Author A. Oblak
Biography: Aleš Oblak is currently working on his master’s thesis within The Middle European Master’s Programme in Cognitive Science at the University of Ljubljana. His background is in linguistics, but now he is focusing on the phenomenology of memory, specifically on the experiential structure of mnemonic representations in working memory. His main interests are neurophenomenology, epistemology, philosophy of science, and research methodologies.
Kordes U., Oblak A., Smrdu M. & Demsar E. (2019) Ethnography of meditation: An account of pursuing meditative practice as a tool for researching consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 26(7–8): 184–237.
Kordes U., Oblak A., Smrdu M. & Demsar E.
(
2019)
Ethnography of meditation: An account of pursuing meditative practice as a tool for researching consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26(7–8): 184–237.
The article explores meditation-based examination of experience as a means for developing a contemplative, nonnaturalized, and existentially meaningful empirical research of consciousness in which the experiencing person is regarded as the primary investigator. As the first phase of a broader project, a group of seven researchers carried out a series of five meditation retreats. We sampled the ongoing experience of the researchers at the same random moments during meditation practice. The acquired data, consisting of more than 500 journal entries, interview transcripts, and participatory analysis records, set the ground for three lines of enquiry: (1) What, if any, kind of meditative practice is suitable for researching experience? How can it be cultivated? (2) Can a group of researchers skilled in meditation systematically investigate selected experiential phenomena? (3) What is the actual lived experience of a group of researchers engaged in a continuous meditation-based examination of experience? In this report, we primarily focus on the third question, offering a concrete ethnographic overview of our research enterprise. We conclude by relating our findings to the discussion of the phenomenological practice of the epoché as an empirical tool for the study of consciousness.
Oblak A. (2020) Author’s Response: Does Naturalistic First-Person Research Need Methodological Pluralism? Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 266–270. https://cepa.info/6607
Oblak A.
(
2020)
Author’s Response: Does Naturalistic First-Person Research Need Methodological Pluralism?
Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 266–270.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6607
Abstract: Addressing the methodological issues raised by the commentators, I argue that the disagreement among them regarding the optimal method to gather phenomenal data (micro-phenomenology or descriptive experience sampling) points to the constructive nature of consciousness. Then, I discuss the idea of naturalistic cognitive science (i.e., cognitive science that is relatively free of laboratory constraints. I conclude that if we are to engage in naturalistic first-person research, we must embrace methodological pluralism in order to (a) contend with the constructive nature of consciousness; and (b) account for demand characteristics.
Oblak A. (2020) Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting. Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 238–250. https://cepa.info/6600
Oblak A.
(
2020)
Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting.
Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 238–250.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6600
Context: In sciences of the mind, cognitive phenomena are typically investigated with the use of psychological tasks. These usually represent highly constrained environments that isolate and make phenomena under investigation measurable. However, it is poorly understood how psychological tasks constrain one’s cognition and, to a certain extent, construct their own object of inquiry. Problem: I address the question of how visual-spatial working memory is constrained differently in a naturalistic setting, as compared to when measured with psychological tasks. Specifically, can we observe principled and empirical support for the claim that psychological tasks to a certain extent construct the phenomena they purportedly measure? Method: I employ an empirical phenomenological approach that combines the methodological and analytical framework of constructivist grounded theory with contemporary approaches to the scientific study of experience, to gather phenomenal data on visual working memory in a naturalistic setting - a drawing task. Results: The drawing task elicits visual-spatial working memory as a type of visual-motor behavior with rare instances of mnemonic representations taking the form of language. Importantly, my empirical findings show that investigating cognitive phenomena in naturalistic settings yields constructs that are different from phenomena elicited in a laboratory setting. Implications: The findings suggest that investigating the mind solely with psychological tasks provides an incomplete picture of the phenomena under investigation. Constructivist content: I outline empirical data that points to how, under different constraints from the environment, not only do we conceptualize cognitive phenomena according to different theoretical constructs, but our cognitive system deploys different strategies to solve the task at hand. Keywords: Psychological task, visual-spatial working memory, empirical phenomenology, naturalistic task, drawing task.
Oblak A. (2021) Accusatives, Deixis, and Pointing Fingers. Constructivist Foundations 17(1): 020–022. https://cepa.info/7396
Oblak A.
(
2021)
Accusatives, Deixis, and Pointing Fingers.
Constructivist Foundations 17(1): 020–022.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7396
Open peer commentary on the article “Euphemisms vs. Dysphemisms, or How we Construct Good and Bad Language” by Andrey S. Druzhinin. Abstract: The paradigm of embodied cognition has productively addressed several problems in linguistics. Assuming that embodiment and experience constitute separate levels of description, it may be that Druzhinin’s notion of the experiential field challenges solutions to linguistic problems proposed by embodied cognition. I conclude by raising questions about how the relationship between values, lived experience, and choice of words can be integrated into the framework of the experiential field.
Oblak A. (2021) Participatory sense-making as consensual validation of phenomenal data. Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 19(4): 470–492. https://cepa.info/7633
Oblak A.
(
2021)
Participatory sense-making as consensual validation of phenomenal data.
