Open peer commentary on the article “Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind” by Shaun Gallagher. Abstract: In agreement with Gallagher’s call to re-examine the standard neurocentric view, we situate the target article within constructivist epistemology. We point to certain similarities between E-approaches to cognition (in particular predictive processing accounts) and constructivist ideas originating from the tradition of second-order cybernetics, demonstrating the potential for a productive dialogue between contemporary cognitive science and constructivist theory. Further elaborating Gallagher’s proposal, we suggest an alternative, autopoiesis-based metaphor of the mind.

Purpose: To explore possible innovations that constructivism and its epistemological participatory position offer to philosophy, in particular to the age‐old problem of grounding epistemological assumptions. Design/methodology/approach – The paper follows von Foerster’s account of the participatory position as an epistemological stance. It tries to explain why it is called a “position” rather than “insight” or “theory.” Constructivist (participatory) concepts are explored and related to “classical” philosophical debates such as the “Münchhausen trilemma.” In the conclusion the paper sketches possible ways of how to apply the answers of the participatory position to the philosophical discourse. Findings: The paper points at the possibility to go beyond the insurmountable boundaries dividing different epistemological positions one continuously encounters when searching for the appropriate epistemological starting point. As a result, one cannot expect answers to be universally valid. The paper takes that into consideration. It argues that most philosophical attempts are first order changes (revolutions) as they seek truth and exclude alternative views at the same time. Following von Foerster, the paper suggests second order changes that lead from truth to trust. This transition allows a peaceful coexistence of all philosophical systems. Turning from truth (and belief in analytical clarity) to trust and, consequently, from objectivity to responsibility, it may become possible to transcend the epistemological barriers. Originality/value – The paper contributes to finding a possible direction for the future of discourses in philosophy and many humanities in order to overcome the incompetence of philosophy of finding final answers.

Key words: Cognition, epistemology, undecidability, participatory position, constructivism

Purpose: To explore possible innovations that constructivism and its epistemological participatory position offer to philosophy, in particular to the age-old problem of grounding epistemological assumptions. Design/methodology/approach – The paper follows von Foerster’s account of the participatory position as an epistemological stance. It tries to explain why it is called a “position” rather than “insight” or “theory.” Constructivist (participatory) concepts are explored and related to “classical” philosophical debates such as the “Münchhausen trilemma” In the conclusion the paper sketches possible ways of how to apply the answers of the participatory position to the philosophical discourse. Findings: The paper points at the possibility to go beyond the insurmountable boundaries dividing different epistemological positions one continuously encounters when searching for the appropriate epistemological starting point. As a result, one cannot expect answers to be universally valid. The paper takes that into consideration. It argues that most philosophical attempts are first order changes (revolutions) as they seek truth and exclude alternative views at the same time. Following von Foerster, the paper suggests second order changes that lead from truth to trust. This transition allows a peaceful coexistence of all philosophical systems. Turning from truth (and belief in analytical clarity) to trust and, consequently, from objectivity to responsibility, it may become possible to transcend the epistemological barriers. Originality/value – The paper contributes to finding a possible direction for the future of discourses in philosophy and many humanities in order to overcome the incompetence of philosophy of finding final answers.

Key words: cognition, cybernetics, epistemology.

It is becoming apparent in modern cognitive science that the lack of knowledge about human experiential landscape implies the loss of a very important element, perhaps the very essence. Consequently, a rather new area of research has emerged recently: an attempt at a systematic observation and study of experience. This is the so-called phenomenologically inspired research (or just phenomenological research). Part of this article aims to present this new area of research – it describes the common fundaments of the field and some of its characteristic methodological derivates, relating them to the possibility of studying decision making from the first-person point-of-view, i.e. decision making as an experiential phenomenon (and not as a neurological or behavioural process). The article also presents some of the findings phenomenological studies have led to and some theoretical reflexions encouraged by these insights.

Key words: experience, experiencing, phenomenology, phenomenological research, reason, first-person.

The article briefly describes the relatively young field of cognitive science dedicated to the research of lived human experience – the so-called phenomenological inquiry (or first-person research). It enumerates the reasons for the renewed interest in the study of experience and outlines the field’s relation to the rest of cognitive science. With the help of an example (phenomenology of thinking), the article attempts to illustrate the importance of systematic study of experience and addresses some open questions emerging from such an enterprise.

Key words: phenomenological inquiry, first-person perspective, experience, thoughts

The aim of the article is twofold. First, it aims to overview current empirical methods in the area of first-person research. Such a review cannot overlook epistemological and ontological issues, but must at the same time keep in mind methodological and almost technical nature of the problem. Empirical experience research is positioned within the frame of cognitive science and the overview of approaches and techniques of empirical phenomenology is presented, together with epistemological considerations. The second aim of the paper is concerned with the future of research in the discussed area. It suggests that in-depth, existentially liable introspection and self-inquiry should be considered as serious scientific research tools.

Key words: empirical phenomenology, first-person methods, cognitive science, mindfulness

The article is an attempt at – yet once again – finding a source of more fitting metaphor for the study of consciousness inside the framework of quantum mechanics. It starts by doubting into the possibility of the naturalization of research of experience. Proceeding from that it searches for a more adequate way to implement Varela’s idea about a balanced bridging the explanatory gap. By comparing certain positions of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanical phenomena with the properties of introspection, it tries to point out that there might exist better epistemic positions for understanding consciousness than the ones most frequently used today.

Open peer commentary on the article “Religion: A Radical-Constructivist Perspective” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: Quale argues that radical constructivism and religion are incompatible: a believer must necessarily be a realist, while radical constructivism, with its fundamental relativistic epistemology, can neither confirm nor deny religious beliefs. In the commentary, I first question Quale’s distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive knowledge, especially from the point of view of the discussion of religious beliefs. Later on, I follow his argumentation of the epistemic position associated with religious belief and point out that Quale’s conclusions could be extrapolated, presenting a basis for an interesting and relevant discussion about the split between the everyday and the constructivist epistemic positions.

Upshot: The response starts with a clarification of certain points that commentators found insufficiently articulated and then goes on to discuss some of the suggested solutions, all of which are seen as welcome improvements to the original proposal. The need for establishing a research environment acknowledging and nurturing the non-trivial character of experience is emphasised.

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Solomonova and Sha propose a research programme for the study of dreaming based on the theoretical framework of enactivism. This commentary intends to demonstrate several unclear points connected to the theoretical framework applied and the proposed methodological solutions. By considering the potential reach of various phenomenological approaches in the research of dreams, I intend to show that taking a more radical phenomenological position might further support the authors’ intention to de-pathologise the research of dreams and, even more importantly, might open up a significant new testing ground for the research of lived human experience.