Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that one can develop a form of realism that reflects rather than just accommodates the core principles of non-representationalist embodied cognitive science.

Key words: Embodied cognition, Enactivism, Mental representation, Realism

Open peer commentary on the article “From Problem Solving to Problem Posing, and from Strategies to Laying Down a Path in Solving: Taking Varela’s Ideas to Mathematics Education Research” by Jérôme Proulx & Jean-François Maheux. Upshot: I examine to what extend Varela’s remarks on problem-solving can be applied to mathematical problem-solving. I argue that despite similarities between Varela’s epistemological model and recent advances in mathematics education research on problem-solving, trying to fit ideas and concepts from the latter domain in the Varelian mold runs the risk of misconstruing fundamental aspects of mathematical problem-solving.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We examine whether there are any irreducible contradictions between ecological psychology and radical enactivism. We concentrate on two points of contention between the two approaches: the (ir)relevance of neural structures in understanding perception and the use of semantically loaded concepts in theorizing about perception.