Ene P. (2013) Descriptions as Distinctions. George Spencer Brown’s Calculus of Indications as a Basis for Mitterer’s Non-dualistic Descriptions. Constructivist Foundations 8(2): 202–208. https://cepa.info/862
Descriptions as Distinctions. George Spencer Brown’s Calculus of Indications as a Basis for Mitterer’s Non-dualistic Descriptions.
Constructivist Foundations 8(2): 202–208.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/862
Context: Non-dualistic thinking is an alternative to realism and constructivism. Problem: In the absence of a distinct definition of the term “description,” the question comes up of what exactly can be included in non-dualistic descriptions, and in how far the definition of this term affects the relation between theory and empirical practice. Furthermore, this paper is concerned with the question of whether non-dualism and dualism differ in their implications. Method: I provide a wider semantic framework for the term “description” by means of George Spencer Brown’s terminology in his calculus of indications as laid out in Laws of Form. The connection of descriptions and distinctions enables descriptions to comprise reflections and language as well as empirical observations. Results: Non-dualism can be thought of in different ways but still has essential elements in common with dualism. Implications: Non-dualism, as well as dualism, is an argumentation technique suitable for specific situations, but without significant differences in implications.