Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky obtained a PhD in cognitive science from the Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, with a thesis on the relationship between body awareness and pain experience, integrating third-person (techniques from experimental psychology) and first-person (phenomenological approach based on interview techniques) methodologies. Valenzuela-Moguillansky is an associated researcher at the Center of Studies of Reasoning and Argumentation of the Universidad Diego Portales in Chile. Her research focuses on the sense of self and body awareness using methodologies from neuroscience, phenomenology and body practices. In addition she works on the development of micro-phenomenology, a discipline that deals with the methodological and epistemological challenges that the study of experience entails.
Petitmengin C., Remillieux A. & Valenzuela-Moguillansky C. (2019) Discovering the structures of lived experience: Towards a micro-phenomenological analysis method. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18: 691–730. https://cepa.info/6664
This paper describes a method for analyzing a corpus of descriptions collected through micro-phenomenological interviews. This analysis aims at identifying the structure of the singular experiences which have been described, and in particular their diachronic structure, while unfolding generic experiential structures through an iterative approach. After summarizing the principles of the micro-phenomenological interview, and then describing the process of preparation of the verbatim, the article presents on the one hand, the principles and conceptual devices of the analysis method and on the other hand several dimensions of the analysis process: the modes of structural unfolding of generic structures, the mutual guidance of the processes of structural and experiential unfolding, the tracking of analysis processes, and finally the assessment of analysis results.
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C. (2013) Pain and Body Awareness. An Exploration of the Bodily Experience of Persons Suffering from Fibromyalgia. Constructivist Foundations 8(3): 339-350. https://constructivist.info/8/3/339
Context: Despite the fact that pain and body awareness are by definition subjective experiences, most studies assessing these phenomena and the relationship between them have done so from a “third-person” perspective, meaning that they have used methods whose aim is to try to objectify the phenomena under study. Problem: This article assesses the question of what is the impact of a widespread chronic pain condition in the bodily experience of persons suffering from fibromyalgia. Method: I used an interview methodology stemming from a phenomenological approach called the “elicitation interview.” Results: The results indicate that the intensification of fibromyalgia pain does in fact affect different aspects of body awareness: in particular, experienced body size, weight and localization, as well as the experience of owning one’s own body. In addition, these disruptions in patient’s body awareness have as a result, a modification of the experience of pain, leading to the apparently paradoxical experience of being in pain while not feeling it. Implications: The elicitation interview approach made it possible to gather and analyze descriptions of the bodily experience of persons suffering from fibromyalgia. This approach allowed the consideration of the hypothesis that the disruption of implicit knowledge of the topography of patients’ bodies prevents them from referring to the pain sensation in terms of its localization and intensity, transforming the sensation in a way that is experienced as paradoxical. Further studies should be conducted that focus on the interplay between attention, pain and body perception. Constructivist content: The study presented in this article is framed within the perspective that the study of conscious phenomena should consider a first-person perspective, which is in line with constructivist approaches.
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C. (2014) Cognitive Science and Phenomenology: A Step Towards the Epistemic Ensō. Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 108–109. https://cepa.info/1176
Open peer commentary on the article “The Uroboros of Consciousness: Between the Naturalisation of Phenomenology and the Phenomenologisation of Nature” by Sebastjan Vörös. Upshot: This commentary highlights the contribution of “The Uroboros of Consciousness” to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences by replacing the question of how we want to make such integration. In a very pertinent manner, this article looks at the other side of a coin that until now has been turned to the requirements and criteria of validity of the naturalistic approach. This movement allows us to come back to the original intention of this dialogue and to ask ourselves what we can do to make it more satisfactory.
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C. & Demšar E. (2021) Toward a science of experience: Outlining some challenges and future directions. Adaptive Behavior Online first.
In recent decades, empirical study of experience has been installed as a relevant and necessary element in researching cognitive phenomena. However, its incorporation into cognitive science has been largely done by following an objectivist frame of reference, without reconsidering the practices and standards involved in the process of research and the interpretation and validation of the results. This has given rise to a number of issues that reveal inconsistencies in the understanding and treatment of some crucial aspects of first-person research. In this article, we will outline a research direction aiming at contributing to the establishment of a framework for the study of experience that addresses these inconsistencies. Specifically, we will identify some challenges facing the study of experience – in particular those linked to the understanding of memory, expression and description, and intersubjectivity in exploring experience – and propose to reframe them under the epistemological framework of the enactive approach. Moreover, we will explore the prospect of gaining insight into theoretical and methodological strategies for dealing with these issues by extending our vision beyond the field of cognitive science to its neighboring fields, focusing in particular on the field of somatic practices.
