Embodied Choice considers action performance as a proper part of the decision making process rather than merely as a means to report the decision. The central statement of embodied choice is the existence of bidirectional influences between action and decisions. This implies that for a decision expressed by an action, the action dynamics and its constraints (e.g. current trajectory and kinematics) influence the decision making process. Here we use a perceptual decision making task to compare three types of model: a serial decision-then-action model, a parallel decision-and-action model, and an embodied choice model where the action feeds back into the decision making. The embodied model incorporates two key mechanisms that together are lacking in the other models: action preparation and commitment. First, action preparation strategies alleviate delays in enacting a choice but also modify decision termination. Second, action dynamics change the prospects and create a commitment effect to the initially preferred choice. Our results show that these two mechanisms make embodied choice models better suited to combine decision and action appropriately to achieve suitably fast and accurate responses, as usually required in ecologically valid situations. Moreover, embodied choice models with these mechanisms give a better account of trajectory tracking experiments during decision making. In conclusion, the embodied choice framework offers a combined theory of decision and action that gives a clear case that embodied phenomena such as the dynamics of actions can have a causal influence on central cognition.

Humans and other animals are able not only to coordinate their actions with their current sensorimotor state, but also to imagine, plan and act in view of the future, and to realize distal goals. In this paper we discuss whether or not their future-oriented conducts imply (future-oriented) representations. We illustrate the role played by anticipatory mechanisms in natural and artificial agents, and we propose a notion of representation that is grounded in the agent’s predictive capabilities. Therefore, we argue that the ability that characterizes and defines a true cognitive mind, as opposed to a merely adaptive system, is that of building representations of the non-existent, of what is not currently (yet) true or perceivable, of what is desired. A real mental activity begins when the organism is able to endogenously (i.e. not as the consequence of current perceptual stimuli) produce an internal representation of the world in order to select and guide its conduct goaldirected: the mind serves to coordinate with the future.

Key words: anticipation, expectation, internal model, prediction, representation, simulation, goal.

Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: One intriguing concept that the author introduces and uses throughout the paper is the idea of an “anticipatory drive,” which is described as explaining the systematic tendency to develop anticipatory capabilities that ultimately support goal-oriented action. Although the idea of a common mechanism that explains a multitude of capabilities can be appreciated, it is unclear if the author uses the term “drive” in a literal or metaphorical sense. Should the evolutionary advantage, the selective “pressure” for anticipatory capacities and representation be considered a drive in the sense of Hull like, for example, the sex drive, or hunger? If this is true, it should be related to some bodily control structure like the other mentioned drives. Another possibility is that the anticipatory drive is an intrinsic motivation, like curiosity, which “pushes” towards certain situations, such as those that are more predictable. If this is true, it should be explained what is the exact nature of such intrinsic motivation.