The attempt to define living systems in terms of goal, purpose, function, etc. runs into serious conceptual difficulties. The theoretical biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela realized that any such attempt cannot capture what is distinctive about them: their autonomy and unity. Goal, purpose, etc. always define the system in terms of something extrinsic, whereas living systems are unique because they maintain their unitary continuity of pattern despite the ceaseless turnover of their components. So, system-closure is a prerequisite of their adequate conceptual comprehension. Maturana and Varela themselves found that system-closure pertains exclusively to their organization, i.e. the set of relations among system-components which unify them. For living systems this comprises the relation between the system-components and the processes which they undergo. This relation is self-referential because it is closed, i.e. it essentially (re)produces itself. \\While this model worked very well in the biological domain, attempts to extend it to the social domain met with serious conceptual obstacles. The reason for this is that Maturana did not make a consistent enough application of it. He understood the components of social systems biologically (individuals, persons, etc.) and the relations between them socially (language). This inconsistency ruptured the system’s organizational closure. Consequently organizational closure (autopoiesis) can be maintained only when both the components of social systems and their processes are of the same type: social. This interpretation can be found in the work of Niklas Luhmann who recognizes that the components of social systems are not persons, individuals, actors or subjects but communicative actions themselves. This preserves the organizational closure of the system and permits the concept of autopoiesis to be used as a powerful instrument of social analysis.

Key words: Autopoiesis, communication, meaning, organization, social systems, structure.

Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: What von Foerster accomplished in raising the specter of second-order cybernetics now requires experimental design and the heavy lifting of theory to complete his quest for new ways of thinking. Scholte’s “black box theatre” points to research into non-trivial systems as a formal means of grasping living systems.

Open peer commentary on the article “Audience and Eigenform: Cybersemiotic Epistemology and the “Truth of the Human Spirit” in Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: Scholte’s counterintuitive use of the arts as laboratories of perceptual inquiry investigates meaning, language and formation of perceptual systems. Theory of Logical Types offers one way of understanding the power of theatre as a tool revealing the contextual organizing structures of perception.

Excerpt: Readers of Complicity are most fortunate to have Jerome Proulx’s paper distinguishing “Maturana and Varela’s Theory of Cognition.… from Constructivist Theories.” This paper sits as a fine companion piece to the Educational Theory paper by Brent Davis and Dennis Sumara (Fall, 2002), distinguishing various types of constructivism and situating complexity as an alternative to constructivism, one focusing neither exclusively nor heavily on the actions of the learner but rather on the interplay of factors or forces within a dynamic, learning situation. Proulx points out that “constructivist” (constructivism) – a word Davis and Sumara note is not part of Jean Piaget’s vocabulary1 (p. 411) – has become, in the hands of Ernst von Glasersfeld, a mantra for teachers dealing with children.

Purpose: Often radical constructivists are confronted with arguments why radical constructivism is wrong. The present work presents a radical constructivist alternative to such arguments: a comparison of the results of two instructional practices, the standard, realist-based instruction and a radical constructivist-based instruction, both in physics courses. Design: Evidence from many studies of student conceptions in standard instruction (Duit 2004) is taken into account. In addition, diagnostic data, pre and post instruction, were collected from over 1,000 students in multiple institutions across the U. S. over a period of about 15 years via an established diagnostic of conceptual understanding of motion and force. Findings: Evidence from many studies of student conceptions in standard instruction (Duit, 2004) is that little or no change in student conceptions happens in standard instruction. About half the students in the particular study reported, all science and engineering majors, experienced standard, realist-based instruction and show an average effect size of 0.6 standard deviations and an average normalized gain of 15%. The other half of the students, none of whom were science and engineering majors, experienced radical constructivist-based instruction and show an average effect size over 2.5 standard deviations and an average normalized gain over 60%. Diagnostic pre scores were nearly the same for both groups. Practical implications: The outcome, that students, neither science nor engineering majors, made changes in understanding foundational topics in physics far greater than science and engineering students, poses (1) an ethical challenge to the continued adherence to standard, realist-based instructional practices and (2) an intellectual challenge to the usefulness and appropriateness of the elitist-realist paradigm on which such standard instruction is based. Conclusion: This radical constructivist argument uses the effect of paradigms to judge their pragmatic value, not their truth-value. Based on pragmatic value, radical constructivism results in superior outcomes when applied to physics instruction. The approach to instruction can be applied generally in education. Erratum: Page 52, Column 2, Line 33: The first sentence should read: “Persons who appear to use the pots view do not generally make much conceptual distinction between motion and changing motion; that is…” Erratum: On page 52, middle column, at the beginning of the third paragraph the following words are missing: "Persons who appear to use the pots…"

