Author B. Kastrup
Biography: Bernardo Kastrup has a Ph.D. in Computer Engineering with specializations in artificial intelligence and reconfigurable computing. He has worked as a scientist in some of the world’s foremost research laboratories, including the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and the Philips Research Laboratories (where the “Casimir Effect” of Quantum Field Theory was discovered). Bernardo has authored many academic papers and books on philosophy and science. His three latest books are: More Than Allegory, Brief Peeks Beyond, and Why Materialism Is Baloney.
Kastrup B. (2017) Making sense of the mental universe. Philosophy and Cosmology 19: 33–49. https://cepa.info/4636
Kastrup B.
(
2017)
Making sense of the mental universe.
Philosophy and Cosmology 19: 33–49.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4636
In 2005, an essay was published in Nature asserting that the universe is mental and that we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things. Since then, experiments have confirmed that – as predicted by quantum mechanics – reality is contextual, which contradicts at least intuitive formulations of realism and corroborates the hypothesis of a mental universe. Yet, to give this hypothesis a coherent rendering, one must explain how a mental universe can – at least in principle – accommodate (a) our experience of ourselves as distinct individual minds sharing a world beyond the control of our volition; and (b) the empirical fact that this world is contextual despite being seemingly shared. By combining a modern formulation of the ontology of idealism with the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, the present paper attempts to provide a viable explanatory framework for both points. In the process of doing so, the paper also addresses key philosophical qualms of the relational interpretation.
Kastrup B. (2017) On the plausibility of idealism: Refuting criticisms. Disputatio 9(44): 13–34. https://cepa.info/4635
Kastrup B.
(
2017)
On the plausibility of idealism: Refuting criticisms.
Disputatio 9(44): 13–34.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4635
Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these on- tologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical struc- tures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phe- nomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other argu- ments – such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc. – are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology.
Kastrup B. (2017) There is an “unconscious,” but it may well be conscious. Europe’s Journal of Psychology 13(3): 559–572. https://cepa.info/5358
Kastrup B.
(
2017)
There is an “unconscious,” but it may well be conscious.
Europe’s Journal of Psychology 13(3): 559–572.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5358
Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called “meta-consciousness” in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an “unconscious.” The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren’t re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function.
Kastrup B. (2018) Author’s Response: Informing Metaphysical Choices with Epistemic Considerations. Constructivist Foundations 13(3): 357–361. https://cepa.info/5302
Kastrup B.
(
2018)
Author’s Response: Informing Metaphysical Choices with Epistemic Considerations.
Constructivist Foundations 13(3): 357–361.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5302
Upshot: It is admittedly difficult, if at all possible, to establish a direct, positive logical bridge from epistemic considerations to ontological conclusions. Yet, epistemic considerations can and should inform metaphysical choices, for all we ultimately have for making these choices is our knowledge. More accurately, all we finally have is the mind - sole given of existence - upon which our knowledge resides and within which our metaphysical choices are made.
Kastrup B. (2018) Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy. Constructivist Foundations 13(3): 341–347. https://cepa.info/5296
Kastrup B.
(
2018)
Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy.
Constructivist Foundations 13(3): 341–347.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5296
Context: The alleged dichotomy between mind and matter is pervasive. Therefore, the attempt to explain matter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of matter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely arranged.
Kastrup B. (2018) The universe in consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(5–6): 125–155. https://cepa.info/5394
Kastrup B.
(
2018)
The universe in consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(5–6): 125–155.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5394
I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism, and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers more explanatory power than these three alternatives, in that it does not fall prey to the hard problem of consciousness, the combination problem, or the decombination problem, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: there is only cosmic consciousness. We, as well as all other living organisms, are but dissociated alters of cosmic consciousness, surrounded by its thoughts. The inanimate world we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of these thoughts. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters.
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