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 19(4): 470–492.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7633
This article proposes a method for consensually validating phenomenal data. Such a method is necessary due to underreporting of explicit validation procedures in empirical phenomenological literature. The article argues that descriptive sciences – exemplified by phenomenology and natural history – rely on nominalization for construction of intersubjectively accessible knowledge. To this effect, epistemologies of phenomenology and natural history are compared. The two epistemological frameworks differ in terms of their attitudes towards the interpretation of texts and visual epistemology, however, they both rely on eidetic intuition of experts for knowledge construction. In developing the method of consensual validation, I started out with the prismatic approach, a method for researching embodied social dynamics. I then used debriefings on the experience of consensual validation to further refine the method. The article suggests that for a nominalization of experiential world to be intersubjectively accessible, such a vocabulary must be independently constructed by the entire group of co-researchers. I therefore propose that during consensual validation, co-researchers be presented with composite descriptions of experiential categories, compare them with their experience, attempt to falsify them, and finally jointly name them. This approach does not yield a single vocabulary for description of experience, but several commensurable vocabularies, contingent on a specific research setting.
Oblak A. (2021) The Hell of Being Who One Ordinarily Is: Is it Possible to Construct Stable Phenomenological Traits of Mood Disorders? Constructivist Foundations 16(2): 227–229. https://cepa.info/6962
Oblak A.
(
2021)
The Hell of Being Who One Ordinarily Is: Is it Possible to Construct Stable Phenomenological Traits of Mood Disorders?
Constructivist Foundations 16(2): 227–229.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6962
Open peer commentary on the article “Assessing Subjective Processes and Vulnerability in Mindfulness-based Interventions: A Mixed methods Exploratory Study” by Sebastián Medeiros, Carla Crempien, Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati, Javiera Duarte, Catherine Andreu, Álvaro I. Langer, Miguel Ibaceta, Jaime R. Silva & Diego Cosmelli Sánchez. Abstract: Assuming that the only epistemically relevant experiential report is the one made in the present moment, it may be unclear how individuals ground their responses to stable-trait assessments. Recently, novel approaches (such as the phenomenological control) suggest that it is possible to construct stable phenomenological traits. Questions are raised as to whether there are first-person reports suggesting the nature of stable phenomenological traits in the context of mood disorders.
Oblak A. (2022) For and Against Theory: Some Notes on Doing Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 17(2): 115–119. https://cepa.info/7771
Oblak A.
(
2022)
For and Against Theory: Some Notes on Doing Neurophenomenology.
Constructivist Foundations 17(2): 115–119.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7771
Open peer commentary on the article “Enacting the “Body” of Neurophenomenology: Off-Radar First-Person Methodologies in Pragmatics of Experiencing” by Jakub Petri & Artur Gromadzki. Abstract: I offer a critical reading of Petri and Gromadzki’s target article, suggesting that it constructs a strawman neurophenomenology. I argue that the article is an exemplar of an overabundance of publications that hyper-focus on conceptual questions about neurophenomenology, which ultimately serve to detract from conducting neurophenomenological studies. Rather than introducing novel first-person methods in the form of somatic practices, I suggest that formal theory construction might be a better route towards iterative improvement of neurophenomenology.
Oblak A. (2022) Steps Towards a Constructivist Psychiatry. Constructivist Foundations 17(2): 169–173. https://cepa.info/7787
Oblak A.
(
2022)
Steps Towards a Constructivist Psychiatry.
Constructivist Foundations 17(2): 169–173.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7787
Abstract: In Enactive Psychiatry, de Haan puts forward an enactive solution for the integration problem in psychiatry. I compare her enactive solution to constructivist approaches to psychopathology. I identify a blind spot in the proposed enactive framework for psychiatry and potential for future research in the role of extended cognition.
Oblak A. & Kordeš U. (2018) Neurophenomenology: Ontological Remedy for the Hard Problem? Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 59–61. https://cepa.info/5588
Oblak A. & Kordeš U.
(
2018)
Neurophenomenology: Ontological Remedy for the Hard Problem?
Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 59–61.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5588
Open peer commentary on the article “Neurodialectics: A Proposal for Philosophy of Cognitive and Social Sciences” by Nicolas Zaslawski. Abstract: We offer an empirical reflection on certain assumptions maintained by neurodialectics as envisaged by Zaslawski, specifically, the possibility of continuity between first- and third-person accounts. Stemming from empirical analysis, we further question the attempts at excavation of concealed ontological principles underlying Varela’s work.
Oblak A., Boyadzhieva A. & Bon J. (2021) Author’s Response: The Boundaries and Frontiers of Perceptual Presence. Constructivist Foundations 16(3): 322–326. https://cepa.info/7171
Oblak A., Boyadzhieva A. & Bon J.
(
2021)
Author’s Response: The Boundaries and Frontiers of Perceptual Presence.
Constructivist Foundations 16(3): 322–326.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7171
Abstract: In our response, we demonstrate how theoretical constructs of philosophical phenomenology do not correspond to findings from lived experience. We provide additional subjective reports illustrating the active nature of perceptual presence, and how this phenomenon can be considered a socially reinforced mastery of veridicality. Finally, we outline future directions for computational modelling.
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