Key words: elitism, physics, paradigm, realism, education, understanding

Purpose: This contribution to the Festschrift honoring Ernst von Glasersfeld gives some insight into the perpetual problem of understanding radical constructivism (RC). Parallels with the Middle Way school of Buddhism appear to shed light on this challenge. Conclusion: The hegemony realism has over the thinking of even the most highly educated in our civilization plays a major role in their failure to understand RC. Those still subject to realism in their thinking interpret statements by those in RC in ways incompatible with RC. Until realists disequilibrate over mismatches between realist expectations and experiences, no alternative way of thinking is accessible to them and misinterpretations of RC will continue. Practical implications: While we cannot change someone else’s understanding, in our interactions with them we can focus on creating situations in which those who do not understand us might disequilibrate. If we are successful, they are likely to begin to escape the domination of realism in their thinking. Original value: This insight may enable eventual success in our assisting others to understand RC.

Key words: realism, Buddhism, disequilibration

Open peer commentary on the target article “Arguments Opposing the Radicalism of Radical Constructivism” by Gernot Saalmann. Excerpt: Gernot Saalmann uses the term “radical” in the sense of something “extreme.” For example, in §1, he contrasts “radical” constructivists with “moderate” constructivists. This adjectival usage of the word “radical” as “extreme” is a slang usage from the American sub-culture called “Surfers” which originated in the late 1950s or early 1960s. “Radical,” in their slang means: “At or exceeding limits of control or safety…” (Oxford English Dictionary OED 2007)

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: What follows is offered as an alternative explanation of the nature and status of the concept of society. This alternative is entirely compatible with radical constructivism as described elsewhere by von Glasersfeld (1995, 1999) and some others. This is not a claim of the truth-value of this alternative interpretation, but instead is no more and no less than a claim that there is an alternative explanation that fits and is useful. It is not even a claim of primacy or superiority in some comparative sense. It is merely the claim that this alternative explanation of the nature and status of the concept of society exists, is viable, and is compatible with radical constructivism: a radical constructivist’s explanation of “society.”

Context: In spite of its advantages and its ability to make valid responses to objections, radical constructivism is not mainstream. Problem: Extolling the virtues of radical constructivism and responding logically to the objections does not work. We know this from the evidence of many attempts. Our theoretical stance, radical constructivism, also suggests this approach is not likely to have much influence on realists. We cannot transmit understanding in the signals with which we attempt to communicate. How can we in radical constructivism enable those outside of RC to understand our explanation of human knowing? Method: Examine our understanding of radical constructivism itself, because it is an explanation of how, why and under what circumstances people change their understandings of their experiential worlds. Results: We must find ways to direct the attention of others to situations that they cannot explain with their existing understanding of the world. Then we must create conditions conducive to their revising and testing new understandings for fit with the evidence of their experience. Implications: Since radical constructivism is a theory of human knowing, it tells us how humans develop knowledge, hence it is an answer to the questions central to this special issue. This answer is not one to be used to win in debates with realists. Radical constructivism gives us an answer to the problem of engaging realists in understanding our position, but strategies consistent with radical constructivism are not easily carried out. Developing and executing such strategies is the work at hand.

Key words: history of science, paradigm change, physics education research, realism, folk theory of teaching, cognitive equilibration

Problem: What alternative strategies from our experiences using a Piaget-based radical constructivist pedagogy might have more and better results than the current practice of responding in debate form, each side trying to prove the other wrong? Method: Use of Slezak’s paper to illuminate the point that the central problem with the interpretation of RC generally used in such writing is that the authors seem not to be able to operate from the central tenet of RC, which is the opposite of that used in realism. Description of how this failure to use the central tenet of RC results in claims that RC is irrelevant to education and to definitions of good teaching. Results: A specific approach shown to be useful in facilitating the construction of new understanding in science is adapted in order to guide interaction between an RC and a realist, which can result in the realist understanding the RC point of view. Implications: Instead of debating with critics of RC, where each side is trying to prove the other side wrong, we need to change the interaction to one in which members of opposing sides attempt to understand the other’s position. In this situation we are in a position to use a pedagogical strategy in which the realist examines her own fundamental assumption that we can know a mind-independent world, and considers the implications of a starting assumption that is exactly the opposite.

Key words: realism, good teaching, solipsism, disequilibration, folk theory teaching