experience. Critics continue to charge enactive cultural psychology of being a solipsistic and a materialist reductionistic epistemology. We address that critique, arguing that it consistently follows from misunderstanding in particular the enactivist notion of “operational closure,” and from mixing up two observer viewpoints that must be analytically severed when describing living, cognitive systems. Moreover, Daanen (2009) argued that in particular Heidegger’s phenomenology can help to reconcile enactive cultural psychology and social representation theory. We reply that although enactivism is indeed close to phenomenology, Daanen fails to appreciate Heidegger’s much more radical break with a philosophy of consciousness to anchor meaningful Being. Consequently, representationalist accounts cannot be salvaged, least of all by invoking Heidegger.
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