The article explores meditation-based examination of experience as a means for developing a contemplative, nonnaturalized, and existentially meaningful empirical research of consciousness in which the experiencing person is regarded as the primary investigator. As the first phase of a broader project, a group of seven researchers carried out a series of five meditation retreats. We sampled the ongoing experience of the researchers at the same random moments during meditation practice. The acquired data, consisting of more than 500 journal entries, interview transcripts, and participatory analysis records, set the ground for three lines of enquiry: (1) What, if any, kind of meditative practice is suitable for researching experience? How can it be cultivated? (2) Can a group of researchers skilled in meditation systematically investigate selected experiential phenomena? (3) What is the actual lived experience of a group of researchers engaged in a continuous meditation-based examination of experience? In this report, we primarily focus on the third question, offering a concrete ethnographic overview of our research enterprise. We conclude by relating our findings to the discussion of the phenomenological practice of the epoché as an empirical tool for the study of consciousness.

Abstract: Addressing the methodological issues raised by the commentators, I argue that the disagreement among them regarding the optimal method to gather phenomenal data (micro-phenomenology or descriptive experience sampling) points to the constructive nature of consciousness. Then, I discuss the idea of naturalistic cognitive science (i.e., cognitive science that is relatively free of laboratory constraints. I conclude that if we are to engage in naturalistic first-person research, we must embrace methodological pluralism in order to (a) contend with the constructive nature of consciousness; and (b) account for demand characteristics.

Context: In sciences of the mind, cognitive phenomena are typically investigated with the use of psychological tasks. These usually represent highly constrained environments that isolate and make phenomena under investigation measurable. However, it is poorly understood how psychological tasks constrain one’s cognition and, to a certain extent, construct their own object of inquiry. Problem: I address the question of how visual-spatial working memory is constrained differently in a naturalistic setting, as compared to when measured with psychological tasks. Specifically, can we observe principled and empirical support for the claim that psychological tasks to a certain extent construct the phenomena they purportedly measure? Method: I employ an empirical phenomenological approach that combines the methodological and analytical framework of constructivist grounded theory with contemporary approaches to the scientific study of experience, to gather phenomenal data on visual working memory in a naturalistic setting - a drawing task. Results: The drawing task elicits visual-spatial working memory as a type of visual-motor behavior with rare instances of mnemonic representations taking the form of language. Importantly, my empirical findings show that investigating cognitive phenomena in naturalistic settings yields constructs that are different from phenomena elicited in a laboratory setting. Implications: The findings suggest that investigating the mind solely with psychological tasks provides an incomplete picture of the phenomena under investigation. Constructivist content: I outline empirical data that points to how, under different constraints from the environment, not only do we conceptualize cognitive phenomena according to different theoretical constructs, but our cognitive system deploys different strategies to solve the task at hand. Keywords: Psychological task, visual-spatial working memory, empirical phenomenology, naturalistic task, drawing task.

Open peer commentary on the article “Assessing Subjective Processes and Vulnerability in Mindfulness-based Interventions: A Mixed methods Exploratory Study” by Sebastián Medeiros, Carla Crempien, Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati, Javiera Duarte, Catherine Andreu, Álvaro I. Langer, Miguel Ibaceta, Jaime R. Silva & Diego Cosmelli Sánchez. Abstract: Assuming that the only epistemically relevant experiential report is the one made in the present moment, it may be unclear how individuals ground their responses to stable-trait assessments. Recently, novel approaches (such as the phenomenological control) suggest that it is possible to construct stable phenomenological traits. Questions are raised as to whether there are first-person reports suggesting the nature of stable phenomenological traits in the context of mood disorders.

Open peer commentary on the article “Neurodialectics: A Proposal for Philosophy of Cognitive and Social Sciences” by Nicolas Zaslawski. Abstract: We offer an empirical reflection on certain assumptions maintained by neurodialectics as envisaged by Zaslawski, specifically, the possibility of continuity between first- and third-person accounts. Stemming from empirical analysis, we further question the attempts at excavation of concealed ontological principles underlying Varela’s work.