Beyond the descriptions of ‘viability’ provided by Beer’s Viable System Model, Maturana’s autopoietic theory or Luhmann’s communication theory, questions remain as to what ‘viability’ means across different contexts. How is ‘viability’ affected by the Internet and the changing information environments in a knowledge-based economy? For Luhmann, social systems like businesses are coordination systems that do not ‘live’ as viable systems but operate because they relieve human beings from environmental complexity. We situate Beer’s concept of viability with Luhmann’s through analyzing the way that ‘decisions’ shape organizations in an information environment. Howard’s (1971) metagame analysis enables us to consider the ‘viable system’ as an ‘agent system’ producing utterances as moves in a discourse game within the context of its information environment. We discuss how this approach can lead to an accommodation between Beer’s practical orientation and Luhmann’s sociological critique where the relationship between viability, decision and information can be further explored.

Using second-order systems theory, the concept of ‘sustainability’ shifts from a normative starting point to a probabilistic expectation that is open to investigation. While first-order systems can be considered as observable translations of input into output, second-order systems theory adds the perspective of evolution to networks of first-order systems. Complex and dynamic systems are not instucted by incoming signals, but disturbed. They are able to adapt the cycles of their behaviour. Consequently, second-order delineations are not ‘given’ but are continuously reconstructed. These systems have no ‘natural’ delineations, and their ‘limits to growth’ remain a provisional hypothesis. The likelihood of the various progresions can be specified only in terms of a model. Among other things, changes betwen technological trajectories within the current regrime can be distinguished from the possible transition to a regime of sustainable technological development.

Purpose: In the tradition of Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form, observation was defined in Luhmann’s social systems theory as the designation of a distinction. In the sociological design, however, the designation specifies only a category for the observation. The distinction between observation and expectation enables the sociologist to appreciate the processing of meaning in social systems. Seeks to address this issue. Design/methodology/approach – The specification of “the observer” in the tradition of systems theory is analyzed in historical detail. Inconsistencies and differences in perspectives are explicated, and the specificity of human language is further specified. The processing of meaning in social systems adds another layer to the communication. Findings: Reflexivity about the different perspectives of participant observers and an external observer is fundamental to the sociological discourse. The ranges of possible observations from different perspectives can be considered as second‐order observations or, equivalently, as the specification of an uncertainty in the observations. This specification of an uncertainty provides an expectation. The expectation can be provided with (one or more) values by observations. The significance of observations can be tested when the expectations are properly specified. Originality/value – The expectations (second‐order observations) are structured and therefore systemic attributes to the discourse. However, the metaphor of a (meta‐)biological observer has disturbed the translation of social systems theory into sociological discourse. Different discourses specify other expectations about possible observations. By specifying second‐order observations as expectations, social systems theory and sociocybernetics can combine the constructivist with an empirical approach.

I elaborate on the tension between Luhmann’s social systems theory and Habermas’ theory of communicative action, and argue that this tension can be resolved by focusing on language as the interhuman medium of the communication that enables us to develop symbolically generalized media of communication such as truth, love, power, etc. Following Luhmann, the layers of self-organization among the differently codified subsystems of communication versus organization of meaning at contingent interfaces can be distinguished analytically as compatible yet empirically researchable alternatives to Habermas’ distinction between “system” and “lifeworld.” Mediation by a facilitator can then be considered as a special case of organizing historically contingent translations among the evolutionarily developing fluxes of intentions and expectations. Accordingly, I suggest modifying Giddens’ terminology to “a theory of the structuration of expectations.”

Although Luhmann formulated with modesty and precaution, for example in Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (1990: 412f.), that his theory claims to be universal because it is self-referential, the “operational closure” that follows from this assumption easily generates a problem for empirical research. Can a theory that considers society – and science as one of its subsystems – operationally closed nevertheless contribute to the project of Enlightenment that Popper (1945) so vigorously identified as the driver of an open society? How can a theory that proclaims itself to be circular and universal nevertheless claim to celebrate “the triumph of the Enlightenment” Luhmann, (1990: 548)? Is the lack of an empirical program of research building on Luhmann’s theory fortuitous or does it indicate that this theory should be considered as a philosophy rather than a heuristic for the explanation of operations in social systems?

Excerpt from the first paragraph: In response to the interesting comments of Kate Distin and Roger Harnden, let me focus on the relationship between the biological (and evolutionary) systems view and the socio-cultural perspective.

Open peer commentary on the article “Communication Emerging? On Simulating Structural Coupling in Multiple Contingency” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: In Füllsack’s paper, the communication network is considered as emergent. This raises the question of whether society is emerging or sui generis. This contribution discusses the latter (perhaps counter-intuitive) perspective and some analytical consequences.

Context: Using radical constructivism, society can be considered from the perspective of asking the question, “Who conceives of society?” In Luhmann’s social systems theory, this question itself is considered as a construct of the communication among reflexive agents. Problem: Structuration of expectations by codes operating in interhuman communications positions both communicators and communications in a multi-dimensional space in which their relations can be provided with meaning at the supra-individual level. The codes can be functionally different and symbolically generalized. Method: More than Luhmann, I focus on the hypothetical status of the communication of meaning and the uncertainty involved. Meaning can be communicated because of reflexivity in interhuman communications; meaning cannot be observed. Results: The communication (and reflexive translation) of denotations between semantic domains can generate “horizons of meaning” as reflexive orders that remain structurally coupled to individual minds. This elusive order contains a trade-off between “organization” at interfaces integrating (differently coded) expectations at each moment of time, and the potential of further differentiation among symbolically generalized codes of communication in a “self-organization” over time. Implications: One can model the coding in the communication of meaning as latent variables (eigenvectors) that evolve as an implication of the interacting intentions and expectations. The structure of expectations can be visualized (at each moment) and animated (over time) using semantic maps. The self-organizing horizons of meaning operate in a multidimensional space different from the network topology, and at another pace, since meaning is provided to events from the perspective of hindsight. Constructivist content: This perspective of the radical constructedness of social reality transforms the status of agency and organization in sociological theorizing from a source of change to a resource of communicative competencies and reflexive performativity.

Key words: Constructivism, sociology, Luhmann, supra-individual, self-organization, intentionality.

One can discard Luhmann’s contributions as flawed (e.g., Padgett & Powell, 2012, pp. 55–58) or discuss the limitations of the theory from a sociological perspective (e.g., Giddens, 1984, at p. xxxvi f.; Leydesdorff, 2010), but in my opinion, important steps were made by Luhmann in sociological theorizing when compared with his predecessors such as Parsons and Habermas, but also when compared with more empirically oriented contemporaries such as Merton and Giddens. These new developments were made possible by an interdisciplinary orientation in which Luhmann absorbed into his sociology, on the one side, Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis (self-organization) and, on the other, Husserl’s philosophy, and then provided a sociological reconstruction that can eventually be operationalized (Leydesdorff, 1996 and 2012). In my opinion, these new steps in terms of sociological theorizing were made mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas the emphasis shifted to a synthesis of this oeuvre in the 1990s (e.g., Luhmann, 1997) and to the more philosophical ambition of developing a general theory of observation (Baecker et al., [1992] 1999; Gumbrecht, 2003 and 2006; Leydesdorff, 2006).

Open peer commentary on the article “Social Autopoiesis?” by Hugo Urrestarazu. Upshot: The dynamics of expectations in inter-human communications can be modelled as “autopoiesis.” Consciousness and communications couple not only structurally (Maturana), but also penetrate each other reflexively (Luhmann. Reflexivity opens and enriches the model of autopoiesis for further exploration.