Purpose: This paper is a brief introduction to enactive cognitive science: a description of some of the main research concerns; some examples of how such concerns have been realized in actual research; some of its research methods and proposed explanatory mechanisms and models; some of the potential as both a theoretical and applied science; and several of the major open research questions. Findings: Enactive cognitive science is an approach to the study of mind that seeks to explain how the structures and mechanisms of autonomous cognitive systems can arise and participate in the generation and maintenance of viable perceiver-dependent worlds – rather than more conventional cognitivist efforts, such as the attempt to explain cognition in terms of the “recovery” of (pre-given, timeless) features of The (objectively-existing and accessible) World. As such, enactive cognitive science is resonant with radical constructivism. Research implications: As with other scientific efforts conducted within a constructivist orientation, enactive cognitive science is broadly “conventional” in its scientific methodology. That is, there is a strong emphasis on testable hypotheses, empirical observation, supportable mechanisms and models, rigorous experimental methods, acceptable criteria of validation, and the like. Nonetheless, this approach to cognitive science does also raise a number of specific questions about the scope of amenable phenomena (e.g., meaning, consciousness, etc.) – and it also raises questions of whether such a perspective requires an expansion of what is typically considered within the purview of scientific method (e.g., the role of the observer/scientist).

Key words: cognition, radical constructivism, olfactory system, autonomy, umwelt, concepts, Francisco Varela

Purpose: This, the second part of a two-part paper, describes how the concerns of enactive cognitive science have been realized in actual research: methodological issues, proposed explanatory mechanisms and models, some of the potential as both a theoretical and applied science, and several of the major open research questions. Findings: Despite some skepticism about “mechanisms” in constructivist literature, enactive cognitive science attempts to develop cognitive formalisms and models. Such techniques as feedback loops, self-organization, autocatalytic networks, and dynamical systems modeling are used to develop alternatives to cognitivist models. A number of technical similarities are starting to emerge in the different models being proposed. Research Implications: The need to resolve the interplay between autonomy and coupling with the environment suggests the need for further technical research. And the reintroduction of first-person concerns into cognitive science raises some questions of method, particularly with regard to the relationship between first-person experience, neuroscience, and methods of description, analysis, and explanation. Results to date suggest that insights from enactive cognitive science could lead to innovations in the design of artifacts.

Key words: embodiment, mechanisms, dynamical systems modeling, purposive systems, autonomy, coupling, intersubjectivity, morphogenesis, neurophenomenology

Summary: wenty years ago, philosopher Evan Thompson’s aim is to “bring the experimental sciences of life and mind into a closer and more harmonious relationship with phenomenological investigations of experience and subjectivity.” He wants to “make headway on one of the outstanding philosophical and scientific problems of our time – the so-called explanatory gap between consciousness and nature. Exactly how are consciousness and subjective experience related to the brain and body?”… In conclusion, this is a rich, complex, and valuable book in the constructivist tradition of philosophy and science – and a book deserving of extended review and discussion.