Excerpt: “Worldmaking,” Goodman tells us, “begins with one version and ends with another.” Is worldmaking, then, simply the making of versions, that is, descriptions, depictions or other representations, and are worlds to be construed just as versions? The answer does not lie on the surface. The term ‘world’ is nowhere defined in the book and an examination of the passages in which the term appears yields two conflicting interpretations: On the first, or versional, interpretation, a world is a true (or right) world-version and the pluralism defended simply reflects, and extends to versions generally, the Structure of Appearance doctrine that conflicting systematizations can be found for any prephilosophical subject matter. On the second, or objectual interpretation, a world is a realm of things (versions or non-versions) referred to or described by (119) a right world-version. Pluralistic talk of worlds is here not simply talk of conflicting versions; “multiple actual worlds” is Goodman’s watchword and he cautions us that it should not “be passed over as purely rhetorical.” (110)
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