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C. & Vásquez-Rosati A. (2019) An Analysis Procedure for the Micro-Phenomenological Interview. Constructivist Foundations 14(2): 123–145. https://cepa.info/5759
Context: The advent of the embodied approach to cognition produced a paradigm shift giving experience a primary place in the different fields of inquiry. This gave rise to the need to develop methodologies for the study of experience from a first-person perspective. In this context, micro-phenomenology emerges as a methodological tool that allows the study of experience in a systematic and rigorous way. Problem: To reproduce and share the micro-phenomenological analysis - crucial for the intersubjective validation of micro-phenomenological research - it is relevant to have a procedure that allows us to trace the different steps of the analysis. As many of the stages of the micro-phenomenological analysis remain implicit, a step-by-step description has not yet been produced. We describe the procedure of analysis of the micro-phenomenological interview, step by step, thus complementing the micro-phenomenological analysis method. Method: In order to specify the analysis procedure, we used the micro-phenomenological interview to explore our experience of abstracting, developing the example of an analysis carried out in the context of a specific investigation. Results: We propose an analysis procedure organized in a concertina-shaped structure. It has fifteen stages organized into five sections. Each surface of the concertina corresponds to one stage of the analysis. We identified grouping as an abstraction operation that participates in the very early stages of the categorization process. This operation participates in the categorization mechanism we called “iterative interrogation.” Moreover, we propose that the refinement of the structures results from a process that involves recursively contrasting the description of the experience, the understanding we have gained from it throughout the analysis and the resulting structures. Implications: The proposed procedure allows the tracing not only of the different steps of the analysis, but also of the criteria used to solve the numerous issues that arise throughout it. The iterative interrogation mechanism makes it possible to reveal, in an orderly manner, the principles used by the analyst to establish the diachronic and synchronic units. This greatly facilitates the communication of a process that is highly implicit. We hope this procedure will contribute to the establishment of standards in micro-phenomenological research, facilitating the exchange between researchers and thus consolidating the intersubjective validation procedures that make it possible to evaluate the quality of neuro- and micro-phenomenological research.
Abstract: We discuss the epistemological background of micro-phenomenology, we clarify some aspects of the proposed procedure, and we expand our reflections on some of the challenges facing micro-phenomenology.
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C., Demšar E. & Riegler A. (2021) An Introduction to the Enactive Scientific Study of Experience. Constructivist Foundations 16(2): 133–140. https://cepa.info/6941
Context: The enactive approach to cognition affirms the relevance of the study of lived experience within cognitive science. Problem: Taking experience as the phenomenon of investigation, while at the same time recognizing it as a necessary medium of any scientific activity implies theoretical, epistemological, and methodological challenges that have to be addressed in order to undertake the scientific study of experience. At the same time, it calls for a development of an alternative, non-objectivist and non-representationalist framework for and by addressing those challenges. Method: After presenting the development of the idea of cognition as enaction and pointing to its consequences for the understanding of science, we situate the study of experience within the enactive approach, presenting neurophenomenology as the methodological implementation of the enactive framework that motivated the development of first-person methods. We distinguish the micro-phenomenological interview and descriptive experience sampling as examples of such methods, reviewing their distinctive features. Results: Understanding first-person research against the background of the enactive approach is shown to be crucial for bringing about the radical epistemological shift that an enactive position entails. Implications: The examination of the relationship between first-person research and enaction makes it possible to clarify the ground from which to address the specific challenges that arise in studying lived experience. Investigating these challenges is necessary for developing a coherent research program for the enactive scientific study of experience.
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C., O’Regan J. K. & Petitmengin C. (2013) Exploring the subjective experience of the “rubber hand” illusion. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7: 659. https://cepa.info/4444
Despite the fact that the rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that has been widely used in the last 14 years to investigate different aspects of the sense of bodily self, very few studies have sought to investigate the subjective nature of the experience that the RHI evokes. The present study investigates the phenomenology of the RHI through a specific elicitation method. More particularly, this study aims at assessing whether the conditions usually used as control in the RHI have an impact in the sense of body ownership and at determining whether there are different stages in the emergence of the illusion. The results indicate that far from being “all or nothing,” the illusion induced by the RHI protocol involves nuances in the type of perceptual changes that it creates. These perceptual changes affect not only the participants” perception of the rubber hand but also the perception of their real hand. In addition, perceptual effects may vary greatly between participants and, importantly, they evolve over time.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00659
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C., Vásquez-Rosati A. & Riegler A. (2017) Building a Science of Experience: Neurophenomenology and Related Disciplines. Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 131–138. https://cepa.info/4062
Context: More than 20 years ago Varela initiated a research program to advance in the scientific study of consciousness, neurophenomenology. Problem: Has Varela’s neurophenomenology, the solution to the “hard problem,” been successful? Which issues remain unresolved, and why? Method: This introduction sketches the progress that has been made since then and links it to the contributions to this special issue. Results: Instead of a unified research field, today we find a variety of different interpretations and implementations of neurophenomenology. We argue that neurophenomenology needs to give additional attention to its experiential dimension by addressing first-person methods’ specific challenges and by rethinking the relationship between the frameworks of the firstand third-person approaches.