As discussions about so‐called ‘epistemology’ have receded within family therapy, discussions about te doctrine of constructivism have emerged to carry on the underlying impulse of those earlier discussions. This article contends that a constructivist epistemology is not a new doctrine in family therapy, but, rather, reflects a shift in emphasis in that discipline from a nontraditional use to the traditional use of the term “epistemology” uses that coexisted during the ‘epistemology’ debates of the early 1980s and that were the source of many confusions and logical contradictions. The articale also demonstrates how recent articulations of cosnstructivism have resulted in the same logical contradictions tht were committed during the earlier ‘epistemology’; debates. The logic and utility of applying constructivism in particular, and epistemological analysis in general, to the practice of psychotherapy are questioned and considered.

The doctrine of constructivism, which pays much attention to meaning, has itself a meaning within psychotherapy that has not received sufficient attention by the therapists who have adopted it. To remedy this problem, I first show how an antirealist epistemology (i.e., the knower makes rather than discovers reality) defines constructivism as well as the variant of it known as social constructionism. I then argue that the antirealism of constructivism and social constructionism is subverted when therapists use those doctrines to make clainis about the real workings of therapy; I explain how the word construct is behind much of the confusion. Finally, I give reasons for the rise of antirealism in therapy and maintain that the problem generating that trend can be solved not by an appeal to antirealism, but by a clearer understanding of the nature and use of theoretical systems in therapy.

The discourse of postmodernism proclaims with a unified voice the context-dependence or knower-dependence, the relativity or subjectivity, of all truth claims. But the discourse of postmodernism also proclaims universal truths upon which this antirealist epistemology itself rests. These constitute the very foundational claims that the postmodernist campaign, in all its alleged antifoundationalism, strives to subvert. In this article I consider three universal truth claims of postmodernist discourse. And because the antirealism that defines much of postmodernist discourse is often grounded in the doctrine of social constructionism, the three truth claims under consideration constitute the claims of social constructionism itself, especially the claims of social constructionism as it has been propounded within postmodern therapy circles. Each of the three claims is articulated, and then followed by a critique which asks whether the claim is not either (a) simply a variant of the so-called modernist paradigm that is under attack, or (b) the product of the very observational/empirical powers that postmodernist doctrine seeks to erode in its anti-empiricist spirit. Particular attention is given to challenging the value – found within postmodernist circles – of a pragmatic or utilitarian standard for acceptance of theory or discourse.

Raskin and Debany (this issue) profess my failure to appreciate how constructivism does not warrant an “anything-goes” relativism. In this reply, I explain how whether any postmodernist doctrine endorses an “anything-goes” epistemology (or a radical relativism) depends on the nature of the constraints that warrant its propositions. I revisit the three core postmodernist claims that I criticized in previous work, which criticism Raskin and Debany now in turn criticize. Emphasis is given to how an objectivist epistemology, contrary to postmodernist belief, does not entail certitude, and moreover incorporates (a) active and indirect knowing, (b) the situated origins of all empirical knowledge, and (c) a subject/object distinction for certain kinds of human/social kinds. I use the example of racist rhetoric to illustrate how discourse can and does affect extradiscursive realities, thereby implicating our moral obligation to seek objective truth as best we can.

Excerpt: Dr. Von Foerster does not directly challenge the basic point to which the clarifications we offer eventually lead. It may be helpful to simplify that point in the following way. It is contradictory to hold both an epistemology (meaning 1) which maintains that reality (or the world) is a function of ourselves as knowers (of our subjectivity, our theories, or our language) and an epistemology (meaning 2) which maintains that reality really has certain features that are independent of the knower – features that should be acknowledged by every investigator. One example we gave of such a supposed feature of nature in general, or at least of nature as encountered in family therapy, is circular causality. It is a supposed feature argued for by some of those whom we perceive to be laboring under the burden of that contradiction.

The epistemology debates within the field of family therapy have become relatively infrequent in the last year or so, perhaps as a consequence of the confusion they have generated for many family therapists. This article maintains that the primary reason for the confusion is a failure to distinguish clearly between the conventional meaning of the term epistemology, which concerns the nature of knowledge, and the unconventional meaning given the term in family therapy, which concerns the nature of what we know. It is proposed that the confusion can be diminished by understanding the relationship between the two meanings, which are here distinguished as epistemology (meaning 1) and epistemology (meaning 2) respectively. Particular attention is given to the logical consequences of adopting a position on epistemology (meaning 1) – e.g, is the knower capable of knowing an independent reality, or does the act of knowing make its own reality? – or on epistemology (meaning 2) – e.g., is causality linear or nonlinear?. The relevance and implications of these problems for the theory and practice of family therapy are discussed.

Comments on the attempt of P. F. Dell [Understanding Bateson and Maturana: Toward a biological foundation for the social sciences] to clear up the confusion generated by the term epistemology. The present authors maintain that the major problem is the contradiction of insisting that there is no independent reality available to the knower, and that the world operates by way of circular causality. H. R. Maturana’s (unpublished manuscript) doctrine of structure determinism is discussed.