Colombetti G. (2010) Enaction, sense-making and emotion. In: Stewart J., Gapenne O. & Di Paolo E. A. (eds.) Enaction: toward a new paradigm for cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 145–164. https://cepa.info/779
Colombetti G.
(
2010)
Enaction, sense-making and emotion.
In: Stewart J., Gapenne O. & Di Paolo E. A. (eds.) Enaction: toward a new paradigm for cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 145–164.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/779
The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e., of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive-emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. I show that this over-intellectualization goes hand in hand with the rejection of the idea that the body is a vehicle of meaning. I explain why I think that this over-intellectualization is problematic, and try to reconceptualize the notion of evaluation in emotion theory in a way that is consistent and continuous with the autopoietic notion of sense-making. Relevance: It links emotion theory and the enactive notion of sense-making.

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