Seiichi Imoto has worked as a veterinarian (DVM, PhD) majoring in internal medicine and pathology since 1973. In 2000, he began to study philosophy, seeking for different ways of thinking. He was lucky enough to encounter Maturana’s work but it was very difficult to follow; there was in it indeed a way of thinking that was very different from his long-accustomed scientific way of thinking.
This paper deals with the philosophical nature of H. R. Maturana’s theory of perception. For such a purpose, one of his core concepts, structural determinism, was closely examined, which revealed that his theory of perception is not an ontological/metaphysical idealism as realist philosophers regarded. My diagnosis is that his theory should be regarded as a version of epistemic idealism underpinned by what Maturana calls the substratum. Thus, he presented us a renewed view of objectivity based on our human biology of cognition, replacing the traditional view of objectivity.
Imoto S. (2004) What is the external world? A cognitive science perspective. Tetsugaku (Annals of the Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University) 40: 29–44. https://cepa.info/6222
John R. Searle (1998) upholds what he calls “external realism” that there is a real world that exists independently of us, a world of mountains, trees, oceans, molecules, and so on. Some research findings in cognitive science, however, are compelling us to re-examine such a framework. In this essay I insist, from a cognitive science perspective, that the so-called external world we perceive as it is, is not independent of us, it is dependent on us in such a manner that those entities such as mountains and oceans are the end results of our perceptual processes, and as such they are in our phenomenal or mental space. It is a world as causes for our perceptual processes that is considered to be independent of us, though we have no direct, empirical access to the world as such.
Imoto S. (2005) Nothing as Plenum: Lao-tzu’s Way and Maturana’s Substratum. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 12(4): 107–114.
Context: Maturana’s work is not easy to follow. Correct and full understanding of his work has still to be achieved in spite of its importance. Problem: The objective of this paper is to investigate the core logic penetrating Maturana’s wide-ranging work and to place his work in the history of western thought. Method: Through intensive reading of his wide-ranging work, I intended to grasp the core biological structure that he advocates, namely, his core logic. Results: Maturana’s biology is the biology of structural determinism. It is embodied in a composite entity called a “structure-determined system” with two non-intersecting domains - the domain of interactions and the domain of the composition of components – which can be called the core structure or the core logic of his biology. From the perspective of the history of western thought, Aristotle and Schopenhauer can be regarded as good candidates as the precursors of Maturana’s work, and his work can be characterized as an advanced form of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, depicted on the horizon of Schopenhauer’s world of “Vorstellung” (bringing-forth). Implications: This finding will be useful for understanding Maturana’s wide-ranging work and its place in the history of western thought.
Imoto S. (2015) Find the word! – But where?: Maturana’s ‘coordination’and Sartre’s ‘reflection’ around naming. Frontiers in Psychology 6: 1814. https://cepa.info/7715
‘Behavioral coordination’ theory of language of Maturana (1928–) does not give a clear explanation for the questions of how naming takes place and where a word adequate for our experience comes from. This flaw may be alleviated by Sartre (1905–1980)s ‘reflection’ theory. According to Sartre’s theory, we can make two types of sentences from the same data: for example, “I am conscious of this chair” and “There is consciousness of this chair.” The difference between the two sentences is the existence of ‘I’ in the first or its lack in the second. Where did ‘I’ come from or how was it removed? There must be a field in which ‘I’ is brought forth, and it may also be a field where naming can take place. This essay concerns a naming process with special reference to Sartre’s philosophy. At first, Maturana’s biology and his linguistic theory are explained, and Sartre’s fundamental ontology and in relation to this, his theory of reflection (two types of reflection) are introduced. Next, Sartre’s notions of language (words and naming) are explained. Then, after operational correspondences between Maturana’s ‘coordination’ and Sartre’s ‘reflection’ are examined, our primary questions are answered. Finally, constraints burdened on our cognition with language and the possibility of liberation from them are discussed. Main arguments: (1) Maturana’s ‘coordination’ and Sartre’s ‘reflection’ are operationally equivalent concepts; (2) Sartre can complement Maturana’s languaging theory of naming by providing both the domain for naming (the domain for the synthesis of identification, or for universalizing synthesis) and a mediator of naming (the cogito, namely the consciousness, of a languaging person).
Open peer commentary on the article “Construction of Irreality: An Enactive-Constructivist Stance on Counterfactuals” by Andrey S. Druzhinin. Abstract: Schopenhauer and the two linguists, Tokieda and Miura, are indispensable figures to elucidate the logic of construction of our counterfactual experiences. In addition to the conditional and the subjunctive moods, the imperative could be regarded as a form of counterfactual experiences. According to Schopenhauer, these experiences belong mainly to the class of willing or acts of will.