Penas M. (2013) The failure of computationalist ai and its possible overcoming: A metaphysical approach. Estudios Filosóficos LXII(179): 115–130.
The failure of computationalist ai and its possible overcoming: A metaphysical approach.
Estudios Filosóficos LXII(179): 115–130.
Research on artificial intelligence guided by the computational paradigm, dominant in the first decades of cognitive sciences, has failed to meet its optimistic predictions. In this article we try to explain, from a metaphysical approach, the causes of this failure and to show how a new paradigm, emerged in cognitive sciences and developing the project of artificial intelligence from radically different foundations, tries to overcome those causes. Relevance: In this article, I make a critique of the computational research program dominant in the first decades of AI. I reject the idea that this research could be understood regardless of the history of philosophical and metaphysical thinking or as an overcoming of this history, and I try to show the links of the computational approach with the subjectivist and representational metaphysics of modern thinking. Thereafter I expose how the autopoietical theory of Maturana and Varela, as well as the further developments of enactivism, provide us with a new and radically different foundation for developing AI’s project. Following with the argument, I also try to show the links of embodied and enactive cognition with some metaphysical theories (mainly Heidegger’s phenomenological approach) that try to escape the subjectivist paradigm, and with the concept of emergence as it is developed in the paradigm of complexity.
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