Author F Ofner
Ofner F. (2008) Action and Discourse. Some Thoughts Concerning a Non-dualizing Conception of Experience. Constructivist Foundations 3(3): 148–152. https://cepa.info/92
Ofner F.
(
2008)
Action and Discourse. Some Thoughts Concerning a Non-dualizing Conception of Experience.
Constructivist Foundations 3(3): 148–152.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/92
Purpose: The paper aims at examining whether George Herbert Mead’s theory of language is an appropriate candidate for developing a non-dualistic conception of experience and empirical research. Problem: Josef Mitterer has limited his theory of a non-dualizing way of speaking to criticizing dualistic positions in philosophy and sciences but has not developed a non-dualistic conception of empirical research. To do this, the task is to forego the notion “description” as a remainder category of dualism to develop a new understanding of language. Findings: Mead’s communication and action theory contains a non-dualistic nucleus. His gesture theory of communication allows us to distinguish action and speech and connect them in a non-dualizing way. Further research should especially focus on the relation between immediate and reflective experience in Mead’s work.
Ofner F. (2013) Some Ideas towards a Non-dualism-Compatible Theory of Science. Constructivist Foundations 8(2): 166–172. https://cepa.info/858
Ofner F.
(
2013)
Some Ideas towards a Non-dualism-Compatible Theory of Science.
Constructivist Foundations 8(2): 166–172.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/858
Purpose: The paper tries to explore the possibility of developing a theory of science that is compatible with the non-dualizing way of speaking. Problem: The difficulty of developing a non-dualism-compatible theory of science consists in the difference of the perspectives of the theory of science and the non-dualizing way of speaking. The non-dualizing way of speaking deals with descriptions as results of inquiries, whereas science theory thematizes the process of gaining descriptions in empirical research. If we want to reach compatibility between these different perspectives, we are led to the question of what kind of relationship exists between inquiry and description and what is the source of attaining knowledge. In respect of social sciences, there is the additional problem that a great deal of their objects are text; therefore the relationship between text and interpretation is relevant for the empirical research process of social sciences. Findings: George Herbert Mead’s theory of action and communication allows a productive approach to the above-mentioned problem to be found. Mead conceives of speaking as potential acting, as action that is initiated but not carried out. In this way, describing and inquiring can be connected non-dualistically. The source of gaining knowledge and descriptions is, however, according to Mead’s action theory, practical activities. Objects are not presupposed, but are results from action. New experiences and descriptions come from inquiries that are stimulated by action problems and action inhibition and the endeavor to overcome the inhibition. Implications: The result of the argumentation is that Mead’s conception of action and language can serve to develop a theory of science that is compatible with non-dualizing thinking. The reason for this is that in Mead’s conception, acting and speaking, experiencing and describing are not conceived of as categorical differences but are related to each other as executed and initiated.
Ofner F. (2017) Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus, Relativismus und Konstruktivismus. [Considerations on theory of science beyond realism, relativism, and constructivism]. In: C. K. & K. K. S. M. J. N. (eds.) Realism – relativism – constructivism. Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg. De Gruyter, Berlin: 233–240.
Ofner F.
(
2017)
Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus, Relativismus und Konstruktivismus. [Considerations on theory of science beyond realism, relativism, and constructivism].
In: C. K. & K. K. S. M. J. N. (eds.) Realism – relativism – constructivism. Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg. De Gruyter, Berlin: 233–240.
My thoughts regarding the theory of science take up Josef Mitterer’s non-dualizing way of speaking according to which it is not justifiable to refer to language-different objects if there are diverging or contradictory research findings. The consequence of this is that – in contrast to realistic, constructivist, and relativistic positions – we cannot differentiate between true and false descriptions. In the view of science, the question arises as to what status objects have in the context of empirical research and how research activities and descriptions of research results are interrelated. In what follows I would like to present a proposal on how these questions can be answered in a non-dualistic way. In doing so, I rely on the pragmatist view of science as well as the action and communication theory of George Herbert Mead. I would like to show that it is possible to develop a conception which allows linking research as linguistic and non-linguistic activities in a non-dualistic way. This concept contains some realistic, constructivist and relativistic elements, but without the reference to true/false